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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Shared equity homeownership (SEH) is resale-restricted housing that provides 
affordable homeownership opportunities for lower income households. The innovative 
aspect of this model is that homes remain affordable in perpetuity for buyer after buyer. 
Unlike traditional affordable housing programs, SEH requires only an initial public 
investment to make a home affordable, and subsequently, resale restrictions ensure the 
home‘s affordability is maintained without additional subsidization. Hence, the public‘s 
investment in affordable housing is retained over time to help more lower income 
households. Additionally, many SEH programs steward both the homes and homeowners 
to ensure that properties are maintained over time as community assets and that residents 
successfully attain and sustain homeownership to increase their likelihood for building 
wealth.  
The three traditional forms of SEH include: limited equity housing cooperatives, 
community land trusts, and deed-restricted housing programs that are designed for lasting 
affordability. The various forms of SEH have been existence since the early-to-mid 
1900s, but expansion of SEH programs predominantly occurred within the last three 
decades.  The model has been gaining more attention from community development 
practitioners, researchers, and policy makers due to its expansion as well as the recent 
turmoil in the housing market and economy. While ample literature has conceptualized 
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and theorized why the model holds promise (e.g. Davis, 2006; Jacobus, 2007; Jacobus & 
Abromowitz, 2010; Jacobus & Davis, 2010; Saegert & Benitez, 2005), much remains 
unknown about SEH, including its current scope, its reception by potential beneficiaries, 
its outcomes for homeowners, its impact on neighborhoods, and its viability for growth. 
This dissertation attends to some of these gaps in the literature.  
The establishment of SEH programs within various localities requires that 
targeted beneficiaries actually perceive a need for this alternative form of tenure. In other 
words, mounting interest in the model by affordable housing providers or government 
officials is not adequate for SEH to be developed, as a market of interested buyers is 
necessary for the success of any SEH program. Affordable housing advocates and 
government officials in Nashville, TN (including myself) turned to the SEH model as a 
way to prevent the ongoing loss of affordable housing in the city. However, the housing 
market within Nashville—like many other places—is not as ―hot‖ or unaffordable as 
many cities with thriving SEH programs (e.g. San Francisco, New York City, 
Washington, D.C., Burlington, VT, Seattle WA). Consequently, advocates decided that a 
market study was necessary to comprehend the viability a SEH program in the 
municipality. 
The second chapter of the dissertation, Shared Equity Homeownership: A 
Welcomed Tenure Alternative among Low Income Households in Nashville, presents the 
findings of this study. Fourteen focus groups with 93 lower income individuals who 
represented the targeted market for Nashville‘s SEH program were conducted. These 
included individuals who were prospective homebuyers, current renters, and homeowners 
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delinquent on their mortgages. The focus groups explored participants‘ experiences and 
perceptions of renting and home owning in the conventional market. Next, a description 
of SEH was presented, and participants evaluated whether they were interested in SEH 
and what they perceived as benefits and deficits of SEH relative to existing tenure 
options.  
The study found that well over the majority of participants expressed a personal 
interest in SEH, supporting that this housing model may have viable markets of buyers in 
relatively affordable localities. Additionally, participants comprehended the model after a 
brief description and perceived numerous benefits of SEH relative to their existing 
housing options. However, they also had concerns about program implementation, which 
affected their interest in becoming an owner of a shared equity home. This study was 
conducted in 2009, and the results were used to inform the development of Nashville‘s 
SEH program. Notably, the program had its first home for sale in the summer of 2011. As 
of November 2012, the program completed development of 22 homes and had 19 newly-
minted homeowners.   
The third chapter of the dissertation sheds some light on the national performance 
of SEH programs. In the mid-2000s, SEH was gaining attention as an innovative housing 
solution that could combat the adverse consequences of hot housing markets on lower 
income households. In particular, permanently affordable homes addressed inaccessibility 
to homeownership due to rising housing values and resident displacement due to 
gentrification.  The few studies that evaluated the performance of SEH programs amidst 
warm and hot housing market conditions found impressive outcomes for lower income 
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homeowners (Davis & Stokes, 209, Tempkin, Theodos, & Price 2010). These studies 
found that the overwhelming majority of homeowners were entering into homeownership 
affordably, building wealth, and moving into market-rate homeownership when they sold 
their shared equity homes.  
With the onslaught of the foreclosure crisis in the latter part of the 2000s, it was 
unknown whether SEH programs would continue to show positive outcomes in spite of 
the systemic presses of the subprime lending boom and economic recession, which 
disproportionately affected lower income and minority households. The third chapter of 
the dissertation examines the performance of one form of SEH, community land trusts 
(CLTs), across the country during cold market conditions. Stable Homeownership in a 
Turbulent Economy: Delinquencies and Foreclosures Remain Low in Community Land 
Trusts presents 2010 data from a national survey of 96 CLTs. Sixty-two CLTs reported 
the delinquency and foreclosure outcomes of 3,143 owners of CLT homes. The outcomes 
of these lower income CLT owners were compared to rates of delinquencies and 
foreclosures among owners of all incomes in the conventional market, as reported by the 
Mortgage Bankers Association‘s National Delinquency Survey (MBA, 2011). At the end 
of 2010, owners in the conventional market were 10.0 times more likely to be in 
foreclosure proceedings (4.63% v. 046%) and 6.6 times more likely to be 90 days or 
more delinquent (8.57% v. 1.30%) than the owners of CLT homes. This chapter is the 
first empirical exploration of the performance of SEH programs during cold market 
conditions, and it reviews findings from the largest sample of SEH programs to date in 
the literature.  
5 
 
 
 
 
Together, these two studies empirically support local feasibility and strong 
national performance of SEH. Both studies echo the efficacy of the SEH model found 
within existing—albeit scant—literature (Davis & Stokes, 2008; Temkin, Theodos, & 
Price 2010). Nevertheless, the question remains that, if this model conceptually, 
theoretically, and empirically supports positive outcomes for lower income households 
and frugally invests public funds in affordable housing, then why does its prevalence 
remain relatively modest?  
The fourth chapter, Shared Equity Homeownership: Challenges and 
Recommendations for Sector Formation and Growth, takes up this question by critically 
contemplating the barriers to sector formation and unit growth. As a primary actor in the 
national field of SEH, I step back from my role as an advocate and practitioner to 
critically analyze the existing problems in the SEH landscape that pose obstacles to 
efficient sector formation and on-the-ground outcomes. The current problems include 
inadequate buy-in to the sector by practitioners, lack of commitment to the original name 
and definition of SEH among its conceivers, and a poor investment strategy by the 
dominant funder. I posit that practitioners, national leaders, and funders need to: 1) 
commit to a definition for the model and sector; 2) collectively devise and implement a 
strategic plan; and 3) redesign organizational roles, functions, and coordination in order 
to form an efficient sector that results in growth. I put forth recommendations that I hope 
will enable better outcomes for the future of the sector, local programs, and potential 
beneficiaries.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP:  
A WELCOMED TENURE ALTERNATIVE AMONG LOWER INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS IN NASHVILLE  
 
In spite of recent declines in housing values, residential costs continue to press the 
majority of U.S. households. Two-thirds of the nation‘s households have not realized 
gains in their incomes over the past decade, while 19.4 million households paid more 
than half of their income on housing in 2009, including 9.3 million owners. More 
recently, difficulties qualifying for mortgage loans have contributed to increased demand 
in the rental market, resulting in escalating rents (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 
JCHS, 2011).   
Meanwhile, disparities in homeownership rates by class and race persevere, and 
any advances in closing these gaps have receded during the foreclosure crisis. In 2009, 
the homeownership rates from lowest to highest income quartiles were 47.0%, 62.0%, 
75.5%, and 88.8% (Economic Policy Institute, 2011).  In 2011, 74.4% of whites were 
homeowners compared to only 45.4% of blacks or African Americans and 47.5% of 
Hispanics (www. infoplease.com; n.d.). Moreover, the foreclosure filing rate in 2010 was 
2.23%, greater than the rates posted in 2007, 2008, and 2009 (respectively 1.03%, 1.84%, 
and 2.21%). Research has established that both subprime lending and 
un(der)employment—dominant predictors of foreclosure—disproportionately affect low-
income and minority households (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2010; 
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Immergluck, 2009; Sum, Khatiwada, and Palma 2010). Above and beyond the greater 
prevalence of housing cost-burden, high-risk mortgages, and un(der)employment, these 
households are at greater risk for foreclosure due to financial vulnerability from divorce, 
illness, child care and transportation expenses (Elmer & Seelig, 1999; Haurin & 
Rosenthall, 2004, 2005; Reid, 2005; Vandell, 1995). Hence, class and racial disparities in 
homeownership are likely to grow (RealtyTrac, 2011).   
Long before the economic recession and deregulation of the lending industry, 
research supported that homeownership was tenuous and risky for many low-income and 
minority households. Reid (2005) conducted longitudinal analyses from 1976 to 1993 
using data from a nationally representative sample (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) 
and found that roughly 50% of first-time, low-income and minority homebuyers were no 
longer owners five years after purchase. This study illustrates the prevalence of early exit 
from homeownership for these households. In spite of the variation in results, additional 
research shows that homeowners of low-cost homes must generally sustain ownership for 
5-10 years in order to preclude financial losses from their investments (Belsky & Duda 
2002; Belsky, Retsinas, & Duda 2005; Goodman 1998). Ultimately, homeownership 
provided by the market in both hot and cold conditions has failed to deliver positive 
outcomes for a significant proportion of lower income and minority households.  
One rejoinder frequently recounted as the ―lesson learned‖ from the foreclosure 
crisis has been, ―Homeownership is just not for everyone.‖  However, some housing 
activists and researchers reject this claim and alternatively posit that homeownership 
needs to be done differently for lower income and minority households (e.g. 
Abromowitz, 2010). Shared Equity Homeownership (SEH) is increasingly referenced in 
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academic articles (e.g. DeFilippis & Fraser, 2010; Hackworth, 2007; Immergluck, 2009; 
Manning, 2009; Shlay, 2006) and policy-focused reports (e.g. Davis, 2006; Flint, 2008; 
Jacobus, 2007; Jacobus & Abromowitz, 2010) as one way to better deliver the benefits of 
homeownership and lessen the associated risks. While the model is theoretically and 
empirically gaining ground as a viable tenure alternative, little is known about the 
perceived viability and reception of SEH by its potential beneficiaries, namely lower 
income households. This paper attends to this gap.  
Shared Equity Homeownership 
Shared equity homeownership (SEH) is a form of resale-restricted, owner-
occupied housing that remains affordable in perpetuity, where a non-profit or government 
organization stewards homeowners and homes. In order to promote successful 
homeownership, the steward typically: 1) provides pre- and post-purchase education; 2) 
approves or rejects first mortgages, refinance loans, or home equity lines of credit; 3) 
offers assistance for major home repairs or improvements; 4) intervenes with delinquent 
homeowners and their first mortgage lenders to prevent foreclosure; and 5) monitors 
homeowner compliance with use, occupancy, maintenance, and resale restrictions. In 
order to keep the homes affordable for future generations of lower income buyers, owners 
of shared equity homes agree to resale-restrictions that limit the returns they realize at 
resale so that the home may be resold over time at an affordable purchase price to another 
lower income household.  
Various models of SEH use different contractual mechanisms to preserve 
affordability. In community land trusts, the steward owns the land on which a home sits, 
and the buyer purchases the improvements and signs a ground lease. In long-term deed-
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restricted programs, the steward subsidizes the purchase price of the home in order to 
lessen the buyer‘s mortgage loan, and the owner signs a deed-restricted covenant. In 
limited equity cooperatives, the buyer purchases a share to be a partial owner of the 
cooperative and signs a shareholder agreement. At the outset, a public investment is 
required to subsidize the affordable unit, but the model sustains the public‘s investment to 
maintain affordability for subsequent owners. SEH starkly contrasts the more common 
delivery methods for affordable homeownership, which are typically forgivable loans or 
short-term resale restrictions that stipulate eligible incomes of the owning household 
(both of which create a windfall for the initial buyer and lose the public‘s investment in 
affordable housing).   
The few studies that have evaluated SEH report compelling results (Temkin, 
Theodos, & Price, 2010; Davis & Stokes, 2009; Thaden, 2010, 2011). Studies support 
that the rates of serious delinquencies and foreclosures for low-to-moderate income 
homeowners in community land trusts are significantly lower than for owners across all 
incomes in the conventional homeownership market regardless of loan type (Thaden, 
2010; 2011). The most recent study gathered data from 96 community land trusts 
representing 3,143 owners and compared results to loan performance data reported by the 
Mortgage Bankers Association‘s National Delinquency Study at the end of 2010. 
Homeowners in the conventional market were 10 times more likely to be in foreclosure 
proceedings than community land trust homeowners (4.63% v. 0.46%) and 6.6 times 
more likely to be 90 days or more delinquent (8.57% v. 1.30%).  
Another study of seven SEH programs across the U.S. found that homes sold and 
resold for 25-50% lower than the home‘s appraised value, households earning between 
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35-86% of the area median income (AMI) could affordably purchase the homes, and the 
homes remained affordable to households with the same income levels across resales 
(Temkin, Theodos, & Price, 2010). The authors additionally found that over 90% of 
residents remained homeowners five years after purchase, increasing the likelihood for 
financial returns at resale. Additionally, the median individual rate of returns realized by 
homeowners ranged from 6.5 to 59.6%. In all but one limited equity cooperative 
program, sellers realized greater returns than if they had rented and invested their down 
payments in either the stock market or a 10-year Treasury bond. When residents did 
move, 68-78% (depending upon the program) moved into market-rate, owner-occupied 
homes.   
Consequently, research supports that SEH not only helps lower income 
households enter homeownership but to sustain homeownership and build wealth. Hence, 
the model has been theorized as a form of tenure that promotes community stabilization 
by limiting the impact of ―foreclosure contagion‖ in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods (Thaden, 2009). Due to the model‘s ongoing affordability provision, SEH 
has also been identified as a tool that buffers the adverse effects of gentrification (Davis, 
2010).  Ideologically, SEH emphasizes community investment and control of property 
through collective ownership between a steward and household who is traditionally 
marginalized by the market. The model minimizes the speculative component of financial 
property investment by maintaining the property use for affordable homeownership and 
curtailing financial windfalls for owners (while also enabling adequate wealth 
accumulation). Additionally, the model values the beneficial ―externalities‖ of 
homeownership for households and communities, or in arguably better words, the 
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psychosocial and community-based outcomes that may be realized from factors such as 
residential stability, housing quality, location, and tenure control (see Herbert & Belsky, 
2008). 
The Market Challenge  
SEH‘s ideological foundation subverts, or at least counters, the notions of 
homeownership that have been reified by neoliberal capitalism (DeFilippis, 2004). 
Individualism, personal responsibility, and self-sufficient boot-strapping are engrained in 
the conceptual fabric of property rights and the right to property, ultimately, creating a 
strong ―American‖ narrative for what is deemed the way to own and prosper from one‘s 
homestead (Shlay, 2006). However, this narrative obscures how the ebbs and flows of 
market capital investment prescribe the places and people who realize wealth-building 
from speculative property investment as well as the psychosocial benefits associated with 
homeownership (DeFilippis, 2001; Herbery & Belsky, 2008). Hence, this narrative may 
be difficult to counteract in spite of evidence that the market‘s provision of 
homeownership delivers differential risks and returns for households and neighborhoods 
by class and race. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 9 out of 10 Americans continue to report the 
desire to become homeowners and consider homeownership a critical part of the 
American Dream (Streitfeld & Thee-Brenan, 2011).  
However Americans, or more specifically low-income and minority households, 
are not irrational for wanting to own a home. In fact, the risks that come with entering the 
homeownership market are well justified for these households. First, no other investment 
is able to be leveraged more than property (Herbert & Belsky, 2008). Second, 
homeownership not only acts as an financial investment but also as a consumption good, 
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meaning that a lower income household would still have to pay rent, which lessens the 
amount available for alternative investments (Brueckner, 1997; Belsky, Retsinas, & 
Duda, 2005). Third, owning may provide economic, psychosocial, and community-based 
benefits, which may change the intergenerational trajectory of low-income and minority 
families (Boehm & Scholttmann, 1999; Davis, 1991; Harkness & Newman, 2003). 
Fourth, homeowners do not face the same problems as renters, such as absentee 
landlords, negligent property management, escalating rents, or lease terminations. 
Therefore, the issue is not whether conventional homeownership can benefit low-income 
and minority households or whether homeownership is for ―everyone.‖ Instead, the 
problem is the high risks that lower income and minority households have to assume in 
order to potentially realize material and non-material returns from homeownership 
provided by the market.   
Seemingly SEH can provide a solution. However, the viability of any alternative 
relies on its reception by those who may benefit. Too often interventions are rolled out 
without practical evaluations of their reception and value from the perspective of the 
supposed beneficiaries. If the story of homeownership within the American Dream has 
come to be disbelieved by those marginalized by the market‘s patterns of risk and returns, 
then the transformative potential of SEH for low-income and minority households and 
communities is more likely to come to fruition.  In other words, for SEH to gain actual 
ground beyond its theoretical feasibility, its targeted audiences must: 1) maintain 
pragmatic critiques of their ―actual‖ versus ―ought‖ tenure experiences, and 2) have 
desire for a tenure alternative that delivers a modified version of the American Dream—
one that does not equate success with ―going it alone‖ or pursuing the maximum level of 
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financial returns. Although SEH requires more than the desires of its potential inhabitants 
for implementation, it is difficult to imagine that the political and institutional will to 
create SEH will be fostered without the cultural and social will of those who could 
inhabit this alternative form of tenure. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to 
explore how lower income households perceive and evaluate SEH relative to market 
options for renting and owning.  
This study takes place in Nashville, Tennessee, which is a growing, mid-sized 
southern city that has a relatively affordable housing stock as compared to larger northern 
cities. Based upon the sizes and waiting lists of SEH programs in places with traditionally 
―hot‖ housing markets like New York City, San Francisco, or Burlington, Vermont, SEH 
appears to serve a need of local lower income households. In these markets, SEH 
programs provide one of the only ways for these households to become homeowners.  
This study considers whether SEH is perceived as serving a need of lower income 
households in localities where the homeownership market is more widely accessible. The 
focus groups with potential beneficiaries of SEH took place at a time when 
homeownership was becoming a dirtier word; the foreclosure crisis was revving up and 
awareness had grown that sustaining homeownership was proving to be as challenging as 
entering homeownership. Hence, this study also captures more recent evaluations of 
renting and owning in the market by lower income individuals and their desires for an 
alternative.  
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Methods 
Focus groups were conducted during 2009 as part of a larger action research 
project supporting an initiative to develop a SEH program in Nashville, TN. The 
initiative‘s Steering Committee—comprised of non-profit, government, lending, and 
academic representatives—had identified their targeted market for the SEH program. 
These included renters, prospective buyers, and homeowners finding it difficult to 
maintain their monthly housing payments all with annual household incomes between 30 
and 100% of the AMI ($19,450-$64,900 in 2009). However, the committee prioritized 
serving households making between 50 to 80% of the AMI ($32,450-$51,900 in 2009). 
During 2009, the median single-family sales price in Nashville was $153,000 (Greater 
Nashville Association of Realtors, n.d.).  Defaulters were considered a potential market 
for a SEH program, as the Steering Committee thought the program could be uniquely 
designed to keep people threatened by foreclosure in their homes or offer individuals who 
have experienced foreclosure another chance at homeownership. However, the Steering 
Committee was concerned whether any or all of these targeted populations would 
perceive the benefits of SEH relative to renting or conventional homeownership and have 
a genuine interest in pursuing homeownership through this alternative.  
Consequently, researchers agreed to conduct focus groups with these targeted 
groups to inform the development of the program. The results were originally presented 
in a public report (Thaden, Greer, & Saegert, 2010) to inform the program‘s 
development. This paper presents a secondary analysis of the data, which explores: 1) 
What matters to participants about their tenure? What are their tenure goals?; 2) How do 
they evaluate pre-existing tenure options (i.e. renting and owning) on delivering what 
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matters?; and 3) What are their perceptions of, reception to, and evaluations of SEH 
versus renting or conventional homeownership? 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 93 individuals in 14 focus groups: four groups of renters 
(n =31), four groups of prospective homebuyers (n=30), and six groups of homeowners in 
default or foreclosure proceedings, which included a handful of participants who had 
completed foreclosure (n = 32). The range of participants in any focus group was 2-10 
(median = 7).  The recruitment plan was based upon the Steering Committee‘s target 
market for SEH and the sites of recruitment that members reported as most suitable for 
finding potential SEH buyers. 
Because the original intent of this research was to make comparison across group 
types (renters, buyers, defaulters) by their reported interest in SEH, a purposive sampling 
strategy was utilized to ensure that approximately the same number of focus groups and 
subsample sizes were acquired for each type. However, convenience sampling strategies 
were also used to gain access to potential study participants through collaborating 
organizations or word-of-mouth, which resulted in eight different sources for recruitment. 
(All were located in Nashville proper except one organization used to recruit some 
defaulters, which was in a low-to-moderate income sprawling suburb that reported the 
majority of their clients lived in Nashville.) Five non-profit housing counseling agencies 
were used to recruit perspective homebuyers and defaulters who were either participating 
in homebuyer preparation or education classes or loss mitigation counseling. Renters 
included residents of a non-profit counseling agency‘s rental properties, the employees of 
a large social service organization, members of a voluntary sports organization, and 
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residents from one gentrifying low-to-moderate income neighborhood.  Table 1 presents 
the characteristics of participants by type of focus group.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of participants by focus group type. 
 
Characteristi
cs 
Renters (n=31) Homebuyers (n = 30) Defaulters (n =32) 
 Missing Range Median Mean Missing Range Median Mean Missing Range Median Mean 
Age 0 23-81 29 39.5 0 22-71 32.5 34.7 0 24-67 48 46.2 
Individual 
Income1 
4 $7,884-64,000 $28,000 $26,746 2 $5,000-49,500 $21,750 $25,450 4 $0-60,000 $29,500 $28,431 
Monthly 
Housing Cost2 
3 $100-1,000 $374 $404 6 $305-1,300 $651 $658 4 $280-1,985 $850 $885 
 Missing % Missing % Missing % 
Female 0 77.4% 0 86.7% 0 75.0% 
Married 0 6.5% 0 16.7% 0 37.5% 
Has minor in 
home 
0 12.9% 0 76.7% 0 50.0% 
White 0 58.1% 0 13.3% 0 31.3% 
Completed 
H.S./GED 
1 93.5% 0 96.7% 1 84.4% 
Completed 
B.A./B.S.  
1 48.4% 0 23.3% 1 25% 
1 
Individual income represents the response to the question ―How much did you make last year?‖, which is less than the household‘s annual income. 
2 
Monthly Housing Cost represents either the mortgage payment or the rent that an individual is paying monthly.  
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Data Collection 
 Focus groups were conducted between February 23
rd 
and July 16
th
, 2009 by two 
researchers (Thaden & Greer). One researcher was female and both were young and 
white. They facilitated focus groups together, where one acted as the facilitator and the 
other acted as the observer to take field notes on group dynamics, including the 
participants‘ body language, reactions to the facilitator, and the facilitator‘s conduct and 
protocol compliance. Each focus group lasted approximately 1.5 hours and took place at 
the organization that recruited participants. Participants were given a $15 gift card to a 
grocery store. After each focus group, the researchers held a peer debriefing session and 
took additional notes on the experience and their interpretations. All focus groups were 
fully transcribed from audio recordings by the researchers, incorporating notes from the 
peer debriefing sessions and the observer‘s field notes.  
Focus groups, rather than interviews, were used as people may be more candid 
and forthright during dialogue with people who share common experiences (rather than 
simply answering the questions posed by an interviewer). Further, the dialogic process 
may enable different opinions and elicit alternative perspectives; however, facilitators 
must attend to the group dynamics to prevent ―group think‖ or domination of particular 
actors (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Hughes & Dumont, 1993). To promote participation of 
all members and the elicitation of diverse perspectives, the facilitator initially asked 
individuals to share their names and background information on their current housing to 
create a climate for sharing. As discussions continued the facilitator would seek out 
alternative perspectives by asking questions like, ―Do others think about this differently?‖ 
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and responding to participants‘ facial expressions or body language. For participants who 
were quieter, the facilitator would directly ask questions.   
The focus group questions were designed as a semi-structured protocol based 
upon the primary study questions (see above), where the facilitators used a set of 
predetermined questions for all groups (to allow for standardized comparisons across 
focus groups and group type) and then a subset of questions designed by group type (to 
ensure that the unique experiences of each group were adequately explored). Also, 
facilitators deviated from the list of questions to collect supplemental information as 
points or topics naturally arose during conversation.  
During the first half of each focus group, the facilitator asked questions about 
renting and owning in Nashville to understand their experiences, evaluations, and 
perceptions of each. These included, ―What do you think people get from owning their 
home?‖, ―Why do you want to continue renting or not want to continue renting?‖, ―What 
are challenges that homeowners can have? Are you worried about facing these challenges 
if you become a homeowner? Why or why not?‖ (These questions were slightly modified 
for homeowners experiencing default). During the second half of the focus group, the 
facilitator introduced the concept of SEH using a 4-5 minute script (see Appendix A) that 
briefly explained why affordable housing stakeholders in Nashville were considering the 
development of a SEH program, what SEH is, and how it works (including its resale-
restrictions and stewardship services). The script was designed to enable comprehension 
of SEH by participants with limited financial literacy, especially the critical components 
of affordability and limited returns from appreciation at resale. Then, the facilitator asked 
the group about their initial impressions, benefits and costs they perceived, concerns they 
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would have, their level of interest, and their evaluations of SEH relative to renting and 
owning. At this point in the focus groups, the facilitator answered participants‘ questions 
about SEH by providing additional information on typical policies and practices used by 
established SEH programs.  
Data Analysis 
An exploratory secondary data analysis of the focus group transcripts was 
conducted using traditional qualitative analysis methods delineated by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998). An inductive thematic analysis coded the data to identify categories, properties, 
and dimensions that respond to the primary research questions. ―Categories‖ capture the 
key concepts of phenomenon (i.e. factors or themes), ―properties‖ delineate the 
characteristics and meaning of categories (i.e. perceptions and evaluations), and 
―dimensions‖ specify the prevalence, range, and variations of categories and their 
properties (i.e. level of interest and diversity of responses).  Inherent in Strauss and 
Corbin‘s qualitative analysis technique is the use of constant comparison and theoretical 
comparison throughout the process of analysis; hence, all analyses systematically 
preserved and compared characteristics of each focus group and its type (renters, 
homebuyers, defaulters) to ensure that findings rendered group differences. The NVivo 
software program was used for analyses, which enabled coding data into emerging 
categories, creating memos to identify properties and dimensions, and assigning group 
type for comparative analysis.  
The first stage of analysis open coded the first half of all the transcripts (until the 
SEH section) for emerging themes capturing the factors that participants noted as ―what 
matters‖ and their ―goals‖ for their tenure to create categories (Question 1). Next, these 
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factors were used as the organizational structure for the second round of analysis, 
whereby the data were axially coded for explanations of whether existing tenure options 
have delivered or could deliver ―what matters‖ (Question 2).  ―Axial coding‖ is ―the 
process of relating categories…linking categories at the level of properties and 
dimensions‖ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 123). Memos were written and coded during 
this process of analysis to facilitate the development of dimensions under each category 
and to identify the way the categories relate for theory building. This process was 
repeated to analyze and organize the data on SEH, which captured how participants 
conceptualized SEH, themes they identified in terms of costs and benefits, and their 
evaluations, considerations, and interest in SEH. Comparative analysis examined the 
emerging themes and evaluations of SEH relative to renting and owning across 
participants‘ responses in addition to comparative analysis that examines systematic 
differences across focus group type.  
The dialogical process inherent to focus groups does not yield individual response 
data by each question posed to the group. Consequently, frequency counts of themes or 
perceptions by individuals could not be measured; therefore, qualitative data was 
supplemented by documenting whether each participant expressed an interest in SEH. For 
defaulters, frequency counts also measured the number of individuals who endorsed: 1. 
―If you could not keep your home, would you consider SEH in the future?‖, 2. ―If you 
could refinance your home into SEH so you would be able to stay in your home, would 
you consider it?‖, and 3.‖Looking back, do you think SEH would have been a good 
option instead of buying your current home?‖ To check reliability for coding participants‘ 
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endorsements of SEH, two researchers separately conducted frequency counts; coders 
had 100% agreement on participants‘ responses.  
 Building upon the work of Lincoln and Guba (1985), Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, 
and Allen‘s (1993) delineate ―trustworthiness‖ criteria for naturalistic inquiry, which 
includes techniques used to evaluate credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
conformability of qualitative research designs and findings. Data collection and analysis 
incorporated the following techniques: triangulation of researcher, peer debriefing, 
aspects of purposive sampling, thick description, and reflexive journaling. Furthermore, 
the findings presented in the original public report were reviewed by the Steering 
Committee (which includes staff from the organizations where participants were 
recruited), which provided a process similar to ―member checking.‖  
Using two individuals to conduct focus groups helps to keep researchers ―honest‖ 
and increases confidence in the findings when similar observations and interpretations are 
made (Erlandson et al., 1993). As previously mentioned, peer debriefing between the two 
researchers was conducted during data collection. However, additional peer debriefing 
was conducted during analysis and reporting. The primary author (Thaden) asked the 
second researcher and a professor, who had read the focus group transcripts, to review 
preliminary findings and the final report in order to challenge the author‘s conclusions 
and suggest alternative interpretations, which improved the credibility of the findings 
(Erlandson et al., 1993).  
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Results 
This section presents the goals and hopes that informants had for their tenure (i.e. 
―what matters‖), and how existing tenure options (renting or conventional 
homeownership) were evaluated on delivering what mattered. Next, this section presents 
participants‘ perceptions of SEH relative to existing tenure options, the level of interest 
that informants expressed in this alternative form of tenure, and their perceived benefits 
or concerns with SEH.  
What Matters in Tenure 
 
Open thematic coding of focus group data revealed eight factors that participants 
sought from tenure (i.e. ―what mattered‖). These were: 1) sense of satisfaction and 
accomplishment, 2) sense of control, 3) agency and action, 4) human development, 5) 
residential stability, 6) access to neighborhood assets, 7) community engagement, and 8) 
financial investment. This section is organized by individual and household factors 
(factors 1-4) and community and economic factors (factors 5-8) to present participants‘ 
evaluations of renting and owning and explore whether and how existing housing options 
were or could deliver what they sought from tenure. However, these factors were not 
articulated by participants as independent or unrelated hopes. Rather, the results illustrate 
that the factors were perceived as inter-related and mutually reinforcing, reflecting 
ecological and transactional theories on the benefits of homeownership across household, 
community, and economic outcomes (Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy, 2002; Saegert 
and Evans, 2003). While informants‘ perceptions and interpretations of renting and 
conventional homeownership were predominantly consistent across all group types, 
differing and minority perspectives are also presented.  
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Individual and household factors. Informants articulated that a dominant goal 
they sought from their tenure was the promotion of life satisfaction and human 
development for themselves, their household members, and particularly their children. If 
conventional homeownership could be attained and comfortably maintained, they 
believed that it was more likely to facilitate human development than renting. 
Participants described that, unlike renting, they perceived that homeownership fostered a 
sense of purpose, accomplishment, and control, which consequently, would enable them 
to use their agency and take action to create a ―home‖ that fosters positive outcomes for 
those who reside there.  
 The relative evaluation of renting versus owning that was repeatedly expressed by 
focus group members is best captured by the following statement, ―Renting feels so 
ridiculous. I am paying money that is going to somebody else‘s pocket. Homeownership 
is a sense of accomplishment. Knowing that something is really yours and you‘re 
working to take care of it and maintain it.‖ Informants explained that they did not 
experience a sense of purpose or accomplishment from renting, as it was ―throwing your 
money away.‖ This sentiment was reinforced by not feeling control over one‘s home or 
stability in one‘s financial situation. As one homebuyer explained, ―Renting I find people 
in my home for repairs and inspections. I have to argue for repairs. Rent can just go up. 
You don‘t got privacy, and you don‘t have control over your place or your neighbors.‖  
Conversely, informants explained that purpose, accomplishment, control, and 
stability were perceived as a part of the homeownership experience, ―Other things in your 
life may be chaotic but having a home base means that you‘re gonna be okay. It has to be 
more psychologically fulfilling to pay a mortgage than rent every month.‖ Numerous 
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participants mentioned that owning a home made work more fulfilling, as their salaries 
were or would be supporting an investment that benefits their household. Similar to these 
perceived benefits articulated by participants, life satisfaction and self-esteem from 
homeownership have been empirically supported as realized outcomes among low-
income homeowners (Rohe & Basolo, 1997; Rohe and Stegman, 1994a).  
With the sense of accomplishment and control expected from owning, renters and 
homebuyers anticipated an eagerness and desire to shape their homestead. Empirical 
studies have also supported increased self-efficacy among homeowners (Galster, 1987; 
Saunders, 1990). As one homebuyer stated, ―You can look at your home as a blank slate 
and think I can do anything I want with this. That is a freedom that I have not yet 
experienced.‖ Consequently, many informants expected that homeownership would result 
in taking different, desired action in one‘s life. One homebuyer stated, ―In renting I am 
not going to paint or plant like my neighbors who own. But if it‘s yours, you‘re going to 
fix it up. I‘d be planting out there because it‘s mine,‖ and a renter stated, ―Having a home 
and family motivates you to change.‖  
 Acting differently in one‘s residence or life due to ownership was motivated by 
human development goals: ―In this country we are raised by our parents to go to school—
maybe not to college—but find a job that you can support yourself and buy a home to 
raise your family.‖ Many participants equated homeownership with a better way to raise 
a family and promote their children‘s development. For instance, one single mother 
explained her considerations as she was looking at homes for sale, ―If you buy a home 
you‘re thinking is this home and this place good for my child? Because her quality of 
living is going to make her whole—who and how she is.‖ The majority of participants 
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expressed that they believed owning a home would enable better outcomes for their 
children, including providing a space or room that a child would feel belonged to him or 
her, a stable homestead that would allow them to attend the same school and maintain 
their peer group, and family wealth that could be used to advance their education (for 
research supporting the respondents‘ expectations of positive outcomes resulting from 
homeownership and residential stability on children, see Boehm & Schlottmann, 1999; 
2002; Harkness & Newman, 2002; 2003).   
Human development goals were nuanced by the life stages of informants. 
Younger participants without children explained that owning a home would enable them 
to start building assets for their future family or professional plans. Participants with 
children described how owning a home created a stable place for their children to call 
home and focus on their education. Older informants emphasized that owning a home 
would provide an asset or wealth that would be passed down to their children. Changing 
the intergenerational trajectories of one‘s family has been documented within the 
literature as a critical reason for entering homeownership (Boehm & Schlottmann, 2002; 
Saegert & Evans, 2003).  
  The dominant perspective across all groups was that owning was better than 
renting, and defaulters agreed with this statement but provided many caveats. Defaulters 
explained how homeownership—if unaffordable or under poor loan terms—could hinder 
rather than enable hopes for well-being and human development. Notably, renters and 
homebuyers also expressed these concerns as the foreclosure crisis was gaining 
momentum at the time of the focus groups. Defaulters explained that ―failing‖ at 
homeownership delivered the opposite of hoped-for outcomes. Rather than feeling 
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accomplished, they reported feeling shame, embarrassment, and failure; rather than 
feeling a sense of control, they reported feeling helpless and less choice in their future 
tenure options: ―Foreclosure is depressing and makes you feel insecure, like the rug can 
always be snatched up from under you.‖ Almost all defaulters reported worsening mental 
and physical health and negative impacts on their children, or as one woman who was in 
the midst of foreclosure proceedings stated, ―It takes the whole family‘s health down.‖ 
These findings echo the results of Saegert, Fields, and Libman (2009) who studied the 
experiences of individuals undergoing foreclosure across the country and Greer,  Seagert, 
Thaden, and Anthony (2012) who studied defaulters in Nashville. 
 Deviating from the dominant perspective espoused by most participants, very 
young and very old renters expressed how homeownership could injure their well-being 
or constrain their human development, even if it was affordable. Some younger renters 
stated a preference for renting so as not to limit their mobility for future employment 
opportunities. The majority of one focus group with older renters receiving Section 8 
rental assistance explained that homeownership would be a poor decision for themselves, 
as they were financially not going to be able to afford owning a home or be able to 
conduct or pay for necessary maintenance.   Ultimately, the majority of focus groups 
members were interested in becoming homeowners in order to promote the life 
satisfaction and the human development of themselves and their families, which are 
documented benefits of homeownership in the literature (for a review, see Herbert & 
Belsky, 2008). However, the majority of informants were not financially able to purchase 
a home in the conventional market without significant compromises in housing quality, 
location, or affordability. Furthermore, renters who were potentially able to afford 
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homeownership reported significant fears about entering homeownership. They were 
afraid of becoming ―the foreclosure horror story‖ and afraid that—even with homebuyer 
education—they would misstep during the buying process and injure their human or 
economic development. 
 Community and economic factors. The majority of focus group members 
articulated the desire for their tenure to help them benefit from neighborhood assets as 
well as contribute to their community. Because they would weigh neighborhood factors 
more while purchasing than renting a home, they perceived that homeownership was 
much more likely to enable residential stability, access to neighborhood assets, and 
community engagement. As previously mentioned, most informants reported that renting 
left them feeling insecure and uncertain about their residential stability. Alternatively, 
most believed that purchasing a home provided greater control over their tenure 
durations, which they thought would promote the development of household members. 
For instance, one homebuyer stated, ―My oldest daughter is seventeen, and she‘s been to 
four school clusters. That‘s just not stable. I want my other children to have a stable 
environment. I will know their teachers, know where they‘re going. That‘s really 
important to me.‖ 
Participants cared greatly about the location of their tenure but more so if they 
were to own a home, as they related location with access to neighborhood assets, and 
ultimately, financial returns. For instance, one participant stated, ―You hope you made a 
wise decision about location. That you bought for the school district. And that you pay 
your house off so your children have something.‖ Almost all participants echoed that they 
wanted to become homeowners because ―it‘s an investment.‖ However, they defined ― 
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investment‖ not only by wealth accumulation for their family but also by better quality of 
life resulting from their households becoming the beneficiaries of existing social capital 
within their neighborhoods and from becoming the producers of social capital through 
investing in their neighborhoods.  
Informants were interested in forging social networks that would contribute to the 
development of themselves, their families, and their neighbors. For instance, one 
defaulter explained that when she had been an owner, she realized benefits from 
participating in PTA meetings held at different homes in the neighborhood, which led to 
exchanging information about schools, community services, and child care assistance. As 
another individual stated, ―I think there is a sense of community that comes with owning. 
That‘s a way to connect with people outside of your other circles you wouldn‘t get to 
otherwise….If I owned I would make a larger effort to know the people around me.‖ 
Empirical studies have found that place attachment is higher among homeowners 
(Brown, Perkins, & Brown, 2003) and that strong social ties reduce mobility particularly 
for lower income homeowners (Dawkins, 2006).  
However, informants were just as interested in contributing to social capital as 
they were in receiving benefits from existing neighborhood assets where they owned a 
home. For instance, one individual expressed that enabling more people to become 
successful homeowners promotes economic development:  
The more people can afford and the more people have a sense ownership, then 
they do create more sense of community. And that will help any community. That 
will help businesses surrounding the community. It will definitely help the 
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economy of the whole situation just by people taking more pride in where they 
live rather than, ‗well, I just rent here.‘ 
And just as participants expressed treating their properties differently as owners, they 
also explained they would treat their neighborhoods differently by becoming more 
engaged civically and locally. Research has supported that these expectations of 
homeownership tend to come to fruition (e.g. DiPasquale & Glaeser, 1999; Kingston & 
Fries, 1994; Perkins, Brown, & Taylor, 1996; Rohe & Stegman, 1994b). For instance, a 
defaulter explained that as a renter she expected to call the landlord to take care of 
neighborhood problems, but as a homeowner, she was more committed to the 
neighborhood‘s well-being. When repeated issues with crime occurred, she called her 
city council members, the police, and the Mayor. She reported feeling that being a 
homeowner gave her more currency in these interactions, and crime ―settled down‖ from 
her actions, which felt ―pleasant.‖  
Acting differently as a function of being a homeowner was also anticipated by 
renters and homebuyers who had not yet had this experience. As one renter explained: 
If I owned a place, I would make it a beautiful home. I would care if there was 
graffiti around the corner from my house. I would go and fix it up. I would attend 
my community meetings to figure out crime issues in my neighborhood.  Whereas 
now, I am probably going to move in three months and how much of a dent can I 
really put in my community association if I am there for only three months? 
Ultimately, social investment in one‘s neighborhood was perceived as a direct investment 
in the economic development of oneself and one‘s household. Informants articulated that 
improving the neighborhood meant that one‘s investment in a home would be more likely 
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to see greater financial returns and that their children were more likely to succeed within 
a better neighborhood. Alternatively, participants repeatedly reported that as renters they 
did not have a financial stake in the neighborhood and little or no assurance that the 
residence would be their long-term home. Consequently, they were not as invested or 
ready to engage in community-building efforts within the neighborhoods where they 
rented. Multiple studies have found that homeowners are more likely to participate in 
community organizations than renters (e.g. Perkins, Brown, and Taylor, 1996; Rohe & 
Stegman, 1994a; 1994b). 
 Defaulters maintained a unique perspective on goals relating to social capital. 
Many of the defaulters who had gone through foreclosure were displaced from the 
neighborhoods where they had owned, and consequently, reported that their families 
experienced extreme hardship from losing access to neighborhood assets and social 
networks. For instance, one mother stated, ―My daughter wouldn‘t even look me in the 
face,‖ explaining she blamed her mother for being removed from her school and friends. 
The psychological consequences of losing the homes and communities where defaulters 
had invested was so devastating that one participant reported considering suicide after 
moving into a rental unit in a dangerous neighborhood.  
 While moving to a better neighborhood to reap the perceived benefits of existing 
social capital and participating in one‘s community were desired outcomes from 
homeownership, all participants interested in owning reported that they would not be able 
to afford owning a home in the neighborhoods where they would self-select to live. And 
many participants were willing to compromise on the neighborhood where they lived in 
order to enter homeownership; however, the majority of participants in prospective 
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homebuyer focus groups reported that they had yet to purchase a home because the 
compromises on either the quality or characteristics of homes or their location for the 
sake of affordability was proving too great.  
Evaluation of Shared Equity Homeownership 
As reviewed above, informants articulated the desire for their tenure to enable 
individual, social, and economic well-being, which they perceived as more likely to come 
to fruition from homeownership—if and only if—it was sustainable and financially 
sound. At the very least, however, informants explained that they did not want their 
residence to hinder or constrain the well-being and development of themselves or 
household members, explicating why many wanted to exit the rental market as well as 
why many were reticent to purchase a home that could prove to be financially 
unsustainable. Their perceived benefits of homeownership, as well as their concerns if 
homeownership proves to be unaffordable, are well supported in the literature (Herbert & 
Belsky, 2008; Saegert, Fields & Libman, 2009; Thaden, 2010). Nevertheless, the 
majority of participants perceived that successful conventional homeownership was out 
of reach due to challenges posed by housing values, affordability of monthly mortgage 
payments and ongoing repairs, down payment requirements, credit histories, or desired 
housing quality and location.  Consequently, many perceived SEH as a practical and 
welcomed alternative to conventional market ownership.  
None of the participants had heard of ―shared equity‖ before the focus groups. But 
after hearing the description of SEH (Appendix A) and asking the facilitator additional 
information about how SEH programs typically work,  many informants perceived that 
SEH may be more likely deliver the perceived benefits of homeownership ―done right,‖ 
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including a sense of accomplishment, control, and agency;  human development; 
residential stability; access to neighborhoods with assets; and opportunities for 
community engagement. And consequently, many participants believed that SEH would 
be more likely to result in better financial outcomes for themselves and the future 
generations of their families than renting or conventional homeownership. As illustrated 
by Figure 1, 73% of responding participants expressed interest in SEH if a program was 
available in Nashville. 
 
 
Figure 1. Lower income renters, homebuyers, and defaulters who expressed interest 
in shared equity homeownership if it was available in Nashville (n =93).  
 
Defaulters, who had lived through the hardships of unsustainable mortgage 
payments or losing their homes, homogenously expressed interest in SEH, perceiving that 
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the affordability it offered and the financial assistance provided to owners would have 
provided a better tenure alternative to the homes they struggled to own in the 
conventional market. Roughly, two thirds of renters and just under half of homebuyers 
expressed interest in SEH. The following section will review participants‘ perceived 
benefits, costs, or concerns with SEH.   
Perceived benefits. Regardless of whether informants personally expressed an 
interest in becoming shared equity homeowner, many perceived benefits of SEH and 
expressed hope that it would become a tenure option for members of their family or 
community. The perceived benefits were that SEH:  
1. Provides access to homeownership for those who would otherwise not be able to own 
a home. Across all groups, the prevailing benefit of SEH was that it would enable a 
greater number lower income and minority households to experience homeownership 
safely. As one defaulter stated,  
It gives a larger number of people the chance to enjoy the benefits of 
homeownership…People now don‘t feel like it‘s in their best interest to get a 
home, but I feel like a program like that would say to people you can still have 
what you want. You can still own a home.  
2. Enables entrée into homeownership faster and more easily. Many participants 
expressed that SEH made homeownership, ―more attainable‖ and ―easier.‖ Renters and 
potential homebuyers explained that saving for a large down payment and emergency 
savings (on top of being able to afford a more expensive monthly mortgage payment) to 
own in the conventional market was too daunting.  Some estimated that it would take 7-
12 years to be ready for home purchase, which felt unattainable or kept being postponed 
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as urgent expenses arose that eroded saving for a down payment (e.g. car repairs or 
medical bills).  For instance, one homebuyer stated: 
 As I get older and haven‘t been able to save a lot of money, I am increasingly 
fine with having a home rather than an investment, so yeah, I would be into that 
[SEH]…I mean, it‘s still an investment, just not as much…I think ideally 
everyone would choose not to compromise, but it‘s like the reason why we‘re 
having this conversation, because some people can‘t do it without having to 
compromise. 
3. Acts as step between renting and conventional homeownership. Informants often 
conceptualized SEH on a housing continuum between renting and private market 
homeownership, where SEH was considered a ―step up‖ from renting that could be used 
to boost individuals into conventional homeownership. As one renter said, ―It‘s kind of 
interesting for people who are pulling themselves up by their bootstraps to get out of 
renting. This is maybe like a halfway point towards traditional homeownership.‖ A 
potential homebuyer explained that for her,  
Shared equity is getting me used to a mortgage, getting me used to owning a 
home, not having to reap all the repercussions of owning. If shared equity was 
available, I would probably be much more likely to go and buy a home now rather 
than waiting until I got married. Because then I am saving money, and it is not 
costing me as much money up front. So then in ten years, I can sell it and put the 
savings into a down payment in a home. It kick starts you. 
4. Prepares and trains households to successfully own a home in the conventional 
market. Many participants who had experienced default and who had gone through 
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homebuyer education courses expressed the value of education on home buying and 
owning, and they believed that SEH offered a more intensive, experiential education on 
homeownership. As one buyer stated,  
I think it gives you the experience of being a homeowner and what it‘s about to 
where if you do want to go in the private sector—the next level of housing—then 
you are more aware of the rules and regulations and all that stuff that is going to 
be thrown at you… It‘s like getting an education in house buying and then you 
pay your tuition back. It‘s almost like going to school to a buy a house. 
Similarly, a defaulter explained that this education was worth realizing less returns at 
resale, ―I think owning a shared equity home would feel like arms wrapped you telling 
you you‘re going to be ok.  And so what? You make less money at the end of the day. 
That sounds like a fair deal to me.‖ Due to observing the foreclosure crisis, some renters 
articulated having fear about making uneducated decisions if they purchased homes in the 
market. Purchasing through a SEH program—whose mission is to promote successful, 
affordable homeownership—allayed these fears, rendering them more likely to pursue 
homeownership with the help of a partnering organization that is looking out for their 
best interests.  
5. Allows lower income homeowners to access better neighborhoods. If affordable 
homes offered by a SEH program were in good condition and located in better 
neighborhoods than homes within reach through conventional homeownership, some 
participants preferred SEH. One homebuyer explained, ―Let‘s say I had $100,000 but the 
house I want costs $150,000. Well, I look at my circumstances and there is no way I 
could get that. But shared equity would let me afford that house?! I can invest in that 
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house. I don‘t see any problem with that!‖  Informants sharing this perspective explained 
that SEH would allow them to live in more expensive homes in better neighborhoods, 
and consequently, they thought it was possible to realize similar or better financial returns 
even when sharing the appreciation than owning a lower-cost home in a worse 
neighborhood and realizing 100% of the sale‘s proceeds. As one informant concluded, 
―The higher you can jump socioeconomically, the more eventual return you will see.‖ 
Hence, some participants believed that SEH was more likely to enable residential 
stability and access to safer or higher-income neighborhoods, and consequently, result in 
a sounder investment opportunity than owning a home in the market they could afford.  
6. Promotes better outcomes for a larger proportion of lower income owners than the 
private market. Many participants expressed that due to the subsidization of higher-cost 
homes, the stewardship activities of the partnering organization, and the ongoing 
affordability provided by SEH, more lower income households would be likely to realize 
positive outcomes from owning a home than those owning in the conventional market. 
This perceived benefit was most strongly communicated by those who had experienced 
foreclosure or were months behind on their mortgage payments. The comment of one 
defaulter about SEH illustrates this perspective, ―Not having to pay so much. Lower 
interest. As far as security, the financial stuff [of SEH] feels much safer.‖  Another 
woman explained that homeowners would be more likely to ―get through the hard times 
because they would have someone [the stewarding organization] to turn to.‖  For a few 
defaulters, the value of homeownership had less to do with making money and more to 
do with the provision of stability: ―I didn‘t think about making money when I bought a 
home. That wasn‘t my big goal. It was having a stable home for my family, and shared 
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equity feels safer.‖ Twenty-five out of 32 defaulters stated that, if they could do it over 
again in hindsight, they would have preferred to purchase a home through a SEH 
program rather than in the conventional market.  
Defaulters were particularly interested in knowing whether SEH could be used to 
prevent foreclosure for households like themselves who were on the verge of foreclosure. 
For instance, one individual stated, ―I sure would consider refinancing my home into 
shared equity if they let me.‖ Thirty out of the 32 defaulters stated they would consider 
entering their home into a SEH program if it meant they could avoid foreclosure and 
remain in their current homes, and 28 stated that, if they had or did lose their homes, they 
would consider entering into SEH in the future as a way to own a home again with 
greater support, better loan terms, and more affordability.  
7. Gives to generation after generation of lower income household. Roughly half of the 
participants perceived a benefit from how SEH provides ongoing affordable homes to 
lower income buyers through limiting the seller‘s returns at resale. One homebuyer said, 
You‘re being able to share what you got and your experiences with somebody 
else. In the long run, it‘s a better future for not only us, but it‘s benefiting our 
children and our children‘s children. I think it‘s a great opportunity for somebody 
instead of taking all the money back [the full profit at resale]. Even if it‘s just a 
little bit you get, it‘s still because that organization‘s helping you, so why not help 
that organization back. I think that‘s a great benefit.  
When a defaulter explained their perception of this benefit from SEH, she stated,  
It‘s distributing the wealth, and it continues to be an affordable house so people 
won‘t do it speculatively or as my vehicle to make a whole lot of money. It‘s 
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going to be affordable for a larger number of the population to enjoy the benefits 
of homeownership. It gives the average working man something to try to look 
forward to, knowing they [otherwise] don‘t stand a chance of owning a piece of 
property. 
As explained above, participants were comfortable with foregoing some of the profit at 
resale in exchange for owning a higher-quality home more affordably and with lessened 
risk due to the steward‘s support, especially when they realized that the steward‘s share 
of profit would be used to preserve homeownership opportunities for future generations 
of lower income households. 
8. Helps the health of the city. Lastly, a minority of informants expressed benefits from 
SEH for the health of the city. Multiple individuals explained that the provision of 
affordable homeownership in Nashville would limit sprawl and pollution from 
commuting and improve the municipal tax base. For instance, one informant discussed 
her colleagues at Home Depot: 
They all commute to work because they can‘t afford to live in the county. So I 
think it [SEH] would help cities in general and maybe then they wouldn‘t have to 
jack the property taxes up so much if they had more shared equity-type programs 
going on. It‘d be better. It means people wouldn‘t have to commute so far because 
they could live closer to where they work. 
A couple individuals suggested that if a SEH program was established then it should 
purchase foreclosed properties, noting that this strategy would be a win-win to develop 
the program and help neighborhoods recover from the crisis.  
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To summarize, the majority of informants perceived that SEH provided a viable 
avenue to realize ―what mattered‖ from their tenure across individual, household, 
community, and economic factors. If conventional homeownership provided by the 
market was impossible to enter, would take many years to enter, or would be too high 
risk due to problems affording the mortgage and ongoing maintenance or saving for 
emergencies, then SEH provided a better alternative than renting, high-cost home 
owning, or owning in an undesirable location. Under these considerations, SEH was 
evaluated as a better pathway for many lower income households to realize better 
household, community, and economic outcomes.  
All of the perceived benefits expressed by participants have been conceptualized 
in the literature on SEH (e.g. Davis, 2006; Jacobus & Davis, 2010). While publications 
have acknowledged the benefits of pre- and post-stewardship support for homeowners 
(e.g. Thaden & Davis, 2009; Thaden, 2010), they have not explicitly articulated the 
benefit of experiential learning offered by SEH for households to succeed as future 
homeowners in the conventional market (#4 above). Even members of homebuyer focus 
groups—who had gone through pre-purchase homebuyer education classes—believed 
they could benefit from learning and being supported during homeownership. As 
previously reviewed, some of the benefits noted by participants have been supported 
empirically as well.  
Perceived costs and concerns. As mentioned above, some renters and 
homebuyers did not express a personal interest in SEH. The rationales varied by 
individuals and groups. Seven of the nine renters who did not express interest in SEH 
were receiving Section 8 rental assistance. They explained that the affordability offered 
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by SEH would still not be adequate for their absolute incomes to offset the additional 
costs of owning a home, such as paying for ongoing maintenance and repairs. Notably, 
those who were older or had chronic health problems could not or did not want to assume 
the added responsibilities of home owning, such as mowing a lawn. Two younger renters 
did not express interest in SEH, as they anticipated moving away from Nashville and did 
not want to constrain mobility.  
Sixteen homebuyers did not express a personal interest in SEH.  Fourteen of these 
homebuyers explained that they had long been working towards being able to purchase a 
home in the conventional market. Some were confident that they would find a home in 
the conventional market that met their standards; others were less confident but not ready 
to give up hope or consider SEH. Lastly, two homebuyers were adamantly opposed to 
SEH due to sharing proceeds at resale, explaining that they would rather not buy or wait 
until they could purchase a home on their own. As one informant stressed, ―I really 
wouldn‘t feel like I owned it. It‘s shared equity, and I‘m not sharing. I‘d like to have it as 
mine, by myself, on my own.‖ 
Whether informants personally expressed interest in SEH, members of all focus 
groups shared considerations and concerns that would factor into their decision to 
purchase a shared equity home. Informants wanted to know: 
1. Would the steward be reliable and trustworthy? With mounting distrust of the lending 
industry due to the foreclosure crisis, participants across focus group types expressed 
concerns about the reputation, stability, and capacity of the stewarding organization. For 
instance, one individual stated, ―Could I really verify that you [the steward] going to do 
what you said you going to do and nobody is going to be knocking on my door later 
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saying you want money and you want interest and I have to pay you back?‖ When the 
facilitator shared that the steward would be a non-profit organization, many people‘s 
fears were allayed. However, a few of individuals stated they would want additional 
information on what would happen if the steward ―goes bankrupt or loses their 
company.‖ Dissolution of the stewarding organization is traditionally addressed by SEH 
programs in the legal documents signed by the steward and homebuyer.  
2. Would thorough, ongoing education occur? Informants across all focus groups types 
(but particularly defaulters) articulated the importance of transparent and thorough pre-
purchase education and post-purchase reminders on the legal requirements, policies, and 
procedures of the SEH program. In order to fully assess whether individuals would want 
to buy a shared equity home, participants wanted additional information on what happens 
if a resident fails to make a mortgage payment, invests in capital improvements, or sells 
during a market downturn.  All SEH programs provide pre-purchase education and many 
offer post-purchase education, which include numerous reviews of the program‘s legal 
documents and policies.  
Informants emphasized the need to continuously remind shared equity 
homeowners of the terms of the legal agreement to promote a positive relationship 
between the homeowner and the steward. Participants acknowledged that purchasing a 
home is a highly emotional experience when individuals tend to focus their attention on 
getting into the home; therefore, ongoing education and reminders would ensure that 
owners remember information from pre-purchase education. Some participants believed 
that ongoing education would help to protect the steward as well, ―The only concern I 
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would have is somebody just all of sudden feeling like the rules don‘t apply to 
them…Money does weird things to people. They can forget who helped them get there.‖ 
3. Would the steward be supportive, not paternalistic? Some participants, particularly 
those who had grown up in public housing or received Section 8 rental assistance, had 
concerns over the types of regulations and monitoring that the steward would do. For 
instance, regular inspections were mentioned as a ―deal-breaker‖ for these informants, 
stating that ―would be just like renting.‖ Many others believed that support and services 
from the steward would be a significant benefit for homeowners who wanted or needed 
additional assistance, such as financial counseling or referrals for home repairs. While 
informants expected rules and regulations in order for the steward to be equitable and set 
clear expectations, they also wanted assurance that the scope of rules and regulations 
would not hinder their autonomy as homeowners, such as being told what colors they 
could paint their walls. Hence, transparency was perceived as critical: ―You should know 
what you‘re getting into and how different situations are gonna be handled.‖ Across all 
focus group types, informants expressed the hope that the steward would act supportively 
rather than paternalistically, in order for SEH to truly ―feel like and be like regular 
owning.‖ 
4. Would homes blend into the neighborhood and be scattered across different 
neighborhoods? Many participants were concerned about the location of the shared 
equity properties and whether the homes would ―all look the same.‖ Notably, the HOPE 
VI program and local Habitat for Humanity affiliate in Nashville have developed 
properties in large, consolidated, and homogenously-designed developments, which 
differentiated their homes from those in the surrounding neighborhood. Participants had 
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adverse reactions to these large contiguous developments of affordable housing, as this 
quote illustrates, ―I wouldn‘t want to stay in a community that is just low-income or all 
affordable housing. I want to go to someone‘s door and knock and not be able to tell one 
house from the other. It‘s just not right if it isn‘t like that.‖   
The majority of participants were not interested in SEH if the homes would be 
identifiable as a part of the program. For instance, one homebuyer stated, ―If it‘s a whole 
neighborhood and everyone is together. Like that‘s what we have in common, we have 
shared equity, like Habitat does. Well, I wouldn‘t partake in the program.‖ Informants 
feared NIMBYism (i.e. not-in-my-backyard) from neighbors and stigmatization from 
living in affordable housing. However, they also expressed concerns over purchasing 
homes where ―everybody is in the same income bracket,‖ explaining that ―before you 
know it, you got a lot of crime going on‖ or ―the same things are happening when you 
were in apartments and renting.‖ 
Hence, participants wanted to know whether the SEH program would provide 
scattered-site options, as they believed that a key benefit of SEH would be to increase 
access to various neighborhoods with income diversity and better assets. For example, 
one participant stated, ―Families who may not be able to afford to live in a certain 
neighborhood that has a certain school district. If the shared equity homes are scattered, 
people could actually live there because they have help.‖ Ultimately, informants 
expressed that they would be more interested in SEH if the homes provided an alternative 
to existing affordable housing options, by offering scattered-site properties that blended 
in with surrounding homes located in higher-quality neighborhoods. 
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5. Would homeowners realize fair returns when they sell? While the majority of 
participants did not have a problem with sharing proceeds from appreciation at resale 
with the steward in order to provide affordable homeownership opportunities to future 
households, they did want concrete examples and additional information to evaluate 
whether the formula for sharing proceeds seemed ―reasonable‖ and ―fair.‖ Facilitators 
shared with each focus group during discussion that many shared equity programs split 
appreciation by giving 25% to the homeowner and 75% to the steward; however, the 
Nashville program was considering giving 50% to the homeowner and 50% to the 
steward. Reflecting the rationale of program designers (Thaden & Saegert, 2009), some 
informants acknowledged that, ―25% seems like too little ‗cause homes here don‘t go up 
[in value] very quickly.‖ In every defaulter focus group, at least one individual wanted to 
know what would happen if a homeowner needed to sell and had negative home equity or 
―if the home were not to appreciate.‖ SEH programs stipulate the outcomes of these 
scenarios in their legal agreements and policies. Many SEH programs will absorb the 
costs if homeowners must sell their homes at a loss.  
 To summarize, some renters and homebuyers did not express an interest in SEH, 
perceiving that SEH would not be beneficial based upon their personal circumstances, 
and two perspective homebuyers were fundamentally against the concept of SEH.  All of 
the informants who expressed an interest in SEH articulated the need for additional 
information and education in order to fully evaluate whether this homeownership 
alternative would be beneficial. Their considerations and concerns were both thoughtful 
and insightful, illustrating that participants not only comprehended SEH but were able to 
critically consume the concept in spite of the limited information.  Hence, informants 
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offered design and development considerations that could promote the success and 
positive outcomes for residents of a SEH program in Nashville. While the 2011 CLT 
Technical Manual provided by the National Community Land Trust Network thoroughly 
outlines design and development considerations for SEH practitioners, no additional 
empirical studies have captured the opinions and perspectives of lower income 
households or potential beneficiaries to date.  
 
Discussion 
This study found that SEH is a desired tenure alternative to existing renting and 
homeownership options provided by the market based upon the perspectives of lower 
income individuals in Nashville. Policymakers and affordable housing developers in 
Nashville had concerns about whether a market for SEH existed and whether the 
complexity of the model would be marketable (Thaden & Saegert, 2009). Based upon 
these findings, their concerns appeared to hold little merit: The majority of lower income 
individuals actively seeking to buy homes, currently renting, or facing challenges 
sustaining ownership expressed interest in buying a home through a SEH program.  
While some homebuyers and renters were not personally interested in SEH based upon 
their individual circumstances, almost all of them thought that this housing alternative 
could benefit other lower income individuals.  
Members in all focus groups acknowledged the failure of the market to deliver 
high-quality rental opportunities or adequate homes for purchase with sound and 
affordable mortgage products. Some participants explicitly referenced how the growing 
foreclosure problem altered their views of homeownership. Participants described how 
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before the foreclosure spike, the greatest challenge was simply entering homeownership, 
but now they were mostly concerned about the challenges of sustaining homeownership 
and the financial vehicles used to enter homeownership. This greater awareness of 
homeownership‘s risks resulted in participants expressing interest in owning through a 
SEH program, as the steward was perceived as a partner that would support the 
homeowner in making sound financial decisions before and after purchase (and offer 
additional assistance if emergencies arose). Notably, participants believed that a key 
benefit of SEH was to have a supported learning experience with homeownership that 
would result in building equity so that successful homeownership in the conventional 
market was more plausible in the future.  
Consequently, even in a city where the housing market is relatively affordable and 
more accessible to those with modest incomes, the majority of participants evaluated the 
benefits of affordability and ongoing stewardship services as being valuable enough to 
want to purchase through a SEH program versus the market. Hence, these findings 
support that SEH may serve the needs of lower income households even in local housing 
markets that provide some homeownership opportunities to these households. One 
implication of these results is that SEH may be viable outside of traditionally ―hot‖ 
housing markets.  
 That being said, how a SEH program gets implemented was just as important to 
participants as the model‘s inherent affordability and ongoing provision of 
homeownership opportunities. Informants expressed that the potential benefits of SEH 
were inextricably related to the neighborhoods where these homes would be located and 
the types of development used. Ultimately, participants placed great value on wanting 
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their tenure—and especially a tenure alternative—to provide access to better 
neighborhoods. Furthermore, participants wanted SEH not only to provide tenure 
alternatives to those provided by the private market but also those offered by public and 
not-for-profit sectors in Nashville. This entailed scatter-site properties that were not 
identifiable as ―affordable housing‖ and were integrated into existing neighborhoods.  
Currently, the academic literature does not address these priorities of lower 
income households. SEH is often posited as a solution to the markets patterns of 
(dis)investment, which implies that the SEH model—in and of itself—is good (e.g. 
DeFillippis & Fraser, 2010; Hackworth, 2007). However, these results point out the need 
to attend to how the positive components of the model (i.e. permanent affordability and 
stewardship) act in concert with neighborhood factors in order to increase or decrease the 
potential for direct and indirect benefits from SEH. As participants articulated, they 
hoped that their tenure would enhance the well-being and human development of 
household members, but they also believed that these goals were more likely to occur 
with residential stability, access to asset-rich neighborhoods, and active engagement in 
one‘s community. If homeownership enabled opportunities for human development and 
access to social capital, then participants believed that positive financial outcomes were 
more likely to be realized.  
Their interpretations echo existing theories of social capital  and intergenerational 
transformation, whereby human and social capital transact with each other and 
inextricably affect the accumulation of economic capital (DeFilippis, 2001; Bourdieu, 
1985). Ultimately, access to these forms of capital maintains the potential to alter the 
intergenerational trajectories of lower income households (Saegert & Evans, 2003). 
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Similarly, participants connected stable, sustainable homeownership with better 
opportunities for household members to develop human capital, benefit from and 
contribute to social capital in their communities, and consequently, realize economic 
capital, which could change their families‘ outcomes for generations.  
 While this study begins to address a gap in the literature on SEH by capturing the 
voices of potential beneficiaries in Nashville, this study cannot be generalized beyond the 
sample. Additional research exploring the needs, priorities, and considerations of lower 
income households in other communities is needed to inform local and national 
development of SEH. Further research using different descriptions of SEH is also needed 
in order to understand how this script introduced bias. It is high likely that varying 
methods and various descriptions of SEH would elicit differing evaluations of the 
housing model. The conversational method of focus groups and recruitment strategy used 
in this study—where individuals were often referred from non-profit organizations—
facilitated good rapport and trust between the facilitators and participants. While many 
SEH programs recruit buyers from community organizations, additional research is 
needed to document ―cold‖ impressions of SEH from potential beneficiaries.   
Lastly, the strongest interest in SEH was reported by individuals who were at-risk 
of foreclosure or had experienced foreclosure, indicating a potentially large market of 
households that may have a dire need for tenure alternatives and public financial 
assistance. Future research should examine how SEH could be expanded to serve these 
households and allay the impact of the foreclosure crisis.  Ultimately, the results of this 
one study in Nashville imply that demand for SEH exists beyond the current supply, and 
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potential beneficiaries not only comprehend the housing model but welcome this tenure 
alternative.  
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Appendix A. Script of Explanation of Shared Equity Homeownership  
 
Now, I want to move to the second portion of the conversation about a relatively 
new housing idea that people are working on in Nashville and nationally. To give you 
some background information, before all the foreclosures were happening and the 
housing market changed, people who were developing affordable housing became 
concerned about how hard it was to make housing affordable and to keep it affordable in 
the long-term. They kept putting money into homes so they could be affordable for 
people to buy them who would have a hard time buying homes in the private market. But 
once those homes resold, the price of the homes kept becoming unaffordable again for 
the next buyer. This led them to think about this new housing idea, which is called 
―Shared Equity Homeownership‖. What it does is bring the price of the home down so 
people can afford it, but it doesn‘t allow the homeowner to make such a big profit on the 
home either…that way, it stays affordable over the long-term.  
A common example that helps to explain how it works is when parents help their 
children buy a house. Ok, so a lot of young adults don‘t have strong lines of credit yet, 
and they often have an ok job, but they aren‘t making a lot of money, so they can use 
help if they want to buy a house. Sometimes their parents will end up helping them get 
into their first home. So let‘s say their parents give them money for a good-sized down 
payment on a modest home.  
And the parents say to their kid, ―Ok. We helped you get into a house by putting 
money down on it so your mortgage payment is a reasonable amount for you to pay and 
you can save enough to handle home repairs too. But now we ask that you in five or ten 
or twenty years when you sell this home, we want you to pay us back the money we put 
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into the down payment with a little bit of money made from the home appreciating in 
value since we lent that money for so long.‖ So that adult—the child of the parents—
ended up being a homeowner. They lived there and took care of the mortgage payment 
and home repairs. But when they sold the home, their parents got back their investment in 
the home and some of the profit if it was worth more than when the home was purchased. 
Does that make sense? [Ensure that the group understands the scenario.] 
Alright, well this is basically what shared equity homeownership is. But many 
people don‘t have parents that can do that, so this program is designed so that instead of 
parent helping you, it‘s an organization. So the difference between shared equity 
homeownership and regular home owning is that the mortgage payment for the people 
who bought the home is less, meaning the home is more affordable than it would have 
been if it was bought in the private market (because of that big down payment—or 
subsidy—that the organization puts in). But it also means that when the home is sold, the 
people who live there give the organization back the money the organization put in and 
some money made from appreciation. That way, the people living there walk away 
making some money from paying off some of the principal on their mortgage loan and a 
portion of money made from the home if it has increased in value. But the organization 
then takes their original investment and their portion of profit if the home has increased 
in value and then reinvests it back into the home to keep it affordable for the next people 
who buy it.  
[Additional information provided on typical policies and practices of shared 
equity programs in response to questions and discussion.] 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
STABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP IN A TURBULENT ECONOMY: 
DELINQUENCIES AND FORECLOSURES REMAIN LOW IN COMMUNITY LAND 
TRUSTS 
 
A record high of 3.8 million foreclosure filings occurred in 2010, meaning that 
one out of every 45 residential units in the United States received a notice of foreclosure 
proceedings. The foreclosure filing rate for 2010 (2.23%) was greater than the rates 
posted for 2007, 2008, and 2009 (respectively 1.03%, 1.84% and 2.21%). Experts 
acknowledge that the 2010 rate would have been even higher if foreclosure proceedings 
had not been temporarily suspended towards the year‘s end due to controversies over 
foreclosure documentation and procedures (RealtyTrac, 2011).  
Foreclosure rates at the start of the housing crisis in 2007 were predominantly 
explained by deregulation of the lending industry and the corresponding spike in high-
cost or subprime home purchase and refinance loans (Immergluck, 2009). Forty-three 
percent of purchase or refinance loans originated in 2006 were subprime (Immergluck, 
2009), and at least one in five subprime loans has become delinquent (Spader & Quercia, 
2008). Ample research has shown that low-income and minority homeowners are more 
likely to hold these loans, as lending institutions targeted lower income and minority 
neighborhoods for high-cost and subprime lending (Immergluck, 2009). For instance, 
when the subprime mortgage market was expanding in 2001, 10% of home loans 
originated to low income households living in low-income communities were subprime, 
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and for African American households in these communities, the proportion was 18%. Out 
of those who obtained refinance loans, the rates were respectively 27% and 42% (Apgar 
& Calder, 2005).  
More recently, delinquency and foreclosure rates have been largely attributed to 
the economic recession. The unemployment rate in 2010 hit a recent high of 9.6%, which 
was up from 9.3% in 2009 and 5.8% in 2008 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). 
Unemployment has disproportionately affected persons of color and low-to-moderate 
income households. In the middle of 2010—while overall unemployment stood at 
9.6%—the unemployment rate for African Americans was 16.3% and 12.0% for 
Hispanics (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2010). According to a study that 
analyzed unemployment rates by income deciles in the fourth quarter of 2009, income 
and unemployment rates were inversely related. Low-income households in the bottom 
two deciles were experiencing joblessness at rates rivaling those seen during the Great 
Depression (Sum, Khatiwada, & Palma, 2010). The study concluded that, ―A true labor 
market depression faced those in the bottom two deciles of the income distribution; a 
deep labor market recession prevailed among those in the middle of the distribution, and 
close to a full employment environment prevailed at the top ‖ (p. 13).   
With the prevalence of high-cost mortgage loans and unemployment among low-
to-moderate income and minority households, it is unsurprising that they have 
experienced the highest rates of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure (Immergluck, 
2009). Above and beyond these factors, lower income and minority households have an 
elevated risk for delinquency and foreclosure due to housing cost burden, 
underemployment, and costly life events (Herbert & Belsky, 2008). Ultimately, 
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homeownership opportunities provided by the conventional market are frequently failing 
to deliver positive outcomes for a large proportion of lower income and minority 
households.   
However, support is mounting for an alternative model of homeownership offered 
through Community Land Trusts (CLTs), which produces better outcomes, especially 
decreased risk of delinquency and foreclosure. A CLT is one of several resale-restricted, 
owner-occupied housing models, collectively known as ―shared equity homeownership,‖ 
which are being used in communities throughout the United States to help low- and 
moderate-income households attain—and retain—homeownership. CLTs own the land 
where owner-occupied homes are located.  Homeowners purchase only the structural 
improvements, while paying a modest monthly fee to lease the underlying land from the 
CLT.  Therefore, these homeowners are allowed to carry a significantly smaller mortgage 
than if they had bought both the home and land in the conventional market.  
At the time of purchase, CLT‘s homeowners agree to resale-restrictions set forth 
in their ground leases, which limit the future resale prices of their homes in order to keep 
them affordable for the next generation of lower income homebuyers. The CLT acts as 
the long-term steward for the homes and their newly minted owners. They provide pre-
purchase and post-purchase services to homeowners (e.g. homebuyer and homeowner 
education, financial and loss mitigation counseling, home repair assistance) and property 
monitoring to preserve affordability over resales, which ensures the longevity and success 
of the homeownership opportunity that the CLT has created.   
This paper presents findings from a national survey of CLTs to examine the rates 
of delinquencies and foreclosures among owners of CLT homes relative to rates among 
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homeowners in the conventional market during 2010. Similar studies were commissioned 
by the National Community Land Trust Network (hereinafter, ―the Network‖) in 2008 
and 2009; consequently, results across years are presented (Misak, 2009; Thaden, 2010a). 
The most recent study gathered data from a larger sample of CLTs and documented the 
policies and practices used by CLTs to administer their homeownership programs, which 
help to explain the low rates of delinquency and foreclosure among the owners of CLT 
homes.  
 
Background 
In order to understand the importance of studying delinquency and foreclosure in 
owners of CLT homes, this section will briefly review literature on the challenges of 
sustaining homeownership and building wealth for low-income and minority households. 
Next, literature on the direct and indirect costs of foreclosure will be summarized.  
Reframing Low-Income & Minority Homeownership 
Researchers have begun to question the benefits of conventional market 
homeownership for lower income and minority households in light of emerging research 
on the foreclosure crisis (e.g. Thaden, 2010b). As previously reviewed, recently these 
households has been more likely to hold high-risk loans and experience 
un(der)employment. However, lower income and minority households are also more 
likely to be cost-burdened by homeownership and experience ―trigger events,‖ which 
increase their risk for becoming delinquent or foreclosing. These ―trigger events‖ include 
divorce, medical illness, car problems, and unstable child care (Herbert & Belsky, 2008; 
Robertson, Egelhof, & Hoke, 2008). 
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In particular, housing affordability has been a growing problem during the past 
decade, a period when the incomes of two-thirds of the nation‘s households have not 
been growing. In 2009, 19.4 million households paid more than half of their income on 
housing, including 9.3 million owners. While the lowest income households are most 
likely to be cost-burdened, The 2011 State of the Nation’s Housing report stated that, 
―Households earning between $45,000 and $60,000 saw the biggest increase in the share 
paying more than 30 percent of their incomes for housing, up 7.9 percentage points since 
2001‖ (Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS), 2011, p. 4). Steady, reliable, or growing 
incomes could reduce the exposure of these cost-burdened homeowners to delinquency 
and foreclosure, but real incomes have actually fallen for the bottom 70 percent of 
households, when measured from peak to peak during the last economic cycle (JCHS, 
2011).  
Nevertheless, cross-sectional studies show that homeownership accounts for the 
majority of wealth amongst low-income and minority households. Home equity made up 
56% of the wealth in households within the bottom quintile on income in 2000 relative to 
32% for all households (Hebert & Belsky, 2008). Further, home equity accounts for 
approximately 61.8% of wealth in African Americans, 50.8% in Hispanics, but only 44% 
for white households (McCarthy, Van Zandt, & Rohe, 2001). However, homeownership 
rates among lower income and minority households have dropped significantly in recent 
years (Economic Policy Institute, 2011; www. infoplease.com).  
Long before the boom in subprime lending, the bust in the housing market, and an 
increase in unemployment during the recent recession, research supported that 
homeownership was tenuous and risky for many low-income and minority households. 
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Studies examining homeownership over time find that low-income homeowners, 
especially minority owners, take longer to enter homeownership and are more likely to 
revert to renting (Boehm & Schlottmann, 2004; Haurin & Rosenthal, 2004; Reid, 2005). 
For instance, Reid (2005) conducted longitudinal analyses from 1976 to 1993 using data 
from a nationally representative sample (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) and found 
that less than 50% of first-time, low-income and minority homebuyers were no longer 
homeowners five years after purchase. This study highlights how prevalent early exit 
from homeownership has been for these households, and additional research shows that 
homeowners of low-cost homes must maintain ownership for 5-10 years in order to 
realize financial gains from their investment (Belsky & Duda, 2002; Belsky, Retsinas, & 
Duda, 2005; Goodman, 1998).  Furthermore, lower income and minority homeowners are 
more likely to borrow against their equity (U.S. Census Bureau, 1995) and are less likely 
to advantageously refinance (Van Order & Zorn, 2002). Short durations of tenure, high-
cost home purchase and refinance loans, housing cost burden, and trigger events all 
decrease the likelihood that lower income and minority homeowners will accumulate 
wealth and increase the likelihood that they will accumulate debt. 
Recent research has reported longer durations of tenure and wealth-building in 
CLT homeowners than findings on their counterparts in the conventional market. Results 
from one study of seven shared equity homeownership programs (including three CLTs), 
found that over 90% of lower income households remained owners five years after home 
purchase. Furthermore, the median rate of return for owners‘ investments in their homes 
ranged from 6.5% to 59.6% (Temkin, Theodos, & Price, 2010).   Another study of the 
largest U.S. CLT found that 96% of CLT homeowners gained equity from principal 
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reduction, and 82% realized financial gains from their share of appreciation (Davis & 
Stokes, 2008). An earlier study conducted by the author in partnership with the Network 
documented lower rates of delinquency and foreclosure among CLT homeowners than 
among homeowners in the conventional market (findings presented below; Thaden, 
2010a).  
Some critics of the CLT model have argued that limiting the amount of financial 
returns at resale may hurt wealth accumulation for lower income owners of CLT homes. 
However, proponents have expressed that these homeowners may be more likely to build 
wealth as the CLT model lessens the risks associated with home owning and increases the 
likelihood that homeownership will be maintained, a prerequisite for equity 
accumulation. This study will contribute to the literature by exploring whether recent 
rates of delinquencies and foreclosures in CLT homeowners are less than those reported 
in the market, increasing lower income households‘ chances for wealth-building and 
stable tenure. 
Costs of Foreclosure 
If CLTs prevent lower income households from being foreclosed upon, they are 
also preventing a costly chain of outcomes for households, lenders, neighborhoods and 
municipalities. Very little research has calculated the financial cost of foreclosure for 
households. However, it is well supported that households‘ credit is significantly 
impaired after experiencing foreclosure, which limits their ability to qualify for car or 
education loans and hinders their ability to access alternative housing options (since 
credit checks are often a part of rental applications). Furthermore, completed foreclosures 
cost lenders. One study examined the cost of foreclosures in Massachusetts and found 
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that foreclosures cost the loan holder an average of $58,792 and took approximately 
eighteen months to resolve (Cutts & Green, 2004). 
The impact of a foreclosure extends beyond the property line into the 
neighborhood. Studies in Columbus OH, Chicago, and New York City have shown that 
foreclosed properties significantly diminished nearby housing values (Been, 2008; 
Immergluck & Smith, 2006a; Lin, Rosenblatt, Yao 2009; Mikelbank, 2008). For instance, 
Immergluck and Smith (2006a) examined the impact of foreclosure in single-family loans 
on nearby property values in Chicago from 1997-1998. After controlling for a variety of 
other neighborhood and property characteristics, they found that each additional 
foreclosure within an eighth of a mile reduced nearby property values by 1-1.5%, 
cumulatively, representing an average loss in nearby property values of $159,000 for 
each foreclosure. Furthermore, the percentage impact was significantly higher in low-
income neighborhoods (1.4-1.8%). 
Just as foreclosures tend to cluster in low-income and minority neighborhoods, 
the consequential rises in vacant properties and crime do as well (Immergluck & Smith, 
2006b). Shlay and Whitman (2004) found that having an abandoned house within 150 
feet decreased property values by approximately $7,000 in Philadelphia. Another study 
measured the relative impact of an abandoned unit versus a foreclosed unit on nearby 
housing values in Columbus, OH (Mikelbank, 2008), where a foreclosure within 250 feet 
decreased the housing price by 2% and an abandoned house within 250 feet decreased it 
by 3.5%.  However, the effect of the foreclosed home spanned a larger distance, where 
housing values were still down 1% at 1000 feet while abandoned homes no longer had an 
effect at 750 feet.  
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Immergluck and Smith (2006b) found that as foreclosure rates increase so do the 
rates of violent crime, where an increase in one standard deviation of the foreclosure rate 
(2.8/100 owner-occupied properties in a year) accounted for a 6.7% increase in violent 
crimes within neighborhoods. Since foreclosed properties in low-income and minority 
communities are more likely to end up as abandoned housing, it is relevant that one study 
showed that block-level crime rates were doubled with the presence of one or more 
abandoned buildings within a low-income neighborhood in Austin, TX (Spelman, 1993). 
Foreclosures not only lead to financial losses for households and their neighbors, 
but they also cost municipalities. The importance of stable homeownership to municipal 
health is great as most municipalities rely on property taxes (and steady appreciation) to 
fund their annual budgets. The costs of unsustainable homeownership, which tend to 
cluster in low-income and minority neighborhoods, leads to additional municipal 
expenditures on increased police presence, fire service needs, demolition of vacant 
properties, legal fees and inspections, and administrative fees to complete the foreclosure 
process. Municipalities also accumulate losses related to outstanding property taxes, 
unpaid utility fees, and a declining property tax revenue stream if nearby property values 
decline (Apgar & Duda, 2005).  
Apgar and Duda (2005) modeled the costs of a foreclosure to the City of Chicago 
under different scenarios and found that more than a dozen agencies could be involved in 
over two dozen activities, which were estimated to cost the government up to $34,199 per 
foreclosure. Moreno (1995) estimated the cost to the cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul 
for the foreclosure of houses financed with FHA mortgages and found that municipal 
losses were approximately $27,000. If foreclosure rates are lower for owners of CLT 
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homes than owners of conventional market-rate homes, then CLTs may either directly or 
indirectly prevent financial losses for households, lenders, neighborhoods, and 
municipalities. 
 
Methods 
Discussed in this section are the methods used to examine delinquencies and 
foreclosures among CLT homeowners, drawing on a subsample of CLTs that completed 
The 2011 Comprehensive CLT Survey (hereinafter ―CLT Survey‖). The CLT Survey 
collected a broad spectrum of data to explore the topics covered in the present report as 
well as various research questions pertaining to the structural and operational dimensions 
of CLTs (see Thaden, 2011). Basic characteristics of the total sample for the CLT Survey 
are presented below. Appendix A presents detailed information on the total sample and 
administration and design of the survey.  
Participation and Administration 
The CLT Survey was designed to yield a holistic picture of the current landscape 
of CLTs in the United States. The CLT Survey was distributed to 216 organizations with 
working email addresses that were listed in the directory of the Network as of March 1, 
2011. These organizations share a common purpose of creating and managing an 
expanding portfolio of permanently affordable, resale-restricted, owner-occupied 
housing. Much of this housing is located on land that is leased from a CLT, although 
many of the organizations included in the Network‘s directory also make use of deed-
restricted covenants or other durable contracts to preserve the affordability of their 
homes. The CLT Survey was administered as an electronic link to a Portable Document 
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Format (pdf) fillable form from March 28
th
-April 22
nd
, 2010. The survey took 
approximately an hour and a half to complete. Respondents were able click a ―submit‖ 
button once they finished the survey, which directly downloaded to a database.  
To promote participation, each CLT received up to three e-mails from the 
researcher or a Network staff member. The remaining non-responders received a phone 
call requesting survey participation by the researcher or a Network staff member. 
Participation was also promoted by raffling five $300 registrations to the Network‘s 
annual conference and five copies of The CLT Reader edited by John E. Davis.  Out of 
the 216 organizations recruited for participation, 96 organizations completed the survey, 
a response rate of 44% (96/216). These 96 organizations had a combined total of 3,669 
resale-restricted homeownership units in their portfolios.   
For the 120 organizations that did not respond to the survey, information on their 
location and number of resale-restricted homes was compiled. For non-responders, the 
number of resale-restricted homes includes those that would feasibly be eligible for 
single-family mortgage loans (the primary unit of analysis), but excludes manufactured 
housing, cooperative, or rental units (hereinafter ―resale-restricted homes‖ abides by this 
definition). Due to a paucity of information provided by Network‘s 2010 database, the 
author compiled information on non-responders‘ resale-restricted unit counts from the 
Network‘s databases in 2010 (n = 27) and 2012 (n = 14), the author‘s personal notes and 
those on file at the Network (n = 19), and websites or organizations‘ annual reports (n = 
60). These 120 organizations were estimated to have 1,118 resale-restricted 
homeownership units. The unit counts for non-responders are estimations, as data from 
the Network‘s 2012 database likely overestimate the units that existed at the time of data 
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collection, and –depending upon when organizations have updated their websites or 
completed annual reports—other unit counts may be over estimates or under estimates 
(See Appendix A).   
A subsample of organizations that completed the survey was created in order to 
examine delinquency and foreclosure rates among those organizations that had resale-
restricted homeownership units with outstanding residential mortgages as of December 
31
st
, 2010. From the initial group of 96 organizations, one organization was excluded 
because its portfolio was comprised solely of cooperatively-owned units without 
individual mortgages.  Another 30 start-up organizations were excluded because they had 
not yet sold a resale-restricted home unit by the end of 2010, representing 89 vacant 
resale-restricted units.  Lastly, three other organizations from the original group of 96 
were excluded because they failed to complete the delinquency and foreclosure section of 
the survey, representing 159 resale-restricted units. The final composition of the 
subsample included 62 organizations with a combined portfolio of 3,421 resale-restricted 
homeownership units. The characteristics of this subsample are described in greater detail 
below. 
Design and Analyses 
To examine delinquencies and foreclosures in the subsample, data from one 
section of the CLT Survey was analyzed. This section included approximately 20 
questions that collected information about outstanding residential mortgage loans held by 
homeowners of resale-restricted homeownership units during 2010.  Most of these 
questions were identical to those within the surveys commissioned by the Network over 
the past two years, allowing a multi-year comparison of delinquency and foreclosure 
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rates among CLT homeowners during 2008, 2009, and 2010. In addition to numerical 
responses, several questions in this section were framed as checklists or open-ended 
queries, seeking clarifications or explanations of responses.  Other sections of the survey 
collected information about practices and policies that might help to explain why many 
CLTs report low rates of delinquency and foreclosure.  
Many of the questions and measures used in designing and analyzing the present 
survey were crafted for consistency with definitions of ―outstanding mortgages,‖ 
―foreclosure proceedings,‖ and ―serious delinquencies,‖ used in the Mortgage Bankers 
Association‘s National Delinquency Survey (hereinafter ―MBA Survey‖).  This provided 
the basis for comparisons between delinquency and foreclosure rates among CLT 
homeowners and similar rates among the owners of conventional, market-rate homes.  
The MBA Survey is among the most widely recognized sources of information on 
residential mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates.  It is based on a sample of more 
than 44 million mortgage loans serviced by mortgage companies, commercial banks, 
thrifts, credit unions and others. This survey is estimated to account for approximately 
80-85 percent of the 50 million loans outstanding in the market (MBA, 2008). Table 1 
presents definitions used by the MBA and replicated in the CLT Survey. The CLT 
Survey collected data on an additional measure of ―completed foreclosures‖ and over 
additional timeframes, which are also presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Terms, definitions, and sources of data by timeframes for 2010. 
1 
Measured as the number of loans that ever fit this description between January 1, 2010 and December 
31st, 2010. 
2 
Measured as the number of loans that fit this description on the last day of 4th Quarter (December 31st, 
2010). 
 
 
The Subsample from The 2011 Comprehensive CLT Survey  
As shown in Figure 1, the 62 organizations that comprise the subsample had 
3,421 units of resale-restricted, owner-occupied housing with outstanding mortgages in 
their portfolios.  (Another 3,552 units of rental housing, cooperative housing, or lease-to-
purchase housing were also held by these organizations, but these units were excluded 
from the analysis of delinquencies and foreclosures.)  The earliest year an organization 
reported selling a resale-restricted home was 1979 and the latest was 2010 (Mdn = 2003, 
M = 2002). 
 
 
 
Term Definition 
CLT 
Establish-
ment thru 
2010 
2010 
Year
1
 
2010 4
th
 
Quarter
2
 
Outstanding 
Mortgages 
All first mortgage loans secured by 1–4 unit 
residences that are serviced by participating 
companies (for MBA Survey) or held by CLT 
homeowners (for CLT Survey). 
  
CLT 
MBA 
Foreclosure 
Proceedings 
The number of loans in the process of 
foreclosure regardless of the date the 
foreclosure proceedings was initiated. This 
excludes loans where foreclosures have been 
completed. The MBA terms this measure the 
―Foreclosure Inventory.‖ 
 CLT 
CLT 
MBA 
Serious 
Delinquencies 
The number of loans that were at least 90 days 
delinquent or loans that were in foreclosure 
proceedings 
 CLT 
CLT 
MBA 
Completed 
Foreclosures 
The number of loans that resulted in completed 
foreclosures. 
CLT CLT  
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Figure 1. Total number of housing units, resale-restricted homeownership units, and 
outstanding mortgages on resale-restricted homes in the subsample at the end of 
2010 (n = 62). 
 
 
 
Differences between the subsample and non-responders. Organizations with 
resale-restricted homes that either did not respond to the survey (n = 42) or did not 
complete the relevant section of the survey (n = 3) were combined into a ―non-responder‖ 
group, as this is the best estimate of the number of resale-restricted homes that were 
likely to have outstanding residential mortgages (the primary unit of analysis). The non-
responder group includes 45 organizations with 1,277 resale-restricted homeownership 
units, and the subsample includes 62 organizations with 3,421 resale-restricted units. 
Considering only organizations that were likely to be eligible for the analysis yields a 
refined response rate of 58% (62/107).  
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Based upon the estimated count of resale-restricted homes among non-responders, 
the subsample represented 69.87% of all resale-restricted homes (3,421/4,698). The 
median number of resale-restricted homes in the subsample of organizations was 30 (M = 
55.18, range = 1 to 488). For non-responders, the median number of resale-restricted 
units was 12 (M = 28.38; range = 1-174). Table 2 presents the number of organizations 
by unit counts within the subsample and non-responder group. Ultimately, the subsample 
over-represents CLTs with larger portfolios of resale-restricted homes.  
 
Table 2. Size of resale-restricted home portfolios for organizations included in and 
excluded from the subsample.  
 
Number of Resale-
restricted Homes  
Subsample Not In Subsample 
# % # % 
0-24 29 47% 31 69% 
25-49 13 21% 6 13% 
50-74 6 10% 3 7% 
75-99 5 8% 2 4% 
100-124 3 5% 0 0% 
125-149 0 0% 1 2% 
>150 6 10% 2 4% 
Total 62 100% 45 100% 
 
 
Table 3 and Figure 2 present where organizations included in and excluded from 
the subsample are located as well as the size of their resale-restricted portfolios relative to 
the state delinquency rates (MBA, 2011). Organizations in the subsample were located in 
29 states (see Table 3). The range in the number of organizations per state was 1 to 10 
(Mdn = 1, M = 2.14). The five most frequently represented states were WA (n = 10), MA 
(n = 5), FL (n = 4), CA (n = 4), and MN (n = 4), together accounting for 44% of the 
subsample. All other states represented in the subsample had less than 4 organizations 
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within their bounds, and 15 states had only one organization represented in the sample. 
Non-responders were located in 27 states. The range in the number of non-responding 
organizations per state was 1 to 6 (Mdn = 1, M = .86). The most frequently represented 
states were VT (n = 6), MN (n = 4), and MA (n = 3), together accounting for 39% of 
organizations not in the subsample. Non-responders were located in ten states that had no 
representation by organizations within the subsample (AZ, CT, ID, LA, MO, MS, NH, 
SD, VA, and WY). The three largest CLTs missing from the subsample were located in 
MA, CO, and VT with a total of 450 resale-restricted homes. 
Ultimately, responders and non-responders vary by their state locations, but more 
responders are located in states with high delinquency rates. Table 2 presents the state 
rankings for serious delinquency rates at the end of 2010 (MBA, 2011), and the 
corresponding cumulative percentage of resale-restricted homes in the subsample and 
non-responder group. A larger proportion of resale-restricted homes within the subsample 
are located in states with higher delinquency rates than the non-responder group. Hence, 
the subsample over-represents CLTs in states with higher seriously delinquency rates as 
of the end of 2010.  
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Table 3. Organizations and resale-restricted homes included in and excluded from the subsample by highest to lowest 
state delinquency rate ranking at the end of 2010.  
 
MBA Information* # of Organizations # of Resale-restricted Homes 
Cumulative % of Resale-
restricted Homes 
State 
State Ranking 
of Highest 
Serious 
Delinquency 
Rates 
Serious 
Delinquency 
Rate 
Not In 
Subsample 
(n = 45) 
In 
Subsample 
(n = 62) 
Total      
(n =107) 
Not in 
Subsample 
(n = 1277) 
In 
Subsample 
(n = 3421) 
Total 
(n = 4698) 
Not in 
Subsample 
(n = 1277) 
In 
Subsample 
(n = 3421) 
Total           
(n = 4698) 
FL 1 19.37% 2 4 6 10 107 117 0.78% 3.13% 2.49% 
NV 2 17.44% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.78% 3.13% 2.49% 
NJ 3 10.94% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.78% 3.13% 2.49% 
IL 4 10.70% 0 3 3 0 87 87 0.78% 5.67% 4.34% 
AZ 5 10.55% 2 0 2 82 0 82 7.20% 5.67% 6.09% 
CA 6 9.79% 1 4 5 22 77 99 8.93% 7.92% 8.19% 
NY 7 9.10% 2 2 4 42 41 83 12.22% 9.12% 9.96% 
OH 8 8.95% 0 2 2 0 20 20 12.22% 9.70% 10.39% 
MI 9 8.90% 1 1 2 12 16 28 13.16% 10.17% 10.98% 
IN 10 8.59% 0 0 0 0 0 0 13.16% 10.17% 10.98% 
GA 11 8.54% 1 1 2 5 22 27 13.55% 10.82% 11.56% 
RI 12 8.52% 2 1 3 65 90 155 18.64% 13.45% 14.86% 
MD 13 8.35% 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.64% 13.45% 14.86% 
MS 14 8.35% 1 0 1 1 0 1 18.72% 13.45% 14.88% 
ME 15 8.26% 1 1 2 6 2 8 19.19% 13.50% 15.05% 
HI 16 7.70% 0 1 1 0 9 9 19.19% 13.77% 15.24% 
CT 17 7.53% 2 0 2 32 0 32 21.69% 13.77% 15.92% 
LA 18 7.41% 1 0 1 2 0 2 21.85% 13.77% 15.96% 
SC 19 7.24% 0 0 0 0 0 0 21.85% 13.77% 15.96% 
DE 20 7.21% 0 1 1 0 23 23 21.85% 14.44% 16.45% 
MA 21 7.14% 3 5 8 138 159 297 32.65% 19.09% 22.78% 
KY 22 6.81% 0 0 0 0 0 0 32.65% 19.09% 22.78% 
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TN 23 6.80% 0 1 1 0 6 6 32.65% 19.26% 22.90% 
UT 24 6.66% 0 1 1 0 38 38 32.65% 20.37% 23.71% 
WA 25 6.55% 1 10 11 12 441 453 33.59% 33.27% 33.35% 
PA 26 6.43% 2 1 3 16 35 51 34.85% 34.29% 34.44% 
ID 27 6.21% 1 0 1 3 0 3 35.08% 34.29% 34.50% 
OR 28 6.17% 2 2 4 29 159 188 37.35% 38.94% 38.51% 
WI 29 6.15% 0 2 2 0 60 60 37.35% 40.69% 39.78% 
DC 30 6.13% 0 1 1 0 42 42 37.35% 41.92% 40.68% 
AL 31 6.01% 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.35% 41.92% 40.68% 
NM 32 5.96% 1 1 2 5 85 90 37.74% 44.40% 42.59% 
NC 33 5.91% 0 3 3 0 249 249 37.74% 51.68% 47.89% 
OK 34 5.81% 0 0 0 0 0 0 37.74% 51.68% 47.89% 
NH 35 5.48% 2 0 2 14 0 14 38.84% 51.68% 48.19% 
MN 36 5.44% 4 4 8 115 550 665 47.85% 67.76% 62.35% 
AR 37 5.34% 0 0 0 0 0 0 47.85% 67.76% 62.35% 
MO 38 5.28% 1 0 1 8 0 8 48.47% 67.76% 62.52% 
TX 39 5.08% 1 1 2 5 2 7 48.86% 67.82% 62.66% 
KS 40 5.03% 0 1 1 0 44 44 48.86% 69.10% 63.60% 
WV 41 4.97% 0 0 0 0 0 0 48.86% 69.10% 63.60% 
CO 42 4.95% 1 2 3 174 435 609 62.49% 81.82% 76.56% 
IA 43 4.89% 1 1 2 7 1 8 63.04% 81.85% 76.73% 
VT 44 4.81% 6 1 7 336 488 824 89.35% 96.11% 94.27% 
VA 45 4.69% 1 0 1 19 0 19 90.84% 96.11% 94.68% 
MT 46 3.64% 0 2 2 0 47 47 90.84% 97.49% 95.68% 
NE 47 3.49% 0 0 0 0 0 0 90.84% 97.49% 95.68% 
WY 48 3.12% 1 0 1 99 0 99 98.59% 97.49% 97.79% 
SD 49 2.86% 1 0 1 18 0 18 100.00% 97.49% 98.17% 
AK 50 2.32% 0 2 2 0 86 86 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
ND 51 2.12% 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
*from the Mortgage Bankers Association‘s National Delinquency Survey (MBA, 2011). 
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Figure 2. Location and number of resale-restricted homes by organizations included in (n = 62) and excluded from the 
subsample (n = 45).  
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Outstanding mortgages on resale-restricted homes. When the subsample of 
organizations was asked how many of their resale-restricted homeownership units were 
occupied by homeowners with outstanding residential mortgage loans as of December 
31
st
, 2010, they reported a total of 3,143 (see Figure 1). The disparity between the 
number of outstanding residential mortgages and the number of resale-restricted 
homeownership units—a surplus of 278 units— is explained as follows: 129 units were 
vacant as of December 31
st
, 2010; 128 units did not have outstanding residential 
mortgages, and 21 units were older units where the organizations could not provide 
accurate information on the mortgage loans (i.e. missing data). Therefore, the final 
subsample used for analyses was 62 organizations and 3,143 outstanding residential 
mortgages on resale-restricted homes as of December 31
st
, 2010.  
The range for the number of outstanding residential mortgages on resale-restricted 
units in the subsample of organizations was 1 to 488 (Mdn = 24.50, M = 50.69). Only two 
organizations reported 200 or more homeowners with outstanding residential mortgages 
at the end of 2010, accounting for 22% of the total mortgages in the subsample (n = 693). 
Four organizations reported between 100 and 200 homeowners with outstanding 
mortgages, equal to 28% of the total mortgages (n = 895). Eleven organizations reported 
50 to 100 homeowners with outstanding mortgages, accounting for 26% of mortgages in 
the subsample (n = 817). Lastly, 43 organizations reported having between 1 to 50 
homeowners with outstanding mortgages, equal to 24% of mortgages in the subsample (n 
= 738).  
CLT survey samples by year. In order to present multi-year longitudinal 
comparisons of delinquency and foreclosure rates among the mortgages held by CLT 
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homeowners, results from previous surveys are incorporated into the Results section 
(Misak, 2009; Thaden, 2010a). Depending upon which organizations participated in each 
survey, the samples of organizations and their outstanding mortgages on resale-restricted 
homeownership units varied each year. Table 4 provides information on these samples by 
year and each measure. 
 
Table 4. Samples of organizations and outstanding mortgages on resale-restricted 
homes and the percentages of missing mortgage data by year and measure. 
 
Year Sample Total 
Completed 
Foreclosures 
Foreclosure 
proceedings 
Serious 
Delinquencies 
Since 
Establish-
ment 
Annual Annual 
4th 
Quarter 
Annual 
4th 
Quarter 
2010 
Organizations 62 60 60 54 57 61 62 
Outstanding Mortgages 3143 3110 3106 2790 2816 3137 3143 
Percent Missing   1.05% 1.18% 11.23% 10.40% 0.19% 0.00% 
2009 
Organizations 42 41 40 40 39 40 37 
Outstanding Mortgages 2173 2167 2160 2075 2151 2099 2099 
Percent Missing   0.28% 0.60% 4.51% 1.01% 3.41% 3.41% 
2008 
Organizations 50 unknown unknown not 
measured 
Unknown not 
measured 
unknown 
Outstanding Mortgages 1936 1928 1928 not 
measured 
1930 not 
measured 
1815 
Percent Missing   0.41% 0.41% -- 0.31% -- 6.25% 
 
 
The survey conducted by the Network in 2008 was not designed and analyzed by 
the same author who designed and analyzed the surveys for 2009 and 2010. 
Consequently, some data was not able to be inferred from the 2008 database, including 
the number of organizations that provided information for each measure. In the 2009 and 
2010 surveys, additional annual measures were included. The percentage of missing data 
over the years may be explained by survey design variations. The 2010 CLT Survey was 
substantially longer and covered a larger array of topics than the 2008 and 2009 surveys; 
therefore, more respondents may have experienced ―burnout‖ when filling out the 2010 
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survey and did not provide information on all items relating to delinquencies and 
foreclosures.  
 
 
Results 
 
This section will first present findings on serious delinquencies and foreclosure 
proceedings in outstanding residential mortgages among resale-restricted homes 
(hereinafter ―CLT loans‖), as compared to delinquencies and foreclosure proceedings 
among the outstanding mortgages held by the owners of conventional market-rate 
housing according to the MBA Survey (hereinafter ―MBA loans‖) (MBA, 2009; 2010; 
2011). ―MBA loans‖ include FHA, VA, prime and subprime loans. While the CLT 
survey was designed to yield comparable metrics with the MBA Survey, the samples of 
these two surveys are not similar.  The MBA sample includes loans held by homeowners 
across all income groups (measured at the time of purchase). By contrast, the CLT 
sample includes mortgage loans held only by low-to-moderate income households 
(measured at time of purchase).  
The organizations included in the CLT subsample (n = 62) were asked to report 
the highest level of area median income (AMI) their CLT may serve, according to their 
homeownership program‘s eligibility policy: five could serve households with incomes 
greater than 120% of AMI; fifteen could serve households up to 120% of AMI; seven 
could serve households up to 100% of AMI; thirty-three could serve households up to 
80% of AMI.  One organization reported having no policy establishing an upper AMI 
limit, and one did not respond to this question. In practice, most CLTs serve households 
whose incomes are well below the maximum limit established by their policies. One 
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study found that the average AMI of households served by three CLTs in 2008 were 
45%, 48%, and 52%, while the CLTs‘ policies on the maximum allowable household 
AMI were respectively 80%, no AMI limit, and 100% (Temkin, Theodos, & Price, 2010). 
Similarly, the mean percentage of AMI for those households who purchased homes in 
2010 from CLTs in the subsample was 64% (Mdn = 65%; range = 22-100%). 
CLT Loans & Conventional Market Loans 
This section reviews the rates of delinquencies and foreclosures across owners of 
CLT homes and owners in the conventional market reported by the MBA. The most 
recent data from 2010 is first reviewed followed by a summary of findings across 2008, 
2009, and 2010 (MBA, 2009; 2010; 2011; Misak, 2009; Thaden, 2010a). 
During 2010. Figure 3 compares rates of foreclosure proceedings and serious 
delinquencies among CLT mortgage loans versus those found among MBA mortgage 
loans at the end of 2010. Out of 2,816 CLT mortgage loans reported by 57 organizations, 
only 13 were in foreclosure proceedings at the end of 2010. A mortgage loan in the MBA 
sample was 10.0 times more likely to be in foreclosure proceedings than a mortgage held 
by a CLT homeowner at the end of 2010. Out of 3,143 CLT mortgage loans from all 62 
organizations in the subsample, 41 were seriously delinquent at the end of 2010. A 
mortgage loan in the MBA sample was 6.6 times more likely to be seriously delinquent 
than a mortgage held by a CLT homeowner at the end of 2010. 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. End of 2010 rates of foreclosure proceedings and serious delinquencies in 
CLT loans and MBA loans. 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates rates of foreclosure proceedings and serious delinquencies 
among CLT mortgage loans versus different mortgage loan types in the MBA sample at 
the end of 2010. CLT mortgage loans posted substantially lower rates on both measures 
than prime, subprime, VA, and FHA loans in the MBA sample.  
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Figure 4. End of 2010 rates of foreclosure proceedings and serious delinquencies in 
CLT loans and MBA loans by type.  
 
 
From 2008-2010. Figure 5 compares rates of foreclosure proceedings and serious 
delinquencies in CLT mortgage loans and MBA mortgage loans at the end of 2008, 2009, 
and 2010. Consistently over the span of three years, CLT loans have posted substantially 
lower rates of foreclosure proceedings and serious delinquencies than MBA loans. MBA 
loans in foreclosure proceedings at the end of 2010 increased five basis points from the 
end of 2009, while the rate in CLT loans decreased 10 basis points. The rate of serious 
delinquencies declined in the MBA sample 110 basis points by the end of 2010 from the 
end of 2009, while the rate in CLT loans decreased by 32 basis points.  
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Figure 5. End of 2008, 2009, & 2010 rates of foreclosure proceedings and serious 
delinquencies in CLT loans and MBA loans. 
 
 
In MBA loans, both serious delinquencies and foreclosures increased substantially 
from the end of 2008 to the end of 2010 (133 basis points in the rates of foreclosure 
proceedings and 227 basis points in the rates of serious delinquencies).  Both rates 
decreased from the end of 2008 to the end of 2010 in CLT loans (6 basis points in the 
rates of foreclosure proceedings and 68 basis points in the rates of serious delinquencies).  
Figure 6 illustrates the rates of foreclosure proceedings at the end of 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 by each type of loan in the MBA sample compared with the rate among CLT 
loans. Table 5 lists the percentages that correspond to Figure 6.  Mortgages held by CLT 
homeowners were less likely to be in foreclosure proceedings than any type of mortgage 
in the MBA sample across all three years. Notably, foreclosure proceedings at the end of 
2010 soared to the highest rate ever posted by the MBA. This record high was 
predominantly explained by the elevated rate of foreclosure proceedings among prime 
loans, as prime loans are most prevalent in the MBA samples (MBA, 2010).  
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Figure 6. End of 2008-2010 rates of foreclosure proceedings in CLT loans and MBA 
loans by type. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Rates of foreclosure proceedings by loan type across three years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loan Type 
Rates of Foreclosure Proceedings 
2008 2009 2010 
Basis Point 
Change 
2008-2009 
Basis Point 
Change 
2009-2010 
MBA prime loans 1.88% 3.31% 3.67% 143 36 
MBA subprime loans 13.71% 15.58% 14.53% 187 -105 
MBA FHA loans 2.43% 3.57% 3.30% 114 -27 
MBA VA loans 1.66% 2.46% 2.35% 80 -11 
MBA total loans 3.30% 4.58% 4.63% 128 5 
CLT loans 0.52% 0.56% 0.46% 4 -10 
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Figure 7 illustrates rates of serious delinquencies at the end of 2008, 2009, and 
2010 by each type of mortgage loan in the MBA sample, compared with the rate among 
CLT mortgages. Table 6 provides the numbers that correspond to Figure 7.  Mortgages 
held by CLT homeowners were less likely to be seriously delinquent than any type of 
mortgage in the MBA sample across all three years. The percentage of serious 
delinquencies among CLT mortgages declined each year by nearly one fifth. After a 
significant increase in the rates of serious delinquencies across all loan types in the MBA 
sample from 2008 to 2009, they turned the corner and slightly decreased from 2009 to 
2010; the overall rate within the MBA sample went down by approximately a tenth from 
2009 to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
 
Figure 7. End of 2008- 2010 rates of serious delinquencies in CLT loans and MBA 
loans by type. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Rates of serious delinquencies by loan type across years. 
 
Loan Type 
Rates of Serious Delinquencies 
2008 2009 2010 
Basis Pont 
Change 
2008-2009 
Basis Point 
Change 
2009-2010 
MBA prime loans 3.74% 7.01% 6.25% 327 -76 
MBA subprime loans 23.11% 30.56% 27.46% 745 -310 
MBA FHA loans 6.98% 9.42% 8.46% 244 -96 
MBA VA loans 4.12% 5.42% 4.82% 130 -60 
MBA total loans 6.30% 9.67% 8.57% 337 -110 
CLT loans 1.98% 1.62% 1.30% -36 -32 
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Additional Findings on the Performance of CLT Mortgages 
This section will present additional information on the outcomes for owners of 
CLT homes. First, the rates of completed foreclosures will be reviewed across different 
periods of time. Next, interventions by CLTs and the outcomes of their seriously 
delinquent homeowners in 2010 are reviewed.   
Completed foreclosures since a CLT’s incorporation. The 2011 CLT Survey 
asked how many completed foreclosures occurred among resale-restricted 
homeownership units from the year of each organization‘s incorporation until the end of 
2010.  The year of incorporation within the subsample of CLTs with outstanding 
mortgages ranged from 1958 to 2008 (M = 1996; Mdn = 1999). Sixty organizations, 
collectively holding 3, 110 outstanding residential mortgages at the end of 2010, 
responded to this question; they reported a combined total of 45 homes that had ever 
completed the foreclosure process.  
Property lost from a CLT’s portfolio because of foreclosure. When a lender in 
the first mortgage position forecloses on a home owned by a resale-restricted 
homeowner, CLTs typically have the right of first offer or first refusal to reacquire the 
foreclosed home from the lender.  Furthermore, CLTs do not allow their homeowners to 
mortgage the underlying land.  A lender who takes possession of a CLT home through 
foreclosure, therefore, does not traditionally take possession of the land, giving the CLT 
considerable leverage in negotiating the future disposition of any foreclosed home.  
Despite 45 completed foreclosures over the entire history of the organizations included in 
the subsample, there were only five instances where a foreclosure resulted in a home 
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being lost from a CLT‘s portfolio of permanently affordable, resale-restricted, owner-
occupied housing.  
Foreclosure and delinquency rates from 2008-2010. While the previous section 
reported delinquency and foreclosure metrics for the fourth quarter of each year in CLT 
and MBA loans, the CLT surveys also asked respondents about the number of completed 
foreclosures and the number of loans that were in foreclosure proceedings or seriously 
delinquent at any time during the calendar year. Table 7 presents these findings. Annual 
rates were calculated using the number of outstanding residential mortgages at the end of 
2010 as the denominator (which does not exactly measure the total number of 
outstanding residential mortgages throughout the year). As illustrated in Table 7, annual 
rates of foreclosure proceedings and serious delinquencies declined from 2009 to 2010, 
while the annual rate of completed foreclosures rose from 2008 to 2009 and remained 
steady from 2009 to 2010.  
 
Table 7. Three-year measures of delinquencies and foreclosures among CLT 
mortgages, 2008-2010. 
 
 
 
The 2010 annual rate of completed foreclosures among CLT mortgages was 
0.42%. To provide a relevant comparison to the market, data from The OCC and OTS 
Mortgage Metrics Report were used (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency & Office 
of Thrift Supervision (OCC-OTS), 2011). This report captures information on first-lien 
Annual Measures 
2008 2009 2010 
# Total % # Total % # Total % 
Serious Delinquencies -- -- -- 58 2099 2.80% 66 3137 2.10% 
Foreclosure Proceedings -- -- -- 18 2075 0.87% 22 2790 0.79% 
Completed Foreclosures 5 1928 0.26% 9 2160 0.42% 13 3106 0.42% 
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residential mortgages serviced by selected national banks and federally regulated thrifts. 
The mortgages in this portfolio comprise 63% of all mortgages outstanding in the United 
States. It reports on the number of mortgage loans serviced and the number of completed 
foreclosures by quarter. In order to create a metric similar to the CLT Survey‘s annual 
foreclosure rate, the number of completed foreclosures across 2010 quarters were totaled 
and divided by the number of loans serviced in the fourth quarter of 2010 (replicating 
how the rate was calculated in the CLT data). Based on this analysis, the annual rate of 
completed foreclosure was 1.85% among mortgages for conventional market-rate homes 
according to the OCC-OTS data. By this metric, the rate of completed foreclosures 
among CLT mortgages was substantially lower.  
Respondents to the CLT Survey were asked to ―Check all that apply‖ from a list 
of factors that they believed contributed to the foreclosures their homeowners 
experienced during 2010. Six reported that homeowners were unwilling to work with 
their organization to prevent the foreclosure; three reported that the lender or servicer did 
not notify them of the delinquency or foreclosure proceeding in a timely fashion to enable 
intervention; three reported that the homeowner‘s financial situation had permanently 
changed, rendering homeownership impossible to sustain; and two reported that the 
homeowner‘s financial situation had temporarily changed, but the CLT did not have 
enough resources to help the homeowner pay the mortgage. Of the thirteen completed 
forecloses that occurred in 2010, only one resulted in the loss of a resale-restricted home 
from a CLT‘s portfolio.  
Intervention and outcomes of 2010 seriously delinquent homeowners. At any 
point in time during 2010, 66 homeowners were seriously delinquent (31 organizations 
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had anywhere from 1 to 7 serious delinquencies).  Twenty-nine organizations provided 
additional information on the outcomes for 61 of these seriously delinquent homeowners: 
40 homeowners (66%) remained in their homes at the end of 2010 despite being seriously 
delinquent, and 21 homeowners (34%) were no longer in their resale-restricted homes by 
the end of 2010 (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8. Outcomes of homeowners who were seriously delinquent during 2010 (n = 
61). 
 
Outcomes # % 
Foreclosed 10 16% 
Completed short-sale 1 2% 
Sold home to CLT/eligible buyer 10 16% 
With financial assistance, remained in home 40 66% 
Total 61 100% 
 
  
For the 21 seriously delinquent homeowners who did not remain in their homes at 
the end of 2010, respondents were asked to categorize how each owner exited 
homeownership. Ten completed foreclosure; one completed a short sale; four sold their 
home to an income-eligible buyer; and six sold their home back to the organization. For 
the 40 seriously delinquent homeowners who managed to stay in their homes through the 
end of 2010, respondents reported providing direct or indirect assistance to promote 
better outcomes than foreclosure. This type of assistance is a part of the stewardship 
services that CLTs typically provide (see next section). Respondents were asked to report 
on the different types of assistance offered to seriously delinquent homeowners during 
2010. Seven homeowners received funds from the organization or another source to bring 
the mortgage current; one homeowner had his/her lease fee payments suspended to lessen 
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monthly bills; eight homeowners received help to complete permanent loan 
modifications; eight homeowners received help to complete temporary loan 
modifications; and fifteen homeowners received assistance to complete other financial 
workouts (e.g. federal programs that provide assistance to households threatened by 
foreclosure). Twenty-three of these seriously delinquent homeowners received 
foreclosure prevention counseling in addition to the aforementioned financial assistance. 
One homeowner refused any form of assistance. 
To summarize, out of the 61 CLT homeowners who were seriously delinquent, 
ten foreclosures and one short sale occurred in 2010. The remaining 50 delinquent 
homeowners were able to avoid foreclosure by selling their homes with the support of 
their stewarding organization, or they maintained homeownership through the end of 
2010 with the financial assistance and counseling of their stewarding organization.  
Successful intervention with homeowners at-risk of foreclosure may be facilitated 
by the rapport that some CLTs appear to maintain with their homeowners. One third of 
the organizations with seriously delinquent homeowners in 2010 reported that 50-100% 
of these owners contacted the organization on their own volition to seek assistance. One 
third reported that 20-50% of these homeowners contacted them, while the remaining one 
third acknowledged that less than 5% of their seriously delinquent homeowners reached 
out to them for help. Regardless of whether the homeowner initiated contact with the 
CLT, the CLTs identified delinquent homeowners and initiated foreclosure prevention 
activities as part of their stewardship practices (see next section). 
While it is not possible to make direct comparisons to measures in the market, 
some statistics may be derived from the OCC-OTS report (2011) that shed light on how 
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the conventional market is performing on home retention when owners of market-rate 
homes become delinquent on monthly mortgage payments. This report provides 
information on ―home retention actions,‖ defined as ―loan modifications, in which 
servicers modify one or more mortgage contract terms; trial-period plans, in which the 
loans will be converted to modifications upon successful underwriting and completion of 
the trial periods; and payment plans, in which no terms are contractually modified, but 
borrowers are given time to catch up on missed payments. All of these actions assist the 
borrower to become current on the loan, attain payment sustainability, and retain the 
home‖ (p.19).  
Using numbers from the OCC-OTS report, a measure of ―serious delinquencies‖ 
(mortgages at least 90 days delinquent or in foreclosure proceedings) was calculated for 
the fourth quarter of 2010, totaling 2,333,720 seriously delinquent loans. Next, loan 
modifications were isolated from other home retention activities in the OCC-OTS report, 
yielding a total of 208,696 modifications for the fourth quarter of 2010. A quarterly rate 
for loan modifications was then calculated using the same metric for the denominator as 
was used to calculate serious delinquencies for the CLT mortgages. Because seriously 
delinquent loans undergoing loan modifications often span more than one quarter (and 
are, therefore, counted in more than one quarter), it is not possible to simply multiply the 
quarterly loan modification rate to calculate an annual loan modification rate for the 
OTS-OCC data, as this would result in an overestimate.  Among the owners of market-
rate homes, 9% of seriously delinquent mortgage loans were modified in the fourth 
quarter of 2010. Among owners of the resale-restricted homes included in the CLT 
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Survey, the annual rate of loan modifications for seriously delinquent homeowners was 
26% (16/61).  
Using the same denominator and the total number of home retention actions 
completed in the fourth quarter of 2010 as the numerator, the quarterly rate for home 
retention actions among market-rate homeowners was 20% (473,415/2,333,720) based on 
the OCC-OTS data. In CLTs, home retention actions included a broader array of 
activities; the annual rate of home retention actions for seriously delinquent homeowners 
in CLTs was 64% (39/61).  
Important caveats must be made on this attempt to provide a relative comparison 
of home retention activities between the OCC-OTS sample and the CLT survey sample. 
First, the OCC-OTS sample does not allow for any estimate of the annual rates of loan 
modifications or home retention activities. Second, home retention actions may be 
occurring on loans that are less than 90 days delinquent in the OCC-OTS loan pool; 
therefore, the rates presented in the OCC-OTS data are likely to be overestimations for 
seriously delinquent loans.  The CLT numbers for home retention actions and loan 
modifications were those occurring only with seriously delinquent homeowners. Lastly, it 
should be pointed out that home retention activities do not always result in a delinquency 
being cured, regardless of whether a homeowner is in market-rate housing or CLT 
housing.  
Even though rigorous comparisons are not possible, these findings do suggest that 
CLTs may be more successful than lending institutions in the conventional market at 
curing or mitigating the impact of mortgage delinquency.  These findings imply that 
stewardship services performed by CLTs are contributing to this success.  Nevertheless, 
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additional data are necessary to evaluate these differences and draw empirical 
conclusions about the relative cure rates of owners in CLT homes versus those in the 
conventional market. 
CLT Stewardship Practices that Promote Positive Outcomes 
While the previous section reviewed the interventions performed by CLTs during 
2010 when confronted with seriously delinquent homeowners (albeit relatively few), this 
section will review information from the survey on the overall prevalence of various 
stewardship policies and practices that the CLTs had in place as of December 31
st
, 2010. 
What tends to set the CLT model apart from other shared equity homeownership models 
and affordable housing programs is their steadfast commitment to the stewardship of their 
homeowners. A recent study supports the claim that stewardship is a forte of CLTs and 
enables homeowners to succeed at maintaining homeownership (Thaden & Davis, 2010).  
The policies and practices reviewed below do not provide an exhaustive list of 
stewardship activities (for additional information, see Thaden, 2011). It focuses only on 
those activities that may prevent homeowners from becoming delinquent and prevent 
delinquency from leading to foreclosure. This section is organized according to five types 
of stewardship conducted by CLTs: (1) approval of home financing; (2) pre-purchase and 
post-purchase education of prospective homebuyers; (3) interaction with mortgage 
lenders; (4) intervention in delinquencies; and (5) intervention in foreclosures The results 
shed light on how delinquencies and foreclosures are prevented for CLT homeowners.   
Table 9 summarizes the prevalence of various policies and practices in ascending order 
under each type of stewardship.  
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Table 9. Percentages of CLTs with various stewardship policies or practices (n = 
62). 
 
Type of 
Stewardship 
Percentage of CLTs With Each Policy or Practice 
Approval of Home 
Financing 
84% Have right to review and approve first mortgages before purchase 
82% Have right to approve or reject home equity lines of credit 
74% Have right to approve or reject refinancing loans 
Pre-purchase and 
Post-purchase 
Education 
98% Require CLT-specific education 
96% Require general homebuyer education 
42% Provide ongoing financial literacy 
42% Communicate program policies over time 
42% Staff position for outreach 
37% Ongoing education or events  
26% Have one-on-one interaction at least annually 
6% Offer savings programs 
Interaction with 
Mortgage Lenders 
53% Contact lender if homeowner defaults 
44% Require lenders to contact them about 30 or 60 day delinquencies 
44% Have legal right to communicate directly with lender 
31% Require lenders to send all homeowner notifications to CLT 
Intervention in 
Delinquencies 
79% 
Provide or refer delinquent homeowners to foreclosure prevention 
counseling 
73% Able to make mortgage payment current on homeowners behalf 
66% Provide or refer delinquent homeowners to financial counseling  
58% Able to help the owner sell the home to an income-eligible buyer  
42% Require a meeting with the homeowner if a mortgage default occurs 
39% Able to re-purchase the home themselves in order to prevent foreclosure 
19% 
Able to provide emergency or rescue funds to the homeowner to help 
them become current on their mortgage 
Intervention in 
Foreclosures 
89% Have the right of first offer and first refusal when a foreclosure occurs 
58% 
Have the right to increase monthly ground lease fee when a foreclosure 
occurs 
 
 
Approval of home financing. A core protection of the CLT homeownership 
model is to ensure that homebuyers obtain sound, affordable mortgages when purchasing 
their homes and do not obtain unsound, unpayable loans or disadvantageously refinance 
during their tenure. A large majority of the CLTs surveyed have a contractual right to 
oversee the financing of their resale-restricted homes: 84% had the right to review and 
approve first mortgages before purchase; 74% had the right to approve or reject 
refinancing loans, and 82% had the right to approve or reject home equity lines of credit. 
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Pre-purchase and post-purchase education. Pre-purchase education of 
prospective homebuyers, along with detailed disclosure of the special conditions and 
restrictions that come with owning a CLT home, has long been required by most CLTs. 
General homebuyer education (e.g. a NeighborWorks or HUD homebuyer counseling 
course) was required by 96% of the CLTs surveyed, with 25% of the respondents 
providing this education themselves. Homebuyer education specific to owning a resale-
restricted CLT home was required by 98% of CLTs, and almost all (90%) of the 
respondents provide this education themselves.  
Ongoing support and education through post-purchase stewardship is conducted 
by CLTs to proactively promote the success of their homeowners. Some of the post-
purchase practices reported by CLTs included ongoing financial literacy education 
(42%), formal communication with owners over time about the program‘s policies 
(42%), a staffed position to conduct homeowner outreach (42%), annual or more frequent 
one-on-one interactions with homeowners (26%), ongoing homeownership education 
classes or events (37%), and homeowner savings programs (6%).  
Interaction with mortgage lenders. In order to identify homeowners at risk for 
serious delinquency, some CLTs have instituted the legal right to maintain direct 
correspondence with the lender. Some lenders are not willing to legally agree to this 
obligation as it places responsibility on them to communicate with an additional party, 
which deviates from standard practices in the conventional market. Nevertheless, 44% of 
CLTs reported that mortgage lenders are required to notify the CLT when a homeowner 
becomes 30 or 60 days delinquent. The same percentage reported they had the legal right 
to communicate directly with the mortgage lender, and 53% reported that they contact the 
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lender if a homeowner defaults (regardless of whether this communication is built into 
the CLT‘s contractual rights). Additionally, 31% of CLTs reported that their first 
mortgage lenders are required to send the CLT any notifications that they send to the 
homeowner. Such notifications provide an early warning to the CLTs that intervention 
with a troubled homeowner may be needed, but some CLTs reported that lenders failed to 
communicate with them, even when lenders are contractually obligated to do so. Part of 
this failure may result from lenders not servicing the loans they originate to homebuyers. 
Intervention in delinquencies. When owners of CLT homes become delinquent 
on their mortgages, many CLTs have policies and practices in place to intervene so 
foreclosures may be prevented: 79% reported that they provide or refer delinquent 
homeowners to foreclosure prevention counseling, 66% provide or refer delinquent 
homeowners to financial counseling (which may also happen before a homeowner ever 
becomes delinquent), and 42% reported that they require a meeting with the homeowner 
if a mortgage default occurs. Additionally, 19% of respondents reported that they are 
ready to provide emergency or rescue funds to the homeowner to help them become 
current on their mortgage.  
If homeownership proves unsustainable for the delinquent owner, then 58% of the 
CLTs reported that they would help the homeowner sell the home directly to another 
income-eligible buyer and 39% reported they would re-purchase the home themselves in 
order to prevent foreclosure. Another intervention that multiple CLTs mentioned in open-
ended comments was that they may suspend collection of their monthly ground lease fees 
to lessen the homeowner‘s expenses and to make it easier for the homeowner to cure the 
mortgage delinquency. 
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When CLTs evaluate that a delinquent homeowner may be able to maintain 
homeownership with some financial assistance, CLTs may cure the delinquency on 
behalf of the homeowner.  While this action takes resources and may not be feasible for 
the organization, 73% of CLTs reported that they have the legal right to pay the 
outstanding mortgage amount to the lender. Enacting this right can be crucial for 
preserving the resale-restricted home rather than losing it through the process of 
foreclosure.  
Intervention in foreclosures. When a completed foreclosure or deed-in-lieu of 
foreclosure occurs for a homeowner, the CLT has a vested interest in keeping the resale-
restricted home in its portfolio. Most CLTs (89%) reported that they legally have the 
right of first offer and first refusal when a foreclosure has occurred, meaning that they 
have the first opportunity to purchase the home from the first mortgagee or the right to 
match an offer made by another party to purchase the home. For CLTs that use a ground 
lease to impose use and resale restrictions on homes located on a CLT‘s land, they often 
have an additional recourse that incentivizes the lender to sell a foreclosed home to the 
CLT: The CLT may increase the ground lease fee if resale restrictions are removed. 
Fifty-eight percent of CLTs had the right to increase their ground lease fee if a foreclosed 
home on their land is no longer a part of the CLT‘s portfolio of permanently affordable 
housing.  
  All of these rights, policies, and practice, which comprise the typical stewardship 
program of a CLT, contribute to their homeowners avoiding delinquency, preventing 
foreclosure, and maintaining homeownership. These stewardship activities require 
staffing and financial resources. With more lower income homeowners facing difficult 
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financial circumstances due to the economic recession, CLTs have needed to provide 
more intensive stewardship for these owners. Unsurprisingly, 45% of CLTs reported that 
they have devoted more staff time since 2008 to post-purchase stewardship activities that 
addressed mortgage delinquencies and foreclosure prevention; 42% reported the same 
staff time had been allocated; and 13% reported less staff time had been allocated. These 
variations could be a function of inadequate organizational resources or a lack of need for 
such services within their pool of homeowners.  
 
Discussion 
This study found that lower income owners of resale-restricted homes with 
outstanding mortgages at the end of 2010 were substantially less likely to be seriously 
delinquent or in the midst of foreclosure proceedings than homeowners across all income 
levels with conventional mortgages. These findings are consistent with similar studies of 
CLTs for 2008 and 2009 (Misak, 2009; Thaden, 2010). A large body of research 
documents higher rates of delinquency and foreclosure among lower income homebuyers 
(e.g. Immergluck, 2009), suggesting that the difference between CLT loan outcomes and 
MBA loan outcomes would have been even greater if low-to-moderate income loan 
holders could have been isolated in the MBA data. Furthermore, the durability of the 
CLT model for preserving land in trust was illustrated by the nominal loss of only five 
properties to foreclosures in the histories of the entire sample. 
While the findings of the study showed robust effects, numerous limitations need 
to be addressed by future research. First, the findings were based upon 58% of all CLTs 
that were assessed to be eligible for analysis. The analysis included roughly 70% of 
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resale-restricted homes that likely had outstanding mortgages at the end of 2010. The 
subsample overrepresented CLTs in states with higher foreclosure rates and CLTs with 
larger portfolios of resale-restricted homes. However, CLTs within the subsample that 
were located in states with higher foreclosure rates did not have significantly higher rates 
of serious delinquencies among their homeowners (r = .08). Additionally, the rates of 
serious delinquencies reported by CLTs were not significantly correlated with the size of 
CLTs‘ resale-restricted home portfolios (r = -.12). These trends support that non-
responders may have similar loan performance outcomes among their homeowners as 
responders. However, more information is needed to assess the representativeness of the 
subsample and how responders and non-responders may have differed. Consequently, 
future research should gather additional information on all CLTs, including more 
accurate counts of resale-restricted unit and outstanding residential mortgages.  
Next, CLT staff provided information on the first mortgage loans of their owners; 
consequently, they may have inaccurately reported loan performance. Because CLTs 
have a recorded ownership interest in the property, CLT staff are very likely to be aware 
of foreclosure proceedings initiated on any home within their portfolio. However, 
respondents may have been unaware of some instances of 90 day or longer delinquencies, 
resulting in the under reporting of serious delinquencies. To explore this possibility, rates 
of serious delinquencies at the end of 2010 were compared among CLTs that require 
lenders to notify them of 60-day or 90-day delinquencies (n = 27) and CLTs that do not 
require these delinquency notifications from lenders (n = 35). The former group had a 
serious delinquency rate of .98%, and the latter group had a rate of 1.58%. Hence, it 
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appears that CLTs tend to be aware of serious delinquencies in their homeowners 
regardless of third-party notifications.   
Nevertheless, desirability effects among respondents to under report occurrences 
of serious delinquencies or foreclosure proceedings cannot be ruled out.  It should be 
noted, however, that even if the actual numbers of serious delinquencies and foreclosure 
proceedings were double those reported by respondents, then the rates of serious 
delinquencies and foreclosure proceedings in CLT loans would still be substantially 
lower than rates within conventional market loans. Lastly, due to the sample size and 
research design—where organizations were the unit of measure—it was not possible to 
model various factors that predicted delinquency and foreclosure outcomes for 
individuals.  Consequently, future research should build upon this preliminary study by 
examining individual-level data on CLT homeowners. Despite limitations, this is the 
largest sample of shared equity homeownership programs documented in the empirical 
literature to date.  
For a large majority of the CLT homeowners who were seriously delinquent 
during 2010, stewardship arrested the slide toward foreclosure.  While more research is 
needed to rigorously compare CLT interventions to conventional market interventions, 
CLTs were found to activate a wider array of strategies to promote better outcomes for 
homeowners than foreclosure (e.g. grants or loans to cure delinquency, monthly lease fee 
forgiveness, permanent and temporary loan modifications, financial counseling, resale of 
homes). The result was that four out of five seriously delinquent homeowners were able 
to keep their homes through 2010 or sell their homes back to the CLT or an income-
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eligible buyer, avoiding injuries to their credit and other costs incurred from foreclosure 
or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. 
In order to isolate the effects of various structural and programmatic components 
of CLTs, ideally this study would have been able to compare performance of mortgages 
held by CLT owners to mortgages held by recipients of other types of affordable 
homeownership assistance programs. Unfortunately, data on long-term loan performance 
outcomes do not exist for down payment assistance programs, homebuyer education 
counseling programs, or foreclosure prevention counseling (and it was beyond the 
capacity of the existing study to gather such data). In part, this data do not exist as no 
other existing affordable homeownership programs—outside of shared equity 
homeownership programs—provide permanent subsidies for housing affordability, pre-
purchase education, direct oversight and approval of first mortgage loans (and any 
subsequent refinance loans or home equity lines of credit), formal communication with 
first mortgage lenders, and post-purchase stewardship services for lower income 
homeowners. Consequently, it is likely that CLTs may outperform other types of 
programs that aim to help lower income households enter or sustain homeownership. 
Nevertheless, future research should examine the rates of delinquencies and foreclosures 
among various recipients of affordable homeownership programs to tease apart the 
relative contributions of various aspects of the CLT model that predict delinquency or 
foreclosure outcomes.  
This study supports that lower income and minority owners of CLT homes were 
spared from the adverse impacts of the subprime lending boom—an industry that 
predominantly targeted these types of buyers and owners— due to the oversight of home 
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purchase and refinance loans by the CLTs.  While low-to-moderate income and minority 
homeowners in CLTs have not been spared from the impact of the economic recession, 
the protections and stewardship services offered by CLTs seem to have buffered the 
extent to which the recession has negatively impacted residents‘ investments in 
homeownership. After all, low-to-moderate income homeowners are unable to build 
wealth from homeownership during housing market downturns unless they sustain 
homeownership and pay down the principal of their mortgage loans. Since so few 
homeowners in CLTs experience serious delinquency or foreclosure, their likelihood for 
sustaining homeownership and building wealth is far better than their counterparts in the 
conventional market, even if the accumulation of equity is limited by restrictions that 
maintain affordability of homes for future buyers. This study contributes to the emerging 
body of research, which supports that this form of homeownership is providing better 
outcomes for lower income households than the conventional market, even during 
housing market downturns and poor economic conditions (Davis & Stokes, 2008; 
Temkin, Theodos & Price, 2010; Thaden, 2010a).  
CLTs are not only enabling entry into homeownership by lower income and 
minority households; they are also protecting the homeownership and wealth-building 
opportunities that they and their public sector partners have worked so hard to create. 
Unlike other affordable housing programs, these programs retain public investment in 
affordable housing to serve lower income household after household. In addition to the 
provision of permanent affordability, the CLT model is designed so that lower income 
households are more likely to enter and sustain homeownership. However, the creation of 
resale-restricted homes in a CLT requires an initial subsidy of public funds and often 
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modest ongoing support for stewardship activities to promote the program‘s and the 
homeowners‘ ongoing success. The low rates of delinquency and foreclosure found by 
this study suggest that greater public support of CLT projects and programs appears 
warranted.  
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Appendix A. Survey and Sample 
 
Survey and Administration 
The 2011 Comprehensive Community Land Trust Survey (hereinafter ―CLT 
Survey‖) aimed to holistically capture the current landscape of CLTs in the United States. 
The CLT Survey was administered to U.S. community land trusts or shared equity 
homeownership programs (collectively referred to as ―CLTs‖) included in the National 
Community Land Trust Network‘s directory as of March 1, 2011 that had working e-mail 
addresses (n = 216). Shared equity homeownership programs that do not use a ground 
lease to preserve affordability (and are, therefore, not technically CLTs) are included in 
the directory if they have elected to become a member of the Network and subscribe to 
the CLT model in terms of affordability and stewardship practices. CLTs in the directory 
are included all known CLTs and organizations working to develop CLTs in the U.S.; 
they may or may not be members of the Network. The directory included an additional 30 
organizations that did not have electronic communication or working e-mails, which were 
removed from the database prior to recruitment.  
The survey was comprised of eight sections: 1. Preliminary Information (i.e. 
contact information), 2. Your Organization & Homeownership Program, 3. Your Resale 
Controls: Policies & Practices, 4. Sources of Funding, 5. Your Organization‘s Portfolio, 
6. First Mortgage Loans, 7. Delinquencies & Foreclosures, and 8. Characteristics of 
Current Homeowners. The majority of the questions were close-ended, including 
checklists and best-answer selections. Open-ended questions were predominantly seeking 
numeric values (e.g. number of units) or concrete textual responses (e.g. names of 
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lenders), while a minority of questions sought comments to clarify or supplement 
responses.  
Using Adobe X Pro, the survey was administered as an electronic link to a fillable 
form that could be incrementally saved and returned to for completion from March 28
th
-
April 22
nd
, 2010. The instructions, survey, and general feedback was presented in a 25-
page fillable Portable Document Format (pdf) with approximately 110 questions that 
included up to 413 fillable fields (depending on whether questions were applicable to the 
respondent). Piloting revealed that the survey took approximately an hour and a half to 
complete. Respondents were able click a ―submit‖ button once they finished the survey, 
which directly downloaded data to a database, minimizing data entry errors.  
Up to three e-mails were sent to the recruitment sample to advance participation 
and offer alternative methods for administration (hand-written responses) and submission 
(scanning and e-mail or postal mail). For non-responders, the researcher or a Network 
staff member called the organization to request survey participation. Participation was 
also promoted by raffling five $300 registrations to the annual National Community Land 
Trust Network conference and an additional five copies of The CLT Reader edited by 
John E. Davis.  
Characteristics of Survey Responders and Non-responders 
Out of the 216 organizations recruited for participation, 96 organizations 
submitted a survey, a response rate of 44% (96/216). The number of resale-restricted 
homes and location of the 96 organizations within the survey sample and the 120 
organizations not in the sample (―non-responders‖) are presented in Table A1.  ―Resale-
restricted homes‖ excludes manufactured homes, coops and rentals that would not be 
118 
 
eligible for single-family mortgages. Of the 120 non-responders, 42 organizations had 
resale-restricted homes, totaling 1,118 units. Of the 96 survey responders, 72 had resale-
restricted homes, totaling 3,669 units. Ultimately, 72% of responders had resale-restricted 
homes and only 35% of non-responders had resale-restricted homes. Hence, the survey 
responders represented 76.6% of all resale-restricted homes, and over-represented CLTs 
with resale-restricted units.  
Examining only organizations with resale-restricted homes, responders had larger 
portfolios of resale-restricted homes (Mdn =24, M = 50.96, range = 1-488) than non-
responders (Mdn =15, M = 26.62, range = 1-174).  For non-responders, the largest 
organization had 174 resale-restricted homes, accounting for 15.5% of the non-
responder‘s combined portfolio (n =1,118). Similarly, one organization, Champlain 
Housing Trust, had 488 resale-restricted homes, accounting for 13.3% of units among 
survey responders (n =3,669). Amongst non-responders, a total of two organizations had 
more than 100 resale-restricted homes and five organizations had between 50 to 100 
units. Cumulatively, these seven organizations accounted for 59.8% of the total number 
of resale-restricted homes not represented in the sample. 
 Amongst responders, a total of four organizations had more than 200 resale-
restricted homeownership units in their portfolios, accounting for 31.2% of the units 
among survey responders (n = 1,142). An additional six organizations had more than 100 
resale-restricted homeownership units (n = 817). Cumulatively these ten organizations 
accounted for 56.5% of the resale-restricted homeownership units within the sample. 
While four organizations did not provide information and 30 organizations had yet to sell 
a resale-restricted unit because they were start-ups, the earliest year a respondent reported 
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selling their first resale-restricted unit was in 1976, while the latest was in 2011 (Mdn = 
2003, M = 2001).  
Figure A1 presents the geographical location of responders and non-responders. 
The responders were located in 35 states, and non-responders were located in 38 states. 
The range of the number of responders per state was 0 to 15 (Mdn = 1, M = 1.88). The 
range of the number of non-responders per state was 0-10 (Mdn = 2, M = 2.35). The 
states most frequently represented in the sample of organizations were WA (n = 15), CA 
(n = 8), FL (n = 8), MA (n = 6), NY (n = 5), MN (n = 5), and MT (n = 5), which 
accounted for 54.17% of the total sample. All other states were represented by no more 
than four organizations in the sample, and 18 states were represented by only one 
organization. The states most frequently represented by non-responders were FL (n = 10), 
CA (n = 8), NY (n = 8), VT (n = 8), MA (n = 6, OR (n = 6), NH (n = 6), and MN (n = 5), 
representing 47.5% of the organizations that were not in the sample.   
Some of the non-responders came from states with high foreclosure rates, while 
others did not. Table A1 presents the cumulative total of resale-restricted units by ranking 
of states with the highest foreclosure rates. More of the resale-restricted homes within the 
sample were located in states with higher delinquency rates than the resale-restricted 
homes within the non-responders.  
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Figure A1. Organizations included in (n = 96) and excluded from (n = 120) the survey sample. 
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Table A1. Organizations and resale-restricted homes included and excluded from the sample by highest to lowest state 
delinquency rate ranking at the end of 2010.  
 
MBA Information* # of Organizations # of Resale-restricted homes 
Cumulative % of Resale-
restricted homes 
State 
State Ranking of 
Highest Serious 
Delinquency 
Rates 
Serious 
Delinquency 
Rate 
Not in 
Sample     
(n =120) 
In 
Sample 
(n = 96) 
Total             
(n = 216) 
Not in 
Sample     
(n =1118) 
In Sample 
(n = 3669) 
Total            
(n = 4787) 
Not in 
Sample       
(n =1118) 
In Sample     
(n = 3669) 
Total           
(n = 4787) 
FL 1 19.37% 10 8 18 10 115 125 0.89% 3.13% 2.61% 
NV 2 17.44% 3 0 3 0 0 0 0.89% 3.13% 2.61% 
NJ 3 10.94% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.89% 3.13% 2.61% 
IL 4 10.70% 1 3 4 0 87 87 0.89% 5.51% 4.43% 
AZ 5 10.55% 4 0 4 82 0 82 8.23% 5.51% 6.14% 
CA 6 9.79% 8 8 16 0 140 140 8.23% 9.32% 9.07% 
NY 7 9.10% 8 5 13 42 41 83 11.99% 10.44% 10.80% 
OH 8 8.95% 2 2 4 0 20 20 11.99% 10.98% 11.22% 
MI 9 8.90% 2 1 3 12 16 28 13.06% 11.42% 11.80% 
IN 10 8.59% 0 0 0 0 0 0 13.06% 11.42% 11.80% 
GA 11 8.54% 3 3 6 5 22 27 13.51% 12.02% 12.37% 
RI 12 8.52% 3 1 4 65 90 155 19.32% 14.47% 15.60% 
MD 13 8.35% 3 0 3 0 0 0 19.32% 14.47% 15.60% 
MS 14 8.35% 2 0 2 1 0 1 19.41% 14.47% 15.63% 
ME 15 8.26% 3 1 4 6 2 8 19.95% 14.53% 15.79% 
HI 16 7.70% 0 1 1 0 9 9 19.95% 14.77% 15.98% 
CT 17 7.53% 4 0 4 32 0 32 22.81% 14.77% 16.65% 
LA 18 7.41% 3 1 4 2 0 2 22.99% 14.77% 16.69% 
SC 19 7.24% 2 0 2 0 0 0 22.99% 14.77% 16.69% 
DE 20 7.21% 0 1 1 0 23 23 22.99% 15.40% 17.17% 
MA 21 7.14% 6 6 12 13 284 297 24.15% 23.14% 23.38% 
KY 22 6.81% 1 0 1 0 0 0 24.15% 23.14% 23.38% 
TN 23 6.80% 0 2 2 0 6 6 24.15% 23.30% 23.50% 
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UT 24 6.66% 0 1 1 0 38 38 24.15% 24.34% 24.29% 
WA 25 6.55% 2 15 17 0 453 453 24.15% 36.69% 33.76% 
PA 26 6.43% 4 2 6 16 35 51 25.58% 37.64% 34.82% 
ID 27 6.21% 1 1 2 3 0 3 25.85% 37.64% 34.89% 
OR 28 6.17% 6 3 9 29 160 189 28.44% 42.00% 38.83% 
WI 29 6.15% 1 2 3 0 60 60 28.44% 43.64% 40.09% 
DC 30 6.13% 1 1 2 0 42 42 28.44% 44.78% 40.97% 
AL 31 6.01% 0 1 1 0 5 5 28.44% 44.92% 41.07% 
NM 32 5.96% 3 1 4 5 85 90 28.89% 47.23% 42.95% 
NC 33 5.91% 2 4 6 0 249 249 28.89% 54.02% 48.15% 
OK 34 5.81% 0 0 0 0 0 0 28.89% 54.02% 48.15% 
NH 35 5.48% 6 0 6 14 0 14 30.14% 54.02% 48.44% 
MN 36 5.44% 5 5 10 115 550 665 40.43% 69.01% 62.34% 
AR 37 5.34% 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.43% 69.01% 62.34% 
MO 38 5.28% 1 1 2 8 18 26 41.14% 69.50% 62.88% 
TX 39 5.08% 3 1 4 5 2 7 41.59% 69.56% 63.02% 
KS 40 5.03% 0 1 1 0 44 44 41.59% 70.75% 63.94% 
WV 41 4.97% 0 0 0 0 0 0 41.59% 70.75% 63.94% 
CO 42 4.95% 2 3 5 174 435 609 57.16% 82.61% 76.67% 
IA 43 4.89% 1 1 2 7 1 8 57.78% 82.64% 76.83% 
VT 44 4.81% 8 1 9 336 488 824 87.84% 95.94% 94.05% 
VA 45 4.69% 1 1 2 19 0 19 89.53% 95.94% 94.44% 
MT 46 3.64% 1 5 6 0 63 63 89.53% 97.66% 95.76% 
NE 47 3.49% 0 0 0 0 0 0 89.53% 97.66% 95.76% 
WY 48 3.12% 1 0 1 99 0 99 98.39% 97.66% 97.83% 
SD 49 2.86% 1 0 1 18 0 18 100.00% 97.66% 98.20% 
AK 50 2.32% 2 2 4 0 86 86 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
ND 51 2.12% 0 1 1 0 0 0 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
*from the Mortgage Bankers Association‘s National Delinquency Survey (MBA, 2011). 
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Organizational Characteristics of the Sample  
Some CLTs are located within broader organizations; others are CLTs that stand 
alone as their own organization, and some are CLT programs (referred to as ―resale-
restricted homeownership programs‖) that have yet to establish their organizational 
designations. The oldest organization in the sample was established in 1958, the youngest 
in 2010, where the median was 2001 and the average was 1998 (14 organizations did not 
provide information).  Respondents were also asked when their resale-restricted 
homeownership programs were established (since these could be different from the 
organization), the oldest homeownership program was established in 1974 and the 
youngest in 2011 (M = 2003, Mdn = 2001, 11 did not provide information).  
For the 95 organizations that provided information, the service areas for these 
organizations were as follows: one or more neighborhoods (n = 17), the city (n = 17), the 
county (n = 30), the MSA (n = 8), more than one county including smaller and larger 
areas than the MSA (n = 19), and the state (n = 4). Respondents were asked about the 
service area for their resale-restricted homeownership programs to see whether they 
differed from the organization. Only three respondents reported smaller service areas for 
their resale-restricted homeownership programs. Table A2 presents the designations and 
affiliations of responding organizations (organizations were asked to check all that 
apply).  
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Table A2. Organizational designations and affiliations (n = 96). 
 
Designations or Affiliations # of Organizations % of Organizations 
Community Land Trust (CLT)  92 95.8% 
Tax exempt nonprofit with a 501(c)(3) designation 87 90.6% 
Community Housing Development Organization 
(CHDO) 42 43.8% 
Community Development Corporation (CDC)  19 19.8% 
Other  10 10.4% 
NeighborWorks organization (NWO) 4 4.2% 
Local Initiatives Support Coalition (LISC) affiliate 3 3.1% 
Community Development Financial Inst. (CDFI) 2 2.1% 
Department or agency of municipal government 2 2.1% 
Public housing authority 2 2.1% 
Habitat for Humanity affiliate 1 1.0% 
State Housing Authority/Agency 0 0.0% 
 
 
Ten organizations indicated ―other,‖ which they explained in a follow-up question: half 
were start-ups currently located or being supported by a government agency and half 
were working to be designated as non-profits or CHDOs. 
Organizational Portfolios of the Sample 
At the end of 2010, the sample of organizations had 9,543 residential housing 
units within their portfolios, which are presented by housing type in Table A3. 
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Table A3. Organizational portfolios of residential units & unit additions during 
2010 (n = 96). 
 
Housing Type 
Total # of 
Units 
Range of # of 
Units per 
Organization 
# Added in 2010 
Homeownership units with resale-restrictions 3,669 0-488 405 
Homeownership units without resale-restrictions 273 0-150 7 
Cooperative units 156 0-58 0 
Lease-purchase units 54 0-19 6 
Rental Units 5,391 0-1,449 222 
Total 9,543 0-1,995 640 
 
 
In addition to residential units, 13 organizations reported having 96 commercial 
spaces within their portfolios. When respondents were asked what entities lease these 
spaces, responses included office space for the organization, other non-profits, and small 
or local businesses (e.g. homeless shelter, child development centers, adult day care 
center, legal aid services, non-profit utility provider, community garden sites, retail 
companies, storage space, photo gallery, artist cooperative, food cooperative, arts and 
crafts store). Lastly, 12 organizations reported land conservation as a part of their 
missions. Ranging from .5 to 16,035 acres, these organizations stewarded a total of 
17,431.5 acres of land in urban and rural environments.  
 The 3,669 resale-restricted homeownership units accounted for 38% of the units 
in the sample‘s organizational portfolios. As Table A3 illustrates, during 2010 more 
resale-restricted homeownership units were added to these organization‘s portfolios than 
any other type of housing. Notably, 30 organizations had yet to sell a resale-restricted 
unit because they were new, start-up CLTs. However, seven of these had developed a 
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total of 89 resale-restricted homeownership units during 2010 (range for start-up CLTs = 
1-25 units).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: CHALLENGES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECTOR FORMATION AND GROWTH 
 
It [shared equity homeownership] was meant to be a tool for making affordable tenure 
durable, but it was never meant to be a financial tool or a tool of the finance industry. 
John E. Davis (personal communication, April 10, 2012) 
 
Increasing access to homeownership has long been a federal policy goal, as 
owning a home is well established as the dominant vehicle for building wealth among 
lower-income and minority households. However, the foreclosure crisis has shown that  
homeownership is not always sustainable and does not always yield positive financial 
results. The crisis has additionally elucidated that the outcomes of home purchase—good 
and bad— extend far beyond the household, affecting surrounding communities and the 
broader economy.  Consequently, growing attention has been paid to ―shared equity 
homeownership‖ (SEH), which provides communities with permanently affordable 
homeownership opportunities and residents with sound investments and sustainable 
tenure.  
However, SEH has by no means expanded significantly or become a widely 
recognized sector. In fact, SEH is being conflated with similarly-named finance products 
or less effective affordable housing programs, obscuring the transformational potential of 
this model on the U.S. housing market. This paper examines existing problems in the 
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landscape of SEH, which are hindering sector formation and growth. Recommendations 
for how to resolve these problems and advance the development the SEH sector are 
presented.    
 
Introduction 
Over the past few decades, a variety of tools or models have been developed with 
the express purpose of: 1) increasing access to homeownership by lowering monthly 
mortgage payments, and 2) structuring ―shared returns‖ at resale from residential 
property ownership.  They took different names and various forms, such as shared 
appreciation mortgages, limited equity housing cooperatives, community land trusts, 
shared equity mortgages, and some deed-restricted housing programs (sometimes referred 
to as inclusionary zoning). However, only some of these tools structured shared returns at 
resale for the express and intentional purpose of maintaining the affordability of homes in 
perpetuity for owner-occupancy by lower income households; these were limited equity 
housing cooperatives (LECs), community land trusts (CLTs), and deed-restricted housing 
or inclusionary zoning programs with lasting affordability restrictions (referenced as 
―Deed-restricted housing‖ or ―DRH programs‖ hereinafter)1.   
Alternatively, shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs) or shared equity mortgages 
have been crafted by the lending industry to lessen monthly mortgage payments for new 
or existing homeowners, who tend to be low-income and minority borrowers. And more 
recently, the federal government has offered and continues to explore the potential of 
SAMs as a foreclosure prevention tool (Dodd-Frank Act of 2010; Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008). While SAMs share the common outcome of increasing access to 
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homeownership with affordable monthly payments, they differ from the aforementioned 
tools because they are first mortgage products that yield returns from home equity or 
appreciation at resale for the lenders or investors. These products did not and do not keep 
properties permanently affordable, as the lender does not reinvest the financial returns 
into the same residential properties.   
With the publication of a landmark report in 2006, these critical distinctions were 
made clear. Funded by the Ford Foundation and Surdna, John E. Davis authored, Shared 
Equity Homeownership: The changing landscape of owner-occupied, resale-restricted 
housing (2006). The report distinguished those tools that maintained the common purpose 
of keeping residential owner-occupied properties permanently affordable for lower 
income households from those that did not. Additionally, it put forth an umbrella name—
―shared equity homeownership‖ (SEH) — to house these tools (or submodels), enabling a 
unified definition and conceptualization of SEH as an overarching model. So while LECs, 
CLTs, and DRH programs had been known by different names, had various strategies for 
implementation, and maintained unique histories of development, the labeling of SEH 
intended to build cohesion across various movements or SEH submodels that were 
committed to permanent affordability of homes in order to develop knowledge, practice, 
political support, and growth. Ultimately, SEH was put forth as the name for the 
overarching model in order to establish a SEH sector, a ―third sector‖ of housing that was 
neither renting nor conventional home owning (Davis, 1993).  
Nevertheless, three key problems with SEH have remained; each be explained at 
length in this report.  First, practitioners do not seem to be ―buying it.‖ The various 
submodels of SEH are founded upon diverse histories and philosophies of community 
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development, leading to fragmented (and sometimes, competing) priorities among 
practitioners for the advancement of each of their submodels. This affects their support 
for the broader sector. Second, the conceivers of SEH and the sector‘s primary funder, 
the Ford Foundation, do not seem fully committed to it. For example, Cornerstone 
Partnership—funded by the Ford Foundation—went on to endorse using 
―homeownership with long-term affordability‖ in place of ―shared equity 
homeownership‖ (Rick Jacobus, personal communication, June 26, 2012). Third, recent 
grants made by the Ford Foundation do not appear to support a strategic plan for scaling 
up the sector in spite of foundation staff communicating this priority. Unsurprisingly, 
needed supporters in both public and private sectors are confused about SEH and some 
are reticent to support it.  
In spite of the fragmentation within the sector and misunderstanding outside of 
the sector, local and national momentum appears to be intensifying for the housing 
solutions provided by SEH (albeit the public interest is fragmented across submodels or 
misconceived terms). Therefore, it is critical to consider what may be at stake for the 
SEH sector if a core concept is not uniformly named, clearly defined, and then 
strategically planned. For instance, it is possible that the division of movements under 
various names may hinder reaching scale. It is also possible that the reputation of non-
profits doing ―shared equity‖ may be capitalized upon by the private sector to promote 
financial products that result in a new iteration of predatory lending tools.  
Hence, this report contemplates: 1) What issues or tensions exist among 
practitioners, national advocates, and funders that hinder the development of the sector? 
2) What adverse consequences may result if a sector is not named, defined and 
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strategically planned? 3) How can the sector effectively resolve existing issues and 
advance SEH? Before addressing these questions, the next section reviews the definition 
of SEH set forth by Davis‘ report (2006) and the potential impact that SEH may have on 
households, communities, and the housing market.  
 
The Original Definition and Conceptualization of Shared Equity Homeownership 
Prior to reviewing what SEH is and is not, I must acknowledge that I am a 
researcher, practitioner, and political actor within the landscape of SEH. I began applied 
research and community outreach to bring SEH to Nashville as a graduate student in 
2008 with a coalition of practitioners, policy makers, and academics. When a non-profit 
in Nashville received funding for implementation in 2010, I was hired to build and 
manage the program. It will become relevant later in this report, that the program utilized 
a ―hybrid model‖ or ―SEH-like‖ design, which deviated from some of the definitional 
components of SEH that were articulated by Davis‘ report (2006). I was concurrently 
consulting with the National Community Land Trust Network (hereinafter ―the 
Network‖), the national membership organization for community land trusts, to conduct 
research on community land trusts (CLTs).  
In 2011, I was hired onto the staff of the Network to plan and conduct local and 
national trainings and presentations, provide technical assistance, support research, and 
engage in advocacy. Consequently, this report is significantly informed by my 
participatory field experience acting a researcher, practitioner, educator, and advocate for 
CLTs and SEH on both local and national levels.  However, the views expressed in this 
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report are solely my own and do not reflect the views or opinions of my former 
employers or current employer, the Network.
2
   
What It Is  
Shared equity homeownership is resale-restricted, owner-occupied housing for 
lower income households that remains affordable in perpetuity (Davis, 2006). Breaking 
the definition into its component parts, residents of SHE—including the first buyer and 
every subsequent buyer of the home— are low-to-moderate income at the time of 
purchase. The resident has an ownership interest in the property, and is therefore referred 
to as a ―homeowner.‖ However, a non-profit or government organization has provided a 
subsidy to make the home affordable, and consequently, also has an ownership interest.  
This organization is referred to as the ―steward‖ because they steward both the 
home and homeowners. Generally, the steward protects the home as a permanently 
affordable community asset through: 1) monitoring resales to retain the public‘s 
investment that serves lower income households, and 2) overseeing properties to ensure 
they are maintained in good condition. Ideally, they also steward their residents to 
promote successful outcomes from homeownership, such as residential stability and 
wealth-building. Sometimes, the steward provides an array of services for homeowners, 
including pre- and post-purchase education, financial counseling, home repair or 
maintenance assistance, and foreclosure prevention services.  
In return for access to affordable homeownership and the steward‘s ongoing 
support, the homeowner agrees to restrict the price for which the home may be sold in the 
future, which ensures the property will remain affordable for the next low-to-moderate 
income homebuyer. Terms about use and occupancy, eligibility of buyers, and resale 
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restrictions are set forth in a contractual agreement between the homeowner and the 
steward. The result is that the SEH model produces residential properties that remain 
affordable in perpetuity.  
Shared equity homeownership, as defined by Davis (2006), is comprised of three 
different submodels, which provide owner-occupied, resale-restricted permanently 
affordable housing opportunities for low-to-moderate income households. The distinct 
characteristics of each form of SEH are described below and additional information on 
each submodel is summarized in Table 1
3
.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of shared equity homeownership by submodel. 
 
 Limited Equity Housing Cooperatives 
(LEC) 
Community Land Trusts (CLT) 
Deed-restricted Housing programs 
(DRH) 
Brief Definition 
A corporation comprised of lower 
income shareholders that affordably 
own a residential property; the residents 
agree to resale restrictions to maintain 
ongoing affordability of the units.  
A non-profit organization that retains 
ownership of the land underlying 
residential properties, and  lower 
income households purchase the 
improvements and have leasehold 
interests in the land with resale 
restrictions to maintain ongoing 
affordability of homes. 
An organization subsidizes residential 
properties and sells them to lower 
income households at affordable 
purchase prices with resale 
restrictions to maintain the ongoing 
affordability of the property.  
Historical 
Highlights  
 LECs are part of same movement as 
business and agricultural cooperatives 
as well as market-rate housing 
cooperatives. 
 First U.S. cooperative established in 
1876 in New York City  
 National Association of Housing 
Cooperatives formed in 1960. 
 LECs grow significantly during 1950-
60s and 1980-90s due to federal 
programs that predominantly 
converted public housing into coops.  
 Municipal programs and Tenant Right 
to Purchase laws result in LEC 
expansion since 1980s (e.g. 1980 in 
NYC and DC; 2007 in CA). 
 
 Community land trusts (CLTs) 
share roots with conservation land 
trust movement.  
 First CLT established in Albany, 
GA in 1968 to help African-
American farmers retain control of 
land.  
 Institute for Community Economics 
popularizes CLT concept for 
homeownership during 1970-80s. 
 During 1990s, CLTs grow from a 
dozen organizations to over 100.  
 National CLT Network is 
established in 2006. 
 During 2000s, CLTs grow to 
approximately 200 organizations.  
 
 In response to exclusionary 
development of suburbs during 
1950-60s, over 200 state and 
municipalities have enacted some 
form of inclusionary zoning (IZ). 
 Some IZ programs are structured to 
maintain long-term affordability 
(e.g.  Chapel Hill, NC; Montgomery 
County, MD; roughly 170 
jurisdictions in CA, MA, ME, NJ, 
OR, VT)   
 Regardless of whether IZ program 
exists, some local public agencies 
allow deed-restricted covenants 
with lasting affordability to be used 
during administration of federal or 
local funding for affordable housing 
development (e.g. Nashville, TN; 
Pima County, AZ; Clearwater, FL).  
Estimated 
resale-restricted 
units
1 
450,000 units 5,000-9,000 units 200,000-350,000 units 
Typical 
Structure 
Not-for-profit corporation (often has a 
non-profit organization as a sponsor) 
Non-profit organization Program within government agency 
Typical legal 
mechanism to 
preserve 
Shareholder & occupancy agreements Ground lease Deed-restricted covenant 
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1  
Estimated unit counts have been modified from Davis‘ 2006 report, which was based upon ―guesses‖ from informal information gathered overtime 
from practitioners. No reliable or accurate data on SEH unit counts exists.  
2  
From the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board: http://www.uhab.org/about. General cooperative values according to International Cooperative 
Alliance are self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity; for additional principles, see: http://2012.coop/en/what-co-
op/co-operative-identity-values-principles. 
3  
From National Community Land Trust Network website, Application for membership: 
http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=1519 
 
 
 
  
affordability 
Typical 
Governance 
Board of Directors elected by 
shareholders 
Tripartite governance: 1/3 public 
representatives, 1/3 CLT dues-paying 
members from broader community, 
1/3 CLT residents 
Board of Directors as established by 
government agency (may have 
separate advisory committee) 
Typical 
Financing 
Blanket mortgage to corporation 
(sometimes share loans to individuals) 
Residential mortgage to owner  Residential mortgage to owner 
Membership & 
Support 
Organizations 
 
National Association of Housing 
Cooperatives; regional or local 
organizations (e.g. Urban Homesteading 
Assistance Board in NYC, D.C. 
Cooperative Housing Coalition, CA 
Center for Cooperative Development, 
Southeast Association or Housing 
Cooperatives); Cornerstone Partnership 
National Community Land Trust 
Network;  Institute of Community 
Economics; regional or state coalitions 
(e.g. MN CLT Coalition, Northwest 
CLT Coalition); Cornerstone 
Partnership 
No membership organization specific 
to DRH programs; Cornerstone 
Partnership 
Espoused Values 
1. Self-help 
2. Democratic residential control 
3. Shared-equity cooperative ownership 
4. Housing quality 
5. Continuous learning2 
1. Perpetual affordability 
2. Community health, cohesion and 
diversity 
3. Community stewardship of land 
4. Perpetual sustainability 
5. Representative governance 
6. Resident and community 
empowerment 
7. Openness to a variety of 
organizational structures
3
 
None established across DRH 
programs.  
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Limited equity housing cooperatives. LECs are traditionally stand-alone 
corporations that are owned collectively by residents through shareholder agreements. 
Beyond the initial subsidy to make the homes affordable, the corporation typically 
obtains financing through a blanket mortgage. Individual residents may or may not need 
to obtain an individual share loan. Many LECs have a ―sponsor‖ or ―steward,‖ which is a 
government or non-profit organization that assists residents: 1) to establish the 
cooperative and its legal documents, policies, and procedures; 2) to secure development 
financing, permanent financing, and the initial subsidy to make the property affordable; 
and 3) to provide ongoing support and services for successful resident governance and 
property management. Sponsorship—or stewardship— requires significant resources and 
is often challenging to fund. Nevertheless, LECs without a sponsor are more likely to fail 
due to resident conflict or burn-out, mismanagement, or lack of compliance with resale-
restrictions that keeps the property affordable (Sazama, 1996; Andy Reicher, personal 
communication, January 5, 2013).    
LECs often prioritize making monthly housing payments very low in order to be 
affordable for residents (Saegert & Benitez, 2005).  Different from other forms of SEH, 
LECs are often converted from rentals, and consequently, residents of LECs are often 
existing residents and very low income. Therefore, creating wealth among residents is of 
lesser importance than ensuring tenure is sustainable and very affordable. 
The majority of limited equity housing cooperatives (LECs) have been created 
through federal, state, and municipal programs to convert rental properties to LECs 
(Sazama, 1996). The history of (LECs) is founded upon the right for lower income 
households to have control over their tenure and a decent, safe place to live. 
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Consequently, LECs have often been formed to prevent resident displacement from rental 
properties or to improve dwelling conditions of rental buildings that have been 
mismanaged or neglected. Hence, LEC practitioners and inhabitants place an emphasis 
on resident engagement and tenure stability achieved through collective ownership and 
governance. Most LECs are multi-family buildings within historically disenfranchised 
communities, and most are located in large metropolitan areas (e.g. New York City, 
Washington, D.C.) that provide state or municipal support for cooperatives.  
Community land trusts. The traditional CLT model separates title to the 
underlying land from title to the improvements (i.e. the built structures), where land 
ownership is retained for the community‘s interest and ―home‖-ownership allows 
purchase to be affordable for the resident. Hence, the homeowner is given a leasehold 
interest in the land, which is secured by a 99-year renewable ground lease. While the 
CLT must secure public funding to purchase the land and provide any additional subsidy 
necessary to make the property affordable for lower income households, the homebuyer 
must obtain a mortgage loan. Hence, the homeowner purchases the improvements at a 
restricted (or affordable) price and agrees to sell the home at a resale-restricted price to 
enable affordability for future buyers. This unorthodox ―co-ownership‖ structure has 
been embraced more in politically liberal localities. Most homes on CLT land are single-
family, duplexes, and condominiums. Some CLTs have many properties within a 
neighborhood, while others have scattered properties throughout a larger service area.  
The primary goal of CLTs is to own land in trust that serves community members 
who have been marginalized by the market‘s provision of housing and community assets. 
Many CLTs view their mission as providing comprehensive community development for 
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neighborhoods and their lower income residents; hence, some CLTs provide rental units 
or LECs, develop commercial spaces, create community gardens, or conserve land in 
addition to providing owner-occupied properties that remain permanently affordable 
(Rosenberg & Yuen, 2013). CLT‘s outlook on homeownership is to balance the 
community‘s interests (i.e. protecting the public‘s investment in well-maintained 
affordable homes) with the homeowner‘s interest (i.e. affording and sustaining 
homeownership to produce wealth). Balancing community and resident interests is 
reflected in their typical tripartite board governance structure. A tripartite board is 
constituted by one third residents of CLT properties, one third non-resident CLT 
members (dues paying members that live within the CLT service area), and one third 
public representatives (government officials or professionals with relevant expertise). 
Therefore, CLTs practice representative democracy and vary by their levels of resident 
engagement, whereas LECs practice direct democracy and require resident participation. 
In order to meet the interests of the community and the residents, CLTs tend to 
intensively steward both homes and homeowners, or as the 2012 board president of the 
Network said, ―We are the developer that doesn‘t go away.‖ Because CLTs commit to 
stewarding homes in perpetuity, they have a vested interest in rehabbing or constructing 
high-quality durable homes that take into account the surrounding neighborhood. 
Additionally, CLTs manage the resales of properties to ensure the home is sold in good 
condition to an income-eligible buyer at an affordable price. However, they also steward 
homeowners pre-purchase through homebuyer education and financial counseling and 
post-purchase by offering services like home repair assistance, ongoing education, and 
foreclosure prevention counseling.  
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Deed-restricted housing. DRH programs subsidize the cost of a residential 
property, and a low-to-moderate income homebuyer obtains a mortgage loan for the 
affordable purchase price. The homebuyer signs a deed-restricted covenant that stipulates 
the property‘s future resale restrictions. DRH programs tend to serve households at 
higher income ranges than LECs and CLTs. Typically these programs are housed within 
government organizations, such as municipal housing authorities, planning or housing-
related departments. Because they are not autonomous entities, their boards are those of 
the larger organization, minimizing resident roles in governance.   
DRH programs are sometimes established as the recipient of affordable units from 
inclusionary zoning programs, whereby developers are required to give a certain 
percentage of their newly-constructed units to the program or a fee in lieu of units 
(Schwartz, Ecola, Leuschner, & Kofner, 2012). Therefore, DRH programs tend to have 
larger portfolios of resale-restricted homes relative to CLTs. DRH programs that work in 
conjunction with inclusionary zoning requirements do not often have influence over 
where the homes are located or how they are built, as they are donated by the developer. 
Sometimes this may result in DRH units that are not best suited to the needs of low-to-
moderate families (e.g. higher-end designs for singles), while at other times, this may 
result in DRH units that are located in higher income neighborhoods, which may offer 
benefits to these households (e.g. access to better schools and services).  
Inclusionary zoning and DRH programs are more embraced by liberal and urban 
governments. Consequently, DRH tends to be located in urban counties that value 
preservation of their public funding in affordable housing (e.g. Denver, CO; San 
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Francisco, CA; Montgomery County, VA). Similar to CLTs, 1-4 unit residential 
properties or condominiums are the dominant housing types in DRH programs.  
Unlike LECs that focus on the provision of durable tenure through collective 
ownership or CLTs that focus on the provision community and resident assets, DRH 
programs tend to focus strictly on the provision of permanently affordable 
homeownership opportunities for low-to-moderate income households (sometimes they 
describe their units as ―workforce housing‖). These programs tend to emphasize the 
frugal use of public funds for affordable housing. Additionally, DRH programs tend to 
prioritize access to affordable homeownership. However, providing ongoing stewardship 
or support to homeowners in order to increase the likelihood of resident success is not 
typically prioritized. Many DRH programs require some form of pre-purchase education, 
but they typically conduct less post-purchase stewardship than LEC sponsors and CLTs, 
such as monitoring the ongoing quality and affordability of their homes and providing 
assistance to homeowners. The goals or priorities vary significantly by DRH program, as 
these programs do not have standard values that guide their design (see Table 1).  
What It Can Do 
SEH enables wealth-building among lower income and minority households by 
providing access to affordable and sustainable homeownership. One study of seven large 
SEH programs across the U.S. found that these programs were serving households with 
incomes that were between 35-73% of the area median income (Temkin, Theodos, & 
Price, 2010).   While shared equity homeowners agree to restrict the proceeds they 
receive at resale in order to keep the homes affordable, this study also found that shared 
equity homeowners experienced significant individual rates of return on their investments 
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(Temkin, Theodos, & Price, 2010). Furthermore, while Reid (2005) found that less than 
50% of first-time, low-income and minority homebuyers maintain homeownership for 
five years, the study found that 90% of shared equity homeowners sustained 
homeownership for at least five years (Temkin, Theodos, and Price, 2010). Longer 
durations of tenure significantly predict the likelihood that owning a home, particularly a 
low-cost home, will result in wealth-building (Belsky & Duda, 2002; Belsky, Retsinas, & 
Duda, 2005; Goodman, 1998).   
In addition to enabling wealth-building in households, SEH may also contribute to 
community development and stabilization of the housing market. First, SEH may buffer 
the adverse effects of gentrification by maintaining affordable homes as community 
assets, which enables access to owner-occupied tenure by lower income residents (Davis, 
2010).  Second, the rate of foreclosure among shared equity homeowners is well below 
that among homeowners in the conventional market; hence, SEH has been gaining 
attention as a tool that concurrently promotes neighborhood stabilization during market 
busts (Temkin, Theodos, and Price, 2010; Thaden, 2010; 2011). One study using a 
national sample of CLTs found that homeowners in the conventional market were ten 
times more likely to be in foreclosure proceedings than lower income owners of CLT 
homes at the end of 2010 (Thaden, 2011). Therefore, as many lower income 
neighborhoods across the U.S. have experienced problems with residential vacancy and 
abandonment due to the foreclosure crisis and the great recession (Immergluck, 2009), 
shared equity homeowners contribute to residential and neighborhood stability.  
Lastly, SEH has recently been conceptualized as a potential third sector of 
housing that may help to stabilize the economy during hot and cold housing markets. As 
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George McCarthy from the Ford Foundation recently stated, ―Shared equity 
homeownership provides an opportunity for a segment of U.S. housing to be protected 
from changes in the housing market, and that‘s in everyone‘s best interest—not just those 
who live in shared equity ‖ (McCarthy, 2012). However, as DeFilippis (2004) 
acknowledged almost a decade ago, the potential for SEH to impact the political 
economy requires scale. If SEH comprised a notable portion of U.S. housing then rooting 
capital locally through investments in property could limit the ongoing marginalization of 
lower income and minority communities from the ebbs and flows of private market 
capital. 
What It Is Not 
Comprehending what SEH is not is as important as understanding what it is and 
its empirically-supported or theoretically-supported outcomes. First, SEH is not a form of 
down payment assistance (DPA). Traditionally, DPA programs have provided forgivable 
loans or grants with short-term affordability restrictions (5-15 years) to low-to-moderate 
income individuals. In effect, DPA results in a windfall for an individual household; 
however, the public investment‘s in affordable housing is lost after the first buyer sells 
the home. Furthermore, this form of public investment can result in gentrification by 
heating up neighborhood housing markets through the infusion of capital that has 
increased buying power, broadening the market of potential buyers and creating demand 
(Hence, initially demand is a manufactured byproduct of public subsidization that results 
in the production of ongoing demand within the private market). Alternatively, SEH does 
not invest public funds in a household; rather, it invests public dollars in a property.  
Therefore, the public investment is preserved in perpetuity and the affordable homes 
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retain their function as lasting community assets for lower income households regardless 
of neighborhood housing market conditions.  
 Second, SEH is not a first mortgage product. In particular, it should not be 
confused with Shared Appreciation Mortgages (SAMs). A SAM is a financing product 
within the mortgage lending industry that is structured so a homebuyer receives an initial 
amount of capital, which buys down the price of a home to make the monthly mortgage 
payments more affordable. Subsequently, the homebuyer gives the lending institution a 
portion of the property‘s appreciation at resale.  Unlike SEH, SAMs do not keep homes 
permanently affordable, as the appreciation shared with the lender becomes profit.  SAMs 
do not have a solid track record of building wealth for low-to-moderate income 
homebuyers. Unlike SEH, they maintain a relatively negative reputation due to SAMs 
provided by Barclays Bank and the Bank of Scotland in the late 90s in the U.K (Kelly, 
n.d.; Kitchin, 2008). This product targeted pensioners and resulted in adverse outcomes 
for borrowers; consequently, numerous lawsuits against the lenders have been filed (see 
www.safe-online.org for litigation information). 
Notably, lending institutions and U.S. federal recovery programs are exploring 
SAMs as a potential refinancing tool for delinquent homeowners that are at risk of 
foreclosure (Griffith & Eizenga, 2012). SAMs were offered through the Hope for 
Homeowners program passed under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act passed in 
2008; however, the program was perceived generally as failure due the paucity of 
delinquent borrowers served (e.g. Gandel, 2009). Nevertheless, the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 mandated HUD to conduct a study of SAMs for future foreclosure prevention 
(HUD report, forthcoming).  The use of SAMs as an effective recovery tool remains 
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empirically untested.  While confusion has arisen from discourse that has characterized 
SEH as ―sharing equity‖ or ―sharing proceeds from resale,‖ SEH limits the homeowners 
proceeds from resale— not to make a profit for someone else — but to keep the property 
permanently affordable. As reviewed above, SEH also does not forego wealth-building 
for households; rather, it balances individual wealth creation with the preservation of the 
community‘s investment in affordable housing.   
Lastly, SEH is not a tool suited for private sector delivery; rather, it is a mission-
driven device. Simply put, SEH programs do not result in profit. Non-profit and 
government organizations implementing SEH have a challenging time realizing adequate 
returns to support their operating expenses while concurrently protecting affordability of 
residential properties within their portfolios and serving their lower income homeowners. 
Based upon findings from a national survey of CLTs, only 19% of 64 CLTs reported 
covering 70% of their operating expenses from generated revenue in 2010 (Thaden, 
2012).  Furthermore, stewardship of homes and homeowners is a critical component that 
predicts the success of SEH (Thaden, 2010; Thaden & Davis, 2010). As the foreclosure 
crisis has shown, lending institutions do not have the capacity to be responsive or 
responsible ―landlords‖ of real-estate owned properties (REOs) nor to assume effective 
support roles for homeowners.  
 
Inception of the Sector and Current Issues Impeding Development 
As mentioned above, ―shared equity homeownership‖ (SEH) was originally 
conceived of during a meeting in 2006, where the advisory board for John E. Davis‘ 
report helped to name and define the sector (John E. Davis, personal communication, 
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April 10, 2012). The purpose of defining SEH was: (1) to clarify the similarities and 
differences among various long-term affordable housing tools or submodels, making 
them distinct from for-profit SAMs or shared equity mortgages, and (2) to form a sector 
for the submodels under the SEH umbrella.    
The benefits of sector formation are manifold (Notably, these benefits tend to be 
strengths of for-profit companies and organized industries). First, branding and 
communications could become consistent and strategic in order to advance public 
awareness and recruit needed partners. Second, a sector could establish collective 
standards and program certifications, professionalizing the field and ensuring quality 
control of SEH.  Third, sector members could collectively learn and share best practices 
and innovations, advancing positive outcomes of SEH programs. Fourth, developing 
research, resources, education, and training on SEH could make adoption easier for 
organizations and streamline the process of implementation. Fifth, the sector could 
collectively organize, increase its political power through maintaining a uniform and 
larger voice, and strategically advocate for public and private policies that would reduce 
obstacles for SEH development. In total, sector formation would result in advancing the 
scale of SEH.  
However, multiple meetings and formal convenings have taken place to call upon 
stakeholders to identify challenges and solutions for the sector to reach scale. The most 
recent such meeting was held at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank 
with sponsorship from the Ford Foundation, NeighborWorks America, the Federal 
Reserve Bank Board of Governors, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond on June 
22, 2012. There were 60 participants, including executive directors of organizations with 
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large SEH portfolios, leaders from national non-profit affordable housing organizations 
(e.g. NeighborWorks America, the Network, Enterprise, National Housing Institute), 
private mortgage lenders, and government representatives from U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. After 
presentations by myself from the Network, Bret Theodos from the Urban Institute, and 
George McCarthy from the Ford Foundation, participants broke out into working groups. 
The result was a list of recommended goals and activities that will enable the growth of 
the SEH sector (see Appendix A).  
Undoubtedly, many important goals and activities for advancing the sector were 
suggested, and many of the necessary actors to support progress on them attended the 
meeting. As I left the meeting; however, I asked myself, if multiple productive meetings 
like this one have been held—where both the right actors and solutions have been 
identified—then why are these activities not being accomplished? My first answer was 
obvious: No key leader or entity is formally assuming responsibility for progress. Every 
representative in the room answers to individual organizations with missions that 
indirectly relate to the goal of advancing SEH. Nevertheless, a segment of these 
individuals consistently carve out time and resources to support the work about which 
they are passionate. So I asked myself, ―What else is at work?‖  
What came to the fore are the conversations I have had with various leaders inside 
and outside of the sector. With inside leaders, I recalled comments such as, ―Well co-ops 
are a different bird,‖ ―Those CLT people are too puritanical about their model,‖ or 
―Government deed-restricted programs have weaker outcomes.‖ From outside partners, I 
recalled comments such as, ―Isn‘t this the same as shared appreciation mortgages?‖ or 
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―While I get it, it‘s hard to convince my organization that shared equity builds wealth.‖ 
Hence, I realized that while these stakeholders are able to conceptually or theoretically 
agree upon abstract solutions, the key challenge is reaching agreement on the priorities 
and the details for how to implement identified ideas and activities, which are necessary 
to form a sector and advance its scale.  John E. Davis stated in his report: 
A full understanding of shared equity homeownership requires not only an 
appreciation for its major models and forms, but also an ability to see the sector as 
a whole. Especially when it comes to building popular understanding and winning 
public support for these unconventional models of tenure, the differences among 
them often matter less than their similarities. (author‘s emphasis, 2006, p.2) 
I believe that Davis significantly underestimated how these differences seemingly matter 
more than similarities when it comes to enacting the activities required to advance 
sectorial development and growth.  
The maxim, ―putting the cart before the horse‖ appears to explain why these 
actors and their organizations are not adequately organizing themselves and effecting 
progress.  This section reviews what has in large part remained unsaid during meetings or 
convenings on the growth of the SEH sector, namely that critical issues and tensions 
exist, which must be addressed if a sector is to be formed. These issues include: 1) 
fragmentation and differing priorities among practitioners and national organizations 
representing particular forms of SEH, 2) definition-drift for what constitutes SEH or its 
sector, and 3) inconsistency between the Ford Foundation‘s espoused priority for the 
sector to reach scale versus the actual projects that the foundation has recently funded. 
This section explicates these issues in the current landscape of SEH.  
    148 
 
Why Practitioners Are Not Totally “Buying It”  
SEH was developed ―top-down‖ by housing researchers, policymakers, funders, 
and advocates in an attempt to create a sectorial community of practitioners. After Davis‘ 
report was published, the Ford Foundation funded NCB Capital Impact to develop the 
Cornerstone Partnership program, which was devised as a new membership organization 
for the SEH sector in order to organize stakeholders and enable development through the 
provision of training, education, technical assistance, resources, research, and advocacy. 
However, many LEC and CLT practitioners had organically developed and 
participated in national or regional trade organizations for their submodels (see Table 1). 
LECs are often members of state-based associations that address local and state policies 
to enable housing cooperative development and provide pre- and post-development 
technical assistance to LECs. Some of these state associations, sponsoring organizations, 
individual housing cooperatives, and professionals serving cooperatives are members of 
the National Association of Housing Cooperatives (NAHC), which was founded in 1960. 
However, NAHC serves all forms of housing cooperatives (not strictly LECs or those 
serving lower income households) and has modest capacity. For CLTs, the National 
Community Land Trust Network was founded by a group of CLT practitioners in 2006 to 
establish their national membership organization. The Network also has limited capacity, 
but its membership is highly active and its mission is focused on providing training, 
education, research, technical assistance, and advocacy for CLTs.  
By their very nature and mission, membership organizations prioritize serving 
their members; consequently, their services and political engagement often results in 
submodel-specific resources and advocacy.   Alternatively, DRH programs remain 
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unorganized nationally or regionally, and few programs participate in existing trade or 
membership organizations for other forms of SEH. Accordingly, the Executive Director 
of Cornerstone Partnership reports that fostering membership and engagement has been 
difficult, particularly with LECs and DRH programs (Rick Jacobus, personal 
communication, June 26, 2012). Because existing membership organizations prioritize 
the needs and goals specific to their submodel of SEH, they do not have a history of 
coordination or collaboration to advance the overarching model. 
As previously reviewed, each submodel maintains unique histories, varying 
values, organizational and legal differences, and nuanced goals, and consequently, each 
maintains different limitations, strengths, and challenges.  It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to comprehensively review these differences. However, I will briefly review the 
impressions of each submodel within the community development field to illustrate why 
practitioners within each submodel seemingly do not perceive that they are a part of a 
cohesive SEH sector.   
First, LECs are considered unique and empowering due to their model for resident 
governance and their efficacy serving very low income households. However, the history 
of LEC development also results in the perception that LECs predominantly work in 
cities with hot housing markets for the prevention of resident displacement. Furthermore, 
LECs are known to require enabling legislation and significant infusions of federal, state, 
and municipal funding for their establishment and ongoing success (including non-profit 
sponsorship), which has not been consistently available over time or in the vast majority 
of states and municipalities.   
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Lastly, LECs are perceived as complex, high risk, and high maintenance projects. 
The financing and funding for development is multi-layered and multi-unit based, 
requiring advanced development skills from the sponsor. Additionally, LECs are deemed 
high risk. For instance, a recent investigation of 134 LECs in Washington, D.C., which 
were established since the passage of the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act in the early 
1980s, found that 36% were no longer in existence as of 2012 (Huron, 2012), and roughly 
10-15% of the LECs established in New York City have not survived over time, which is 
a locality with more support for LEC development and sponsorship than all other places 
(Any Reicher, personal communication, January 5, 2013). Lastly, ample resources and 
intensive staffing are required to ensure effective resident governance for the perpetual 
life of these properties. Consequently, the LEC submodel tends to be considered 
significantly different from CLTs and DRH programs, and the feasibility of replicating 
this submodel in diverse localities is questioned. 
CLTs are often equated with strong performance in terms of delivering perpetual 
affordability and positive resident outcomes, which is attributed to their commitment to 
best practices and comprehensive stewardship. Nationally, CLTs are the most organized 
of the SEH submodels due to the grassroots establishment of the Network; however, the 
total number of resale-restricted homes provided by CLTs is incredibly small relative to 
LECs or DRH programs (see Table 1). Hence, CLTs are also perceived as lacking 
capacity to reach scale, as CLTs tend to be small non-profit organizations that have not 
received formal or prevailing government support. Because the majority of high capacity 
CLTs with large portfolios exist in the northwest or northeast, their ability to succeed in 
non-white, non-liberal localities has been questioned.  
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As a result, some practitioners question whether CLTs are overly principled about 
their submodel and unwilling to compromise on some best practices for the sake of 
expansion to other localities and the growth in the number of homes they provide.  For 
instance, the model ground lease provided by the Network endorses that CLTs retain 
ownership of the land if a home forecloses, which has resulted in serious problems for 
recruiting first mortgage lenders (and homes cannot be developed and sold without access 
to first mortgages for homebuyers). Another example is that some states do not allow for 
the separation of title for the improvements and the land, which may hinder the 
establishment of CLTs. While some CLTs have adopted work around strategies—rather 
than advocating for state policy changes—this is not condoned as a ―best practice.‖ 
Hence, while CLTs boast impressive performance, the field is critical of whether the CLT 
submodel is willing to support variations in CLT implementation for the sake of 
expansion.  
DRH programs have been highly effective at expanding the stock of shared equity 
homes across the United States. Undoubtedly, this submodel is the most transferable to 
various localities, and the submodel is recognized for its ability to rapidly grow. In large 
part, this is explained by the use of deed-restricted covenants as the legal mechanism for 
these programs, as deed restrictions are commonplace and more accepted by developers 
and lenders than shareholder agreements used in LECs or ground leases used by CLTs 
(Ambromowitz & White, 2010).  
However, DRH programs tend to be perceived as the inferior form of SEH that is 
provided by the government. Due to a lack of participation in SEH-support organizations, 
government agencies tend to ―reinvent the wheel‖ when they develop DRH programs. 
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Consequently, their programs are vulnerable to the consequences of poor design, which 
may result in weak or variable outcomes for retaining permanent affordability or 
preventing foreclosures (Rick Jacobus, personal communication, January 18, 2013). 
Furthermore, the organizational cultures, priorities, and capacities of these government 
agencies rarely support the implementation of comprehensive stewardship activities, 
which adversely impacts program performance.  The DRH submodel is also considered 
to be less legally durable than LEC or CLT submodels, as the term of deed-restricted 
covenants cannot extend beyond thirty years in some states due to laws against 
perpetuities. Different from LECs and CLTs, DRH programs are not perceived as 
addressing broader considerations of community development.   
However, DRH and CLT submodels are very similar in terms of their design as 
well as the challenges they face. For instance, both submodels struggle with accessing 
first mortgages for their homebuyers, raising funds for stewardship activities, and 
securing equitable property taxation policies for their homeowners. Nevertheless, 
government staff of DRH programs and non-profit staff of CLTs do not interpret their 
missions, programs, day-to-day operations, or ongoing challenges as similar.  
In effect, practitioners within each camp of the SEH submodels do not perceive 
adequate common cause with practitioners of other submodels to result in banding 
together as one sector. Rather, the actors within each submodel prioritize addressing the 
needs and priorities specific to their submodel without considering the overarching needs 
or priorities of the sector as whole. After all, practitioners within each submodel have 
typically decided upon their specific form of SEH because of deficits or challenges they 
perceive in other submodels. Generally, LECs are perceived as context-contingent and 
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too intensive to implement; CLTs are perceived as lacking capacity for scale while being 
overly principled; DRH programs are perceived as bureaucratic and less likely to deliver 
positive outcomes.  Ultimately, practitioners rarely (if ever) will articulate that they are a 
part of a sector, placing the name of ―shared equity homeownership‖ before the name of 
their particular submodel to explain what they do. Currently, practitioners and 
membership organizations do not have the buy-in necessary to invest in sector formation 
or to collectively plan and act for SEH expansion.  
Why Conceivers Seem Uncommitted To It 
After the term ―shared equity homeownership‖ was conceived of by an advisory 
board for Davis‘ report (2006), the conceivers of SEH did not appear to commit to the 
term or its definition. After funding Davis‘ report, the Ford Foundation funded NCB 
Capital Impact to oversee the development of a new national program, Cornerstone 
Partnership, which aimed to organize and grow SEH programs into an established sector. 
NCB Capital Impact hired a firm to conduct marketing and communications research, 
which ultimately resulted in throwing out ―shared equity homeownership‖ for a more 
well-received and marketable term, ―homeownership with long-term affordability‖ (Jim 
Gray, personal communication, June 22, 2012; Rick Jacobus, personal communications 
June 26, 2012). Consequently, Cornerstone Partnership does not define their audience or 
goals by SEH; rather, they have more broadly adopted the goal of providing ―a peer 
network for homeownership programs that preserve lasting affordability and community 
stability [author‘s emphasis]‖ (www.affordableownership.org).  
Unfortunately, the rationale and messaging research on ―long-term affordability‖ 
or ―lasting affordability‖ was inadequately disseminated to practitioners, membership 
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organizations, and advocates, and therefore, was not generally assimilated. Consequently, 
information published by institutions supporting affordable housing and community 
development has continued to use ―shared equity homeownership.‖ Some practitioners 
and potential partners read the omission of SEH from Cornerstone Partnership‘s mission 
and materials as a signal that it was endorsing an alternative definition (perhaps one that 
was settling for longer-term affordability rather than permanent affordability).  
Adding to the confusion over the term, the definitional and conceptual boundaries 
of SEH, as delineated by Davis‘ report (2006), were clouded in a 2009 report by Sherriff 
and Lubell titled, What’s in a Name? Clarifying the different forms and policy objectives 
of ―shared equity‖ and ―shared appreciation‖ homeownership programs.  Lubell is the 
Executive Director of the Center for Housing Policy and served on the advisory board for 
Davis‘ report. However, Lubell and Sherriff‘s report reframed and—at least in part—
collapsed ―SEH‖ with tools across the public-private sectors that included financing 
products and ―hybrid‖ models, both of which extended beyond the original parameters of 
SEH.  
The Ford Foundation‘s Metropolitan Opportunity Initiative (Ford‘s MOI) is the 
dominant funder and advocate for SEH sector development and reaching scale, but 
Ford‘s MOI has funded numerous projects that are outside the original scope of SEH. For 
instance, Ford‘s MOI has invested millions in ROC-USA, which helps residents of 
mobile home parks collectively purchase the land where their homes reside (see Table 2). 
The goals and outcomes of resident-owned communities (ROCs) align well with SEH, 
but they fail to abide by critical components that define SEH according to Davis (2006). 
Manufactured housing provides the majority of affordable housing in the U.S., even 
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though it is within the private market. Creating ROCs protects residents from 
displacement and promotes residential security and affordability through taking control of 
land collectively, which limits the escalation of ground lease fees for residents in the 
future. While ROC-USA requires ROCs to serve low-to-moderate income households, 
they do not require resale restrictions. Hence, ROCs cannot limit future market impacts 
on the values of manufactured homes. Consequently, ongoing and permanent 
affordability in the future cannot be guaranteed, which is critical to SEH. Notably, even 
Davis went on to characterize the ROC-USA model as a ―shade of gray‖ in the SEH 
family (Davis, 2012). 
Furthermore, the Ford Foundation has funded the Center for American Progress to 
identify innovative financial tools to address the foreclosure crisis. This support has 
contributed to the development of a proposal for the adoption of SAMs by the mortgage 
lending industry as a strategy to prevent foreclosures for delinquent homeowners (e.g. 
Griffith & Eizenga, 2012).  As stated previously, SAMs were explicitly and intentionally 
left out of the definition of SEH, as they are designed to create profit for lenders or, in 
this instance, they are designed to minimize losses for the industry most responsible for 
the foreclosure crises at the cost of delinquent homeowners. Furthermore, SAMs do not 
create permanently affordable homes.   
I am not meaning to imply that variations on the theme are inherently less 
worthwhile or impactful than the submodels delineated within the original scope of SEH. 
Nor do I mean to imply that these ―shades of gray‖ warrant funding less than SEH 
projects.  In fact, some of these models could have immediacy and transferability that 
may eclipse the scalability of traditional SEH submodels, and some of these models may 
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help many lower income households.  However, it difficult to build a cohesive model or 
an organized sector when ―foundation-al‖ leadership seems uncommitted to the SEH 
model and is not offering up clear principles to guide the sector‘s future development. 
Ultimately, the conceivers of SEH—who frequently represent and advocate for 
SEH in national conversations—are not entirely committed to the name or its definition. 
Consensus does not exist for what the sector or the model is, what it does or should do, 
and who it represents. Unsurprisingly, the lack of a clear definition and naming for both 
the model and the sector results in confusion among practitioners, national organizations, 
and needed partners.  
Why the Funder Seems Not Strategic About It 
The Ford Foundation is the single largest private financial supporter of SEH, and 
the foundation has provided critical leadership for SEH. For instance, Ford is the 
dominant funder of Cornerstone Partnership and the National Community Land Trust 
Network, and it has provided funding for local development of SEH programs. The 
progress made to date in SEH would not have taken place without Ford‘s leadership and 
resources, as it is the dominant supporter of incubation, innovation, and development in 
the sector.  
George McCarthy, Director of Ford‘s Metropolitan Opportunity Initiative (MOI), 
has repeatedly communicated that a key priority of this initiative is to enable SEH to 
reach scale (personal communication June 22, 2012). Many of the activities that hold 
promise for catalyzing the development of a sector and its scale have been documented 
during meetings and convenings where a Ford representative was among the presenters or 
participants. In particular, McCarthy has expressed that the SEH sector will require 
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development of leadership, partnerships, resources, and impact measures (McCarthy, 
2012). However, recent grant activity communicates a different message. Table 2 reviews 
grants provided by the Ford Foundation to shared equity organizations and related 
initiatives in the past three years (smaller amounts of discretionary funding for SEH-
related projects are not presented). Grants issued under the MOI do not illustrate a clear 
strategy for efficient sectorial development and growth.   
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Table 2. 2010-2012 Ford Foundation grants that directly or indirectly relate to shared equity homeownership. 
 
Grantee Amount Year Issue Initiative 
Primary 
Approach 
Secondary 
Approach 
Description 
National organizations that focus on the expansion of shared equity homeownership or shared-equity-like models. 
NCB 
Capital 
Impact 
$1,500,000 2012 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Promoting 
Metropolitan 
Land-Use 
Innovation 
Program 
Demonstration 
and Scaling 
Research and 
Public Policy 
Analysis 
Core support for the Cornerstone Partnership 
to build the capacity of organizations 
developing shared equity housing and promote 
long-term affordability policies 
NCB 
Capital 
Impact 
$1,100,000 2011 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Stakeholder 
Development 
and 
Collaboration 
Program 
Demonstration 
and Scaling 
For the Cornerstone Partnership to provide a 
peer network for housing practitioners who 
are implementing or developing long-term 
affordability programs and to promote long-
term affordability policies 
NCB 
Capital 
Impact 
$1,200,000 2010 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Stakeholder 
Development 
and 
Collaboration 
Advocacy, 
Litigation and 
Reform 
To develop a replicable shared equity and 
second mortgage land trust model and 
collaborate with its Shared Equity Coalition 
partners to grow the shared equity 
homeownership sector nationwide 
National 
Community 
Land Trust 
Network 
$400,000 2012 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Promoting 
Metropolitan 
Land-Use 
Innovation 
Capacity 
Building and 
Technical 
Assistance  
 General support to provide training, advocacy 
and resources for its members, which sustain 
healthy and economically diverse 
communities by providing permanently 
affordable access to land and homes 
National 
Community 
Land Trust 
Network 
$650,000 2010 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Promoting 
Metropolitan 
Land-Use 
Innovation 
Advocacy, 
Litigation and 
Reform 
Research and 
Public Policy 
Analysis 
To create a technical assistance program for 
national community land trusts and develop 
pilot technical assistance delivery programs, 
with a particular focus on metropolitan 
communities 
ROC USA 
LLC 
$900,000 2012 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Program 
Demonstration 
and Scaling 
 General support to make resident ownership 
of manufactured home communities viable 
and successful nationwide 
ROC USA 
LLC 
$500,000 2011 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Program 
Demonstration 
and Scaling 
 General support to make quality resident-
ownership of manufactured home 
communities viable nationwide 
ROC USA 
LLC 
$1,000,000 2010 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Program 
Demonstration 
and Scaling 
 Net asset grant to finance the conversion of 
manufactured housing communities to 
resident ownership and leverage capital 
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National organizations that conduct some work relating to shared equity homeownership. 
National 
Housing 
Institute 
$300,000 2012 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Research and 
Public Policy 
Analysis 
 General support to foster decent, affordable 
housing and a vibrant community for 
everyone 
National 
Housing 
Institute 
$250,000 2010 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Capacity 
Building and 
Technical 
Assistance 
Research and 
Public Policy 
Analysis 
 General support to foster decent, affordable 
housing and a vibrant community for 
everyone 
Center for 
Housing 
Policy 
$375,000 2012 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Research and 
Public Policy 
Analysis 
 For research on inclusionary zoning & the 
intersection of housing & transportation & to 
educate stakeholders about the new 
affirmatively furthering fair housing rule & 
develop a communications toolkit 
Center for 
Housing 
Policy 
$750,000 2010 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Advocacy, 
Litigation and 
Reform 
Research and 
Public Policy 
Analysis 
For Exposure-Response.org, its online guide 
to preventing foreclosures & stabilizing 
neighborhoods, and for policy development, 
outreach and advocacy on housing, 
transportation and workforce policy 
Center for 
American 
Progress 
$500,000 2012 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Advocacy, 
Litigation and 
Reform 
 Core support for the Housing Finance 
Program to develop innovative housing 
finance and policy initiatives in response to 
the housing crisis 
Center for 
American 
Progress 
$650,000 2010 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
Quality 
Housing 
Capacity 
Building and 
Technical 
Assistance 
Research and 
Public Policy 
Analysis 
Core support for the Housing Finance 
Program to expand the voices shaping the 
policy debate on housing finance 
Media projects that relate to shared equity homeownership. 
Active 
Voice 
$400,000 2011 Freedom of 
Expression 
JustFilms Media/Conten
t Development 
 To conduct public engagement campaigns for 
foundation-funded documentaries and assist 
with the start-up phase of the National Center 
for Education Organizing, including its new 
film, Parent Power 
Vital 
Pictures 
$310,000 2011 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Promoting 
Metropolitan 
Land-Use 
Innovation 
Stakeholder 
Development 
and 
Collaboration 
 To complete ―Gaining Ground,‖ a 
documentary using Boston's Dudley Street 
Neighborhood Initiative to demonstrate the 
impact of land trusts as community-building 
tools in low-income communities 
Local organizations that indirectly support or directly provide shared equity homeownership. 
The Greater 
New 
Orleans 
$1,550,000 2012 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Promoting 
Metropolitan 
Land-Use 
Capacity 
Building and 
Technical 
Advocacy, 
Litigation and 
Reform 
For the Metropolitan Opportunities Program‘s 
grant making to expand access to quality 
housing, promote innovative land use and 
    160 
 
Foundation Innovation Assistance better connect people to existing and emerging 
economic opportunities 
The Greater 
New 
Orleans 
Foundation 
$1,500,000 2011 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
High Quality 
Housing 
Stakeholder 
Development 
and 
Collaboration 
Research and 
Public Policy 
Analysis 
For the Metropolitan Opportunities Program‘s 
grant making to expand access to quality 
housing, promote innovative land use and 
better connect people to existing and emerging 
economic opportunities 
The Greater 
New 
Orleans 
Foundation 
$1,350,000 2010 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Expanding 
Access to 
High Quality 
Housing 
Stakeholder 
Development 
and 
Collaboration 
 For grant making by its Community 
Revitalization Fund and Metropolitan 
Innovations programs to promote inclusive 
regional housing, transit & community 
revitalization in the greater New Orleans 
region 
Lower 
9thWard 
NENA 
$150,000 2011 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Promoting 
Metropolitan 
Land-Use 
Innovation 
Program 
Demonstration 
and Scaling 
 Net asset grant to accompany a program-
related investment establishing a working 
capital fund for a community land trust to 
build affordable housing in the Lower 9th 
Ward 
Dudley 
Street 
Neighborho
od Initiative 
$225,000 2012 Metropolitan 
Opportunity 
Promoting 
Metropolitan 
Land-Use 
Innovation 
 Capacity 
Building and 
Technical 
Assistance 
 To develop a national community land trust 
and community-building curriculum and 
engage diverse Boston stakeholders in a 
regional community land trust capacity-
building effort 
 From the Ford Foundation Grant Database: http://www.fordfoundation.org/grants/search retrieved on September 17th, 2012.  
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First, Ford‘s MOI funded NCB Capital Impact in 2010, ―to develop a replicable 
shared equity and second mortgage land trust model and collaborate with its Shared 
Equity Coalition partners to grow the shared equity homeownership sector nationwide‖ 
(see Table 2). While this project description directly aligns with the priority for sectorial 
development and scale (and resulted in the establishment of Cornerstone Partnership), in 
2011 and 2012 Ford‘s MOI funded NCB Capital Impact and Cornerstone Partnership not 
to continue sector formation and expansion, but instead, to conduct capacity building, 
education, and some policy activities that enable long-term affordability (see Table 2). 
Cornerstone Partnership‘s shift away from sectorial development to capacity building of 
SEH organizations has resulted in the loss of leadership and resources for the 
development of the sector. Hence, before the SEH sector was organized and established, 
the entity created to lead the sector changed its focus and shifted its core activities 
accordingly (i.e. mission drift). And Ford‘s MOI staff funded this shift despite espousing 
their primary goal as scaling up SEH and articulating the need for leadership 
development.  
Additionally, Ford‘s MOI has funded the Network to provide training and 
technical assistance, but the Network‘s technical assistance program has provided a 
relatively small number of organizations with minor support for activities that do not 
necessarily align with the goal of SEH expansion. As reviewed above, Ford‘s MOI is also 
investing in projects that deviate from the originally conceived of parameters for SEH, 
such as ROC-USA and SAM solutions for foreclosure prevention. In addition to funding 
SEH-like initiatives, or the ―shades of gray,‖ Ford‘s MOI is providing significant support 
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to non-profit organizations that indirectly support or directly provide SEH (see Table 2). 
For instance, it funds a local foundation in New Orleans that is providing some support 
for the development of a city-wide CLT. It also funded a non-profit serving a 
neighborhood devastated by Hurricane Katrina, but the organization has a weak track 
record of CLT development and implementation. More recently, Ford‘s MOI is 
supporting a neighborhood organization in Boston that has a CLT to develop ―a national 
community land trust and community-building curriculum,‖ an odd funding choice 
considering that they provide resources to other national training organizations with 
better capacity for curriculum development. Lastly, Ford has also funded a documentary 
on community organizing conducted by the Boston organization, and it funds the 
National Housing Institute, which provides a key publication for disseminating 
information on SEH. 
I am not insinuating that any individual organization or their funded projects have 
failed to make important contributions to SEH or to those they serve. When considered 
together, however, the projects receiving recent Ford Foundation grants are questionable 
selections if the priority is to advance scale. And when Ford-funded projects are 
compared to the activities identified for scaling the sector (see Appendix A), it is difficult 
to decipher any coherent strategy driving Ford‘s investment in SEH. In totality, these 
investments appear to lack a strategic plan that would most effectively and efficiently 
achieve the goal of sectorial development and scale.   
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Potential for Injury 
 The last section reviewed issues in the current landscape of SEH, including lack 
of buy-in from practitioners, definition drift among SEH conceivers, and poor strategic 
investment by the dominant funder.   The next section will put forth recommendations 
and considerations for ways to address these problems. But first, this section will 
highlight why resolving existing issues and advancing a coherent sector is both urgent 
and critical.  Ultimately, the lack of a communication strategy, clear name, and coherent 
definition for SEH may injure lower income and minority households who could benefit 
from this form of tenure. Additionally, poor sector formation may hinder building needed 
political support for SEH.   
Putting Beneficiaries at Risk  
The lack of concrete boundaries for defining SEH leaves the sector vulnerable for 
misappropriation of its name or concept by the private sector. This places lower income 
and minority households at risk of entering into unsound financial schemes, which runs 
counter to the very mission and goals of SEH programs. Ironically, this was one of the 
motivating factors that led to the production of Davis‘ report in 2006.  
Nevertheless, the ensuing ambiguity of SEH is being capitalized upon by the 
private sector to market financial products or related services that draw upon the 
reputation of SEH models and non-profits providing SEH. For instance, LendingTree, an 
online for-profit lender exchange, offers ―a new type of shared-equity mortgage (SEM)‖ 
(also searchable with ―shared equity‖), which defines SEMs as a co-investor product that 
makes home purchase more affordable and profitable for investors (LendingTree, 2007). 
    164 
 
While the financial product is touted as a ―new type‖ of product called a ―shared equity 
mortgage,‖ it is structured plainly as a shared appreciation mortgage (SAM). Another 
example from the U.K (which has a growing community land trust movement) is a for-
profit company called Share to Buy, which provides ―shared equity loans,‖ ―shared 
ownership properties,‖ and ―shared ownership mortgages.‖ Some of these products are 
making a profit on a government-subsidized SAM program (see www.sharetobuy.com), 
and none of these products produce permanently affordable properties in spite of 
assimilating discourse that is used by practitioners and advocates for SEH.  
Ultimately, for-profit appropriation of ―shared equity‖ makes the very households 
that could benefit from SEH at risk of entering into yet another iteration of an exotic loan 
product, which may result in adverse financial outcomes for households and will not 
result in the production of a permanently affordable housing stock. Similar to the mistrust 
and wariness that has emerged amongst potential homebuyers after the foreclosure crisis 
(Saegert, Fields, and Libman, 2009), confusion between ―bad‖ and ―good‖ shared equity 
tools could significantly injure the marketability and growth of the SEH sector. 
Consequently, the SEH sector may come to find that the growth of similarly named 
products marketed by for-profit companies results in significant barriers for recruiting 
potential homebuyers and expanding their scale.  
Beyond potential injury to sectorial formation and growth, I would posit there is a 
moral imperative for actors within SEH to advance scale. It may continue to be business-
as-usual for practitioners, advocates, partners, and policy makers if major advances in 
sectorial growth do not occur. However, during a time when lower income and minority 
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households have experienced significant wealth-stripping from the foreclosure crisis and 
a new wave of exclusion from homeownership opportunities due to the credit crunch, 
these households lose the most from slow and inefficient growth of SEH.    
Still further, all U.S. citizens—across all incomes—continue to be negatively 
affected by the inefficient use of tax payer dollars on affordable housing, especially in the 
face of a mounting U.S. deficit. SEH actors have a solution that frugally uses public 
funding for perpetual affordable homeownership opportunities while concurrently 
providing opportunities for wealth-building and residential stability for lower income and 
minority households. Consequently, forming a sector and aggressively advancing its 
growth is not simply helpful, but arguably, necessary in the current housing market and 
economic crisis.  
Not Gaining (and Potentially Losing) Needed Supporters 
In light of the incoherence illustrated by practitioners, national leaders, and 
funders to name and define the sector, the confusion among instrumental national actors 
who can enable growth of SEH is unsurprising. These actors represent public institutions 
that could facilitate public policies to support SEH as well as private institutions that 
could increase access to capital. However, poor organization across the sector is 
contributing to confusion, hindering support, and consequently, not resulting in much 
progress. Arguably, there is opportunity in the aftermath of the housing market crisis and 
in the midst of the national debt crisis to gain political support for a safer tenure solution 
that frugally uses public dollars for the provision of permanently affordable housing.  
    166 
 
At best, SEH actors are not being opportunistic by capitalizing upon the current 
climate, and at the very worst, they are potentially harming relationships and partnerships 
by not cohesively and strategically acting as a sector.  The political advocacy efforts of 
SEH leaders and practitioners are not making adequate progress on regulatory changes to 
federal public policies that would decrease barriers for SEH. While Cornerstone 
Partnership and the Network have at times joined forces to submit requests to HUD, 
meetings and discussions with HUD officials show that confusion abounds over unclear 
terminology used for SEH, its submodels, or SEH-like models. 
The following example illustrates that needed supporters are unclear about the 
model they are being asked to support. HUD‘s Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
staff convened a meeting of SEH practitioners, state housing finance agency staff, and 
private lenders, to discuss the challenges of providing FHA-insured mortgages to buyers 
of homes with ―deed-restrictions‖ in May of 2012 (FHA, 2012).  A deed-restricted 
covenant is a broad legal tool, which is most frequently used by HUD-funded affordable 
housing developments to set short-term affordability restrictions (rather than lasting 
affordability restrictions used in SEH).  Regardless of misnaming the meeting, it was 
called to address policy recommendations for SEH programs based upon a memorandum 
to FHA from Cornerstone Partnership and the Network. While this instance of 
terminological confusion was relatively inconsequential, other instances show that the 
lack of clarity on SEH is limiting opportunities to build political will and result in needed 
regulatory changes.   
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For instance, in 2011, Raphael Bostic, HUD‘s Assistant Secretary for Policy 
Development and Research, confused a meeting with SEH advocates from the National 
Housing Institute and the Network as a meeting about SAMs. Notably, the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010 mandated that HUD explore the utility of SAMs, ―to determine prudent 
statutory and regulatory requirements sufficient to provide for the widespread use of 
shared appreciation mortgages to strengthen local housing markets, provide new 
opportunities for affordable homeownership, and enable homeowners at risk of 
foreclosure to refinance or modify their mortgages‖ (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). After 
meeting the primary author for HUD‘s report on SAMs (HUD report, forthcoming) and 
other HUD staff at a convening on SEH in June of 2012, it became increasingly unclear 
to me whether the differences and goals of SAMs and SEH were fully grasped throughout 
the institution. Based solely upon extrapolation, it seemed that government 
representatives had conflated the two models, and it is possible that they attributed 
positive results documented within SEH as a rationale for further examining SAMs.  
Confusion over the differences between these two models is not limited to HUD, 
as representatives from the Federal Reserve System and the mortgage industry have also 
asked me on numerous occasions to clarify the difference between these models and why 
SEH non-profits could not ―just use SAMs.‖ The lack a unified sector, a cohesive 
strategic message, and effective policy agenda is creating confusion and stifling the 
ability to garner support from needed partners.  After all, if needed supporters do not 
understand the unique benefits of SEH— namely its strong delivery of successful 
homeownership for lower income households as well as asset preservation of 
    168 
 
permanently affordable homes for communities—their reticence to support a relatively 
complex and burgeoning model is understandable.  If the sector does not embrace current 
opportunities and aggressively (and coherently) advocate for their model, needed political 
support to expand SEH is unlikely to materialize.  
.    
Recommendations for Advancing Sector Development 
 In this section, I will put forth some recommendations and considerations for 
making progress on the issues previously reviewed in order to advance the development 
and scale of the sector.  My recommendations are intended to be incomplete, not 
comprehensive, and controversial for the sake of inciting dialogue among the leaders and 
actors of SEH and the field of community development more broadly. I cannot claim that 
the enactment of my proposal will result in expeditious growth of SEH; however, I do 
believe that my recommendations could lay the foundation for the establishment of a 
more efficient and effective sector, which will enable scale in the future.  
I would also not advocate for these recommendations to be unilaterally enacted. 
In fact, my first recommendation is to prioritize convening actors within SEH to critically 
and constructively revisit the definition for the sector and identify strategies for sector 
formation, coordination and growth. I would then recommend that a larger group of 
actors, including practitioners and housing advocates who are outside of the original 
scope of SEH, be brought into the planning process.  
The planning process will need to include, but not be limited to: 1) renaming and 
redefining the sector, 2) redesigning the roles and responsibilities of existing 
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organizations in the sector, 3) creating and enacting a practical and highly strategic plan 
that prioritizes sector formation and growth but balances the needs of existing SEH 
programs, and 4) establishing new systems of inter-organizational coordination and 
accountability. As I will explain below, I believe that buy-in can be cultivated among 
practitioners for the new sector and its approach through the implementation of my 
recommendations.  With the aforementioned caveats, my proposal for the future 
organization, coordination, and functions of the sector are presented in Figure 1, and the 
remainder of this section explicates my recommendations. Hopefully, my proposal will 
act as a starting point for future dialogue and planning.  
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Figure 2. A proposal for the organization and functions of the sector. 
    171 
 
Rename and Redefine the Sector  
 I recommend that the name and definition for the sector is reconstructed. The 
original name, ―shared equity homeownership,‖ has proven to be confusing due to its 
likeness to for-profit financial products, such as SAMs and ―shared equity mortgages.‖ I 
believe that a less abstruse and more general name should be adopted, such as 
―permanently affordable homeownership‖ or ―homeownership with lasting affordability.‖ 
The marketing research that was commissioned by NCB Capital Impact should be used 
as the foundation to collectively agree upon a name for the sector and model. Hereinafter, 
I use the term ―permanently affordable homeownership‖ (PAH) to refer to the sector and 
model for the sake of clarity.    
The original conceptualization of SEH defined the model by the inclusion and 
exclusion of particular submodels. However, new submodels, hybrids, and ―shades of 
gray‖ have been developed (e.g. ROCs, shared equity second mortgage products, LEC-
CLT hybrids), and other submodels will inevitably emerge. Consequently, I propose that 
a sector is based upon required elements for PAH rather than required submodels. While 
stakeholders must deliberate over the components that are deemed critical to inclusion 
within the sector, I put forth the following proposal for the required elements of PAH 
programs: 1) The PAH program is not a for-profit venture; 2) The PAH program aims for 
units to be permanent affordability and legally requires that units are affordable for no 
less than thirty years; 3) PAH units are owner-occupied; 4) PAH units serve low-to-
moderate income households; 5) PAH units provide opportunities for wealth-building; 5) 
PAH programs meet minimum programmatic requirements for stewardship (requirements 
will need to be determined by stakeholders).   
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Defining the sector by required elements will hopefully result in support from 
practitioners. The current conceptualization of SEH divides practitioners by their 
submodels. My proposal aims to unify practitioners by focusing on what their PAH 
programs have in common. As alternative submodels have emerged, some practitioners 
have vocalized concerns about the SEH model being compromised. Hopefully, these 
concerns will be allayed by having required elements for inclusion in the PAH sector.  
Redesign Roles and Responsibilities of Existing Organizations in the Sector 
I recommend that organizations acting within the sector reorganize and assume 
new roles and responsibilities. With the express purpose of enabling PAH sector 
formation and scale, the inter-organizational redesign I propose modifies organizational 
functions and formalizes coordination for efficient collaboration. Currently, a strong 
leader that prioritizes strategic sectorial development and growth is missing from the 
PAH landscape, and organizations within the PAH landscape are not effectively 
collaborating or working as one sector.   
A tension exists between meeting the needs of the practitioners within each 
submodel and addressing the needs for scaling up PAH. For instance, funding for 
technical assistance and training could be used to support struggling PAH programs or it 
could be used to support other organizations in the adoption of PAH programs. I propose 
that the sector leader does not have a membership of PAH organizations, but that national 
membership organizations (NMOs)—such as NAHC, the Network, and ROC-USA—
continue to develop memberships of PAH organizations. Consequently, the sector leader 
may prioritize addressing sector development and advancing scale, while NMOs may 
prioritize addressing the needs of existing and new practitioners and their organizations.  
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Cornerstone Partnership is best suited to assume strong, effective sectorial 
leadership; however, it needs to shift the focus of its work, significantly alter its resource 
allocation, and do away with or alter its membership to effectively lead the sector. 
Cornerstone Partnership will require the most resources and growth in capacity to enact 
the four program areas proposed in Figure 1, which are: 1) sector planning, branding, and 
strategic outreach; 2) research and policy engagement, 3) expansion and conversion 
assistance, and 4) a national conference and sector-based resource development.  Some of 
these activities are currently being conducted by NMOs, such as national or regional 
conferences; however, I believe these four program areas must be led by Cornerstone 
Partnership in order for PAH stakeholders to act as one sector. As presented in Figure 1, 
activities under the four program areas should directly support the primary goal of the 
sector leader, which is to prioritize sector development and PAH expansion. While 
NMOs would formally contribute to Cornerstone Partnership‘s program areas, NMOs can 
and should have similar program areas within their individual organizations to meet 
submodel-specific or member-specific needs.   
The NMOs will also need to increase their capacity and expand their membership 
or scope of work to enact my proposal. For instance, a NMO that will effectively serve 
LECs or emerging PAH programs developed from rental or cooperative housing will 
need to be developed. Currently, NAHC does not adequately support LECs, and while the 
Urban Homesteading Assistance Board has the expertise and resources for supporting 
LECs, it would need to become a national organization. Additionally, the Network would 
need to expand its membership and services beyond CLTs to other PAH programs, such 
as deed-restricted housing programs. Additionally, all of the NMOs would need adequate 
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resources to participate in initiatives and activities that would be coordinated with the 
PAH sector leader (see below).   
My proposal aims to delineate clear roles and responsibilities for efficient 
coordination and effective advancement of sector development and scale.   Ultimately, 
the inter-organizational coordination and collaboration I propose aims to build common 
cause among practitioners and national actors, fostering unification as one sector. 
Hopefully, the new organizational structure and functions would alter existing 
perceptions among NMO staff and practitioners that the goals of advancing sector 
development and meeting the needs of NMOs‘ memberships are not in direct 
competition.  
As presented in Figure 1, I am not proposing that national membership 
organizations (NMOs) abort their broader missions or their work that falls outside of the 
scope of PAH expansion. Ideally, NMOs will experience that investing in the 
development of the PAH sector will result in the growth and success of their 
organizations.  I believe that clear roles and responsibilities will assure practitioners that 
an ―and-both‖ approach, rather than an ―either-or‖ approach, is possible. After all, 
practitioners are passionate about their work and want to see expansion of PAH to help 
lower income households and communities across the U.S. And understandably, they also 
want their NMOs to support their organizations‘ work, sustainability, and growth.  
Create a Feasible, High-Impact Strategic Plan  
 With the leadership of Cornerstone Partnership, PAH stakeholders must develop 
and commit to a feasible, high-impact strategic plan for the sector. Even if the Ford 
Foundation or other funders support the PAH sector, the needs and opportunities for 
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growth will undoubtedly outstrip available resources. Unlike previous brainstorming 
sessions on how to advance the sector (see Appendix A for an example), I believe that a 
strategic plan must be rooted within practical resource and capacity constraints. In light 
of limited resources, I propose that a strategic plan prioritizes the four aforementioned 
program areas (which are also presented in Figure 1). Below I highlight the reasoning and 
relevance for some activities in each area.  
 Cornerstone Partnership must spear-head visual branding and messaging for the 
sector, which will need to be consistently applied by NMOs. This will be crucial for 
presenting a larger, cohesive, and professional sector in order to recruit needed supporters 
and future adopters of PAH. Additionally, the sector leader must develop and formalize 
an ongoing strategic planning process for the sector to maintain positive partnerships, 
effective collaborations, and high-impact performance.  
 The sector leader must also lead the development of a policy agenda for sectorial 
advancement.  This is perhaps the single most important priority for the sector leader, and 
I believe that the majority of staff time and resources should be focused on short-term 
and long-term policy agenda activities. Cornerstone Partnership‘s policy agenda should 
be different than—but may overlap with—policy agendas pursued by each NMO. 
Cornerstone Partnership‘s policy agenda should be forward-looking, creating 
opportunities for the expansion of the sector and tackling major barriers that hinder PAH 
development. Cornerstone Partnership should organize working groups for various 
activities on the policy agenda, which should include staff and practitioners from the 
NMOs most affected by the policy agenda item.  
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 Next, Cornerstone Partnership should facilitate the adoption of PAH programs by 
existing organizations and the expansion of PAH portfolios in existing programs. Rather 
than attempting to ―convince and convert‖ organizations to PAH, I recommend that this 
program area initially targets high-capacity organizations interested in adopting PAH 
(e.g. some Habitat for Humanity affiliates, CDCs, or municipalities adopting inclusionary 
zoning policies). Rather than build new PAH organizations, I also recommend that the 
program initially target high-potential expanders that have unique political climates that 
may catalyze growth. For instance, in areas where the government is supporting 
inclusionary zoning or transit-oriented development initiatives, PAH programs could be 
supported to become beneficiaries of affordable housing units.   
Currently, Cornerstone Partnership is expending a significant amount of resources 
on technical assistance and capacity building for PAH organizations. In light of practical 
resource constraints, I propose that it pass these activities to NMOs in the future. NMOs 
in large part have the needed capacity (or can develop it) to support these activities, and 
Cornerstone Partnership should expend the majority of its resources on high-priority, 
forward-looking, ―big picture‖ activities for sector development. 
Lastly, Cornerstone Partnership should spearhead the convening of an annual 
national conference for the sector and the development of sector-based resources. 
Currently, submodel-specific conferences are conducted by NMOs; however, it is critical 
that a sector-based conference fosters ownership and community among practitioners to 
promote buy-in to the sector. Cornerstone Partnership is already developing other needed 
resources in the sector, such as HomeKeeper (which is a workflow data management 
system that will track national performance of the sector) and a PAH program 
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certification (which may enable partnerships with public and private lending institutions). 
I support both of these projects and recommend that more resources go into their 
development and that NMOs promote their adoption by PAH programs.  
While I have put forth some of my ideas for the sector‘s strategic plan, it is crucial 
that an effective planning process is used to develop and adopt a strategic plan for the 
sector. The leadership of Cornerstone Partnership and NMOs will need to expend ample 
resources to implement a planning process that results in buy-in from practitioners, 
strategic partners, and needed supporters. I would urge the Ford Foundation to provide 
the resources necessary to conduct an effective and comprehensive strategic planning 
process.  
Formalize Organizational Collaboration and Accountability  
I recommend that the organizations working in the sector adopt a new formalized 
system of inter-organizational coordination and collaboration with accountability to the 
sector leader. I propose that the Ford Foundation makes funding for NMOs contingent 
upon this coordination and collaboration (see Figure 1). Lastly, I recommend that the 
Ford Foundation increases its funding for the sector leader and NMOs but mandates that 
Ford grants are used for supporting PAH sector formation and growth, as set forth by the 
strategic plan and program agendas led by Cornerstone Partnership.  
The Ford Foundation is a foundation and not a national organizing body 
comprised of practitioners or applied experts. Therefore, Ford is sometimes limited to 
offering guidance and communicating its priorities to organizations working on grant 
proposals. However, the PAH landscape is lacking leadership that helps to ensure 
proposals for PAH projects are working effectively together and catalyzing scale (rather 
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than proposals that focus more narrowly on the separate agendas of each applicant). It 
should be noted that the Ford program officer overseeing many PAH-related projects has 
requested that grant recipients collaborate and coordinate, but ultimately, a foundation is 
not able to provide the regular oversight, management, and staffing to implement 
effective collaboration and ensure performance.   
Consequently, I propose that the Ford Foundation funds Cornerstone Partnership 
to act in this capacity as the sector leader, planner, manager, and monitor.  As presented 
in Figure 1, Cornerstone Partnership would review and approve NMO‘s proposals for 
Ford funding to ensure that their proposals align with the sector‘s strategic plan and work 
plans for the program areas of Cornerstone Partnership. Cornerstone Partnership should 
also have a formal role in reviewing performance of the NMOs under Ford-funded 
proposals to maintain accountability. Perhaps Ford could incentivize performance by 
committing to ongoing funding for high-performing organizations.  
While this proposal is giving a tremendous amount of power to Cornerstone 
Partnership, I do not believe that the Ford Foundation (or any other foundation) has the 
capacity to adequately coordinate multiple organizations and inter-organizational work 
plans or cross-sector performance. One entity needs to be in charge and held responsible 
for the performance and progress of the sector. However, I would also suggest that 
adequate checks and balances are put in the place to ensure that the sector leader is, in 
fact, effectively leading the sector. For instance, NMOs and other stakeholders should be 
involved in strategic planning and annual work planning for Cornerstone Partnership, and 
perhaps an Advisory Board including representatives from NMOs, local PAH programs, 
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and other PAH stakeholders should be involved in reviewing the performance and 
priorities of Cornerstone Partnership.  
 
Conclusion 
 Practitioners, advocates, funders, and partners alike have identified broad targets 
and activities that would result in the expansion of permanently affordable 
homeownership opportunities for lower income households (see Appendix A). What has 
been missing from the national dialogue is acknowledgement and reconciliation of 
critical issues existing in the PAH landscape. First, practitioners do not feel a sense of 
ownership or belonging to a sector. Second, the sector remains ill-developed in name, 
definition, leadership, coordination, and implementation. Third, the primary funder—the 
Ford Foundation— has not strategically invested in sector development and growth to 
enable better outcomes. Hence, this report has made explicit what has—for the most 
part—been ―left unsaid‖ by PAH stakeholders and acknowledges how these existing 
problems may injure the future development of PAH. The comments and critiques I have 
put forth are not meant to be simply an academic exercise, nor are they meant to 
undermine the impressive work conducted by organizations that engage in or support 
PAH. Rather, the sole intention of this report is to make seemingly controversial 
dynamics or issues more approachable for stakeholders by putting them on the proverbial 
table.  
This report has also put forth recommendations to help resolve existing problems 
and advance sector formation. I believe that the recommendations put forth will result in 
increased participation and acceptance of the sector by practitioners and other 
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stakeholders. Additionally, the Ford Foundation should see better outcomes for 
advancing scale in the sector. My recommendations include renaming and redefining the 
sector, redesigning the roles and functions of existing organizations, creating a practical 
and highly strategic plan, and formalizing inter-organizational coordination and 
accountability.  
Stakeholders may evaluate my recommendations as not the best course of action 
or infeasible. That would mean that my objectives were met, as ultimately I hope that this 
report will act as catalyze for further dialogue and critical engagement among 
stakeholders. The feedback and participation of stakeholders is vital to create and 
implement a more effective and coordinated strategic plan for sectorial development.  
If the sector does not take root and implement a productive and aggressive growth 
strategy soon, much is at stake. First, SEH may remain within the margins of the U.S. 
housing market, helping a nominal number of households and modestly affecting select 
communities. Second, lower income households that could benefit from SEH may be left 
vulnerable to exotic loan products similar only in name. Third, the modest but increasing 
attention that has recently been paid to SEH by needed supporters could quickly wane if 
the sector fails to be responsive and proactive. Fourth, the progress, capacity, and 
services of national organizations could dissolve if the Ford Foundation loses their 
interest or faith in the capability for the sector to make significant strides. Ultimately, if 
PAH stakeholders are to forge a more positive trajectory for the future of PAH, then 
stakeholders must change from a grassroots, one-community-at-a-time approach to an 
approach that embraces sector formation and institutionalization of PAH.  I hope that this 
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report may fuel the efforts necessary for PAH to work towards becoming a viable third 
sector of housing. 
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Footnotes 
1 
Deed-restricted covenants are a common legal vehicle to set restrictions on properties, 
which may include restrictions to maintain the affordability of a home. Deed-
restricted covenants are the dominant legal mechanism utilized by inclusionary 
zoning programs and other publicly-funded affordable housing programs to institute 
short-term affordability restrictions on rental and homeownership units. However, 
deed-restricted covenants may be designed and utilized to preserve long-term or 
permanently affordable housing. Programs using deed restrictions in the latter way 
shall be termed ―deed-restricted housing‖ programs or ―DRH programs‖ 
hereinafter. 
2 
Due to my research and employment at the Network, I am frequently invited to 
participate and present at national conferences and meetings about CLTs and SEH. 
Inevitably, the knowledge I have gained from my work at the Network significantly 
informs this report; however, I am assuming the position of an ―outside onlooker‖ 
for evaluation and interpretation set forth in this report, as this report has not been 
funded by or endorsed by the National Community Land Trust Network and solely 
represents the views of the author.  
3 
The reviews of each submodel of shared equity homeownership present generalizations, 
common trends, and the most frequently used structures, policies, and practices for 
each submodel. Undoubtedly, there are many LECs, CLTs, and DRH programs that 
do not fit the descriptions presented in this report.   
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Appendix A. Recommendations for Taking Shared Equity Homeownership to Scale  
 
Below are some activities that were identified to enable shared equity 
homeownership (SEH) to reach scale by presenters and participants of a convening titled, 
―Shared Equity Housing: A Forum on Financing and Capitalization.‖ Activities are not 
listed in any order of priority. The convening was held at the offices of the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors on June 22
nd
, 2012 in Washington, D.C.  Approximately 60 
attendees participated in the convening, including SEH practitioners, the Ford 
Foundation, representatives from public institutions and financial institutions, and leaders 
from national non-profits that support affordable housing. The convening was supported 
by NeighborWorks America, the Ford Foundation, the Federal Reserve Bank Board of 
Governors, and Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Additional notes from the 
convening, which were created by the Federal Reserve Bank, may be retrieved here: 
http://www.richmondfed.org/conferences_and_events/community_development/2012/sha
redequity_20120622.cfm 
 
 Promote public acceptance for a  ―third sector‖ of housing 
 Provide additional resources and benefits to homebuyers that are only offered by the 
SEH sector (e.g. maintenance assistance, bulk utility purchases, discounted insurance, 
mortgage insurance waivers, reduction in transaction costs) 
 Design a national approach for communicating about SEH that is consistent across 
the entire sector (e.g. branding, messaging,  marketing, education)   
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 Standardize all aspects of SEH implementation, especially for partners (e.g. process 
for buyers and sellers, lending procedures and requirements, criteria and process for 
selling loans on secondary market, procedures for appraisals)  
 Standardize education and messaging for potential homebuyers and supporting 
partners (e.g. lenders, developers, funders, realtors, appraisers, and government 
representatives) 
 Create a certification system for SEH programs that ensures specific quality in order 
to increase confidence for partners and streamlines building partnerships  
 Document outcomes of SEH & systematically measure success of sector 
 Convert existing affordable housing to SEH and get affordable housing developers to 
adopt SEH: 
o Convert low-income housing tax credit projects to SEH after affordability 
periods expire 
o Have affordable housing non-profits, especially those with high capacity, 
adopt the SEH model (e.g. Habitat for Humanity affiliates, community 
development corporations, NeighorWorks America members, community 
development financial institutions) 
o Convert mobile home parks to resident-owned communities that preserve 
affordability 
 Change policies and programs of publically-funded affordable housing programs to 
prioritize SEH: 
o Prioritize SEH through low-income housing tax credit project selection 
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o Convert existing inclusionary zoning and short-term deed-restricted programs 
to SEH 
o Prioritize permanent affordability in HUD-funded programs (e.g. HOME, 
CDBG, NSP) 
o Prioritize SEH in the Affordable Housing Programs offered by Federal Home 
Loan Banks 
 Find a way to ensure property taxation of SEH is equitable, affordable, and 
standardized 
 Increase access to first mortgages and the secondary mortgage market: 
o Streamline mortgage lending to SEH and obtain institutional regulations that 
enable lenders to efficiently lend to homebuyers without added burden 
o Gain access to secondary mortgage market and create efficient systems for 
lenders to sell loans on secondary market 
o Change policy regulations to obtain access to FHA-insured mortgage products 
o Gain access to loan products offered by state housing finance agencies  
o Partner with national and local community development financial institutions 
(CDFIs) to provide first mortgages 
o Ensure that qualified residential mortgage regulations enable SEH 
 
 
 
 
